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 By the time today’s Grade K students graduate high school in the Commonwealth of Dominica, 
they will have experienced five major and many low-intensity hurricanes (LIH).  Between 
August and November each year, each hurricane, major or low-intensity, represents a major 
threat to their safety and schooling.  This mixed-method case study investigated how the 
Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (GOCD) addressed education during low-
intensity hurricanes.  I identified and discussed government’s assertions, actions and 
consequences associated with education and LIH.  I reviewed ten official documents to identify 
government’s policies and assertions about education and LIH.  I interviewed nine key senior or 
elite officers in the Ministries of Finance, Public Works and Education responsible for handling 
low-intensity hurricanes to identify their perspectives and actions.  I also interviewed ten school 
principals who experienced Hurricane Dean in 2007 and Hurricane Ophelia in 2011 on their 
experiences and perspectives.  Finally, I inspected ten school buildings to assess the extent to 
which repairs adhered to building codes and standards as mitigation strategy for LIH.  
Theoretically, this study proposed an adaptive developmental approach as an anticipatory 
approach that sustainably incorporates LIH into educational development, planning and 
operations.   Results of this study indicated that government and its agencies adopted a response-
recovery approach based on the perception of disasters as “Acts of God” and insufficient local 
funds to address them.  This resulted in proposed externally-based funding strategies that have 
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not been implemented since announced in 2006.  There appears to be the desire to shift to 
anticipatory mitigation-risk reduction approaches rather than the present response-recovery 
approach.  This would have to be articulated in language that is binding. Institutional and 
administrative frameworks for addressing low-intensity hurricanes and education were described 
as not meeting their mission and objectives.  The result was a set of administrative failures that 
cascaded from the national to the ministerial level and onto schools putting children at risk as 
LIH events unfolded.  Principals were left mostly on their own without the appropriate training, 
support and working communication links to address LIH; unable to safely evacuate students in 
the case of Hurricane Ophelia.  The Ministry of education must become a lead agency in LIH 
management.  The Ministry of Education needs to put in place policies, institutional and 
financial frameworks for managing education during LIH.  This should include LIH professional 
development for teachers, principals and elite officers; development of school disaster plans; the 
conduct of regular disaster drills and exercises at schools, and rescheduling lost instruction days.  
Finally, LIH as chronic events must be incorporated into the plans, budget and operations of the 
Ministry of Education using the adaptive developmental approach.   
Keywords: education in emergencies, mixed-method case study; low-intensity 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................. XVII 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................... XIX 
1.0 CONTEXTUALIZING EDUCATION EMERGENCIES AND STUDY 
PURPOSES ................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 JUSTIFICATION OF THIS STUDY ....................................................... 4 
1.2 STUDY AREA ............................................................................................ 6 
1.2.1 Education in Dominica ............................................................................... 8 
1.2.2 Hurricane frequency in Dominica .......................................................... 10 
1.3 ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION EMERGENCIES ... 11 
1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND RESEARCH 
PROPOSITIONS ...................................................................................... 18 
1.5 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS ............................................................... 19 
2.0 CONCEPTUALIZING EDUCATION EMERGENCIES .................... 21 
2.1 TYPES OF EMERGENCIES - LOUD, SILENT, COMPLEX............ 22 
2.2 IMPACT OF EMERGENCIES ON EDUCATION .............................. 23 
2.2.1 Disruption of access and participation ................................................... 24 
2.2.2 Psychosocial impact .................................................................................. 24 
2.2.3 Impact on academic performance ........................................................... 25 
 vi 
2.2.4 Death of teachers and staff ...................................................................... 26 
2.3 IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION IN SITUATIONS OF 
EMERGENCY .......................................................................................... 26 
2.3.1 Forms of education emergencies ............................................................. 28 
2.3.1.1 Education in emergencies ................................................................... 28 
2.3.1.2 Education-about-emergencies ............................................................ 30 
2.4 APPROACHES TO EDUCATION EMERGENCIES ......................... 33 
2.4.1 Humanitarian-response approaches ....................................................... 34 
2.4.1.1 The Rapid Educational Response Model (RER) .............................. 38 
2.4.1.2 The Acute, Stabilization and Reconstruction Model ....................... 39 
2.4.1.3 Immediate, Sooner and Later (ISL) Matrix ..................................... 39 
2.4.1.4 Circle of Learning Model ................................................................... 40 
2.4.1.5 Cluster Approach ................................................................................ 41 
2.4.2 Developmental approaches ...................................................................... 45 
2.4.3 Developmental approaches and non-government organizations ......... 48 
2.5 HURRICANES AND EDUCATION EMERGENCIES ....................... 50 
2.5.1 Non-priority during hurricanes .............................................................. 50 
2.5.2 Frequency of hurricanes .......................................................................... 51 
2.5.3 The role of national governments ........................................................... 53 
2.5.4 Economic impacts of disasters on developing countries ....................... 54 
2.6 CURRENT FINANCIAL RESPONSES ................................................ 56 
2.6.1 Ex-ante financing ...................................................................................... 58 
2.6.2 Insurance ................................................................................................... 61 
 vii 
2.6.3 International disaster assistance ............................................................. 63 
2.6.4 Emergency Response Loans .................................................................... 67 
2.6.5 Microinsurance ......................................................................................... 68 
2.7 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE ............................................................. 69 
2.8 EMERGENT CONCEPTUAL POLICY FRAMEWORK .................. 71 
3.0 RESEARCH PROCEDURES ................................................................. 74 
3.1 EPISTEMOLOGY AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE .............. 74 
3.2 DATA COLLECTION ............................................................................. 76 
3.3 SINGLE CASE METHODOLOGY ....................................................... 78 
3.3.1 Official documents .................................................................................... 79 
3.3.2 Interviews .................................................................................................. 81 
3.3.3 Inspections ................................................................................................. 87 
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION ......................................... 88 
3.4.1 Official documents .................................................................................... 91 
3.4.2 Interviews .................................................................................................. 92 
3.4.3 Building inspections ................................................................................. 94 
3.5 BIASES AND LIMITATIONS ................................................................ 96 
3.6 INTERPRETATION OF DATA ............................................................. 97 
4.0 FINDINGS .............................................................................................. 103 
4.1 DOCUMENT REVIEWS ...................................................................... 105 
4.1.1 Theme 1: Vulnerability and risk reduction policies ............................ 109 
4.1.2 Theme 2:  Proposed policies for establishing vulnerability and 
contingency funds ................................................................................... 110 
 viii 
4.1.3 Theme 3:  Capacity improvement ......................................................... 117 
4.1.4 Summary of document reviews ............................................................. 123 
4.2 ELITE INTERVIEWS ........................................................................... 123 
4.2.1 Theme 4:  Adverse impacts on education and limited policy responses
 .................................................................................................................. 124 
4.2.2 Theme 5:  External financing of education during low-intensity 
hurricanes ................................................................................................ 129 
4.2.3 Theme 6: Education was deprioritized during emergencies .............. 136 
4.2.4 Summary of Elite interviews ................................................................. 140 
4.3 INTERVIEWS WITH PRINCIPALS .................................................. 141 
4.3.1 Theme 7: LIH had damaging impacts on schools ............................... 143 
4.3.2 Theme 8:  Multiple actors ...................................................................... 145 
4.3.3 Theme 9: Mitigation ............................................................................... 149 
4.3.4 Summary of interviews with principals ................................................ 152 
4.4 INSPECTION OF SCHOOLS .............................................................. 152 
4.4.1 Theme10: Risks and vulnerabilities ...................................................... 153 
4.4.2 Summary of school inspections ............................................................. 161 
5.0 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS .............................................................. 164 
6.0 DOCUMENTED POLICIES ................................................................. 166 
6.1 THEME 1: VULNERABILITY & RISK REDUCTION POLICY ... 167 
6.2 THEME 2: VULNERABILITY AND CONTINGENCY FUNDS..... 169 
6.2.1 Vulnerability funding ............................................................................. 170 
6.2.2 Contingency funding .............................................................................. 170 
 ix 
6.3 THEME 3: LIMITED AND WEAK INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
 .................................................................................................................. 172 
6.3.1 Capacity and disaster management at the national level ................... 172 
6.3.2 Capacity at the MOE level ..................................................................... 173 
6.3.3 Capacity at school level .......................................................................... 175 
7.0 ELITE OFFICERS PERCEPTIONS AND ASSERTIONS ............... 178 
7.1 THEME 4: ADVERSE IMPACTS ON EDUCATION AND LIMITED 
POLICY RESPONSES .......................................................................... 178 
7.1.1 Disruptions .............................................................................................. 178 
7.1.2 Fatalities and trauma ............................................................................. 180 
7.1.3 Poor response policies ............................................................................ 180 
7.2 THEME 5: INADEQUATE FINANCES FOR ADDRESSING 
EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES ..................................................... 181 
7.2.1 Local and diverted funding ................................................................... 182 
7.2.2 Loan funding ........................................................................................... 183 
7.2.3 Grant funding ......................................................................................... 184 
7.3 THEME 6: EDUCATION IS DEPRIORITIZED DURING LOW- 
INTENSITY EMERGENCIES. ............................................................ 185 
7.3.1 Education as priority .............................................................................. 186 
7.3.2 Deprioritizing education ........................................................................ 186 
7.3.3 Ministry of Education and prioritizing education............................... 187 
8.0 PRINCIPALS’ EXPERIENCES ........................................................... 189 
8.1 THEME 7: DAMAGING IMPACTS ON SCHOOLS ........................ 189 
 x 
8.1.1 Damaged school buildings ..................................................................... 189 
8.1.2 Lost teaching and learning materials ................................................... 192 
8.2 THEME 8: MULTIPLE ACTORS ....................................................... 194 
8.2.1 The Ministry of Education ..................................................................... 194 
8.2.2 Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) ............................................ 194 
8.2.3 Parental and community involvement .................................................. 195 
8.2.4 Principals and staff ................................................................................. 197 
8.2.5 Response assessment .............................................................................. 198 
8.3 THEME 9: MITIGATION .................................................................... 200 
8.3.1 Appropriate information and guidelines .............................................. 201 
8.3.2 Operational communication networks ................................................. 202 
8.3.3 Formulation and dissemination of policies and plans ......................... 203 
8.3.4 Do nothing ............................................................................................... 204 
9.0 RESEARCHERS OBSERVATIONS ................................................... 206 
9.1 THEME 10: VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS PERSISTED EX-
POST ........................................................................................................ 207 
9.1.1 Violation of building codes and standards ........................................... 207 
9.1.2 Vulnerable location of schools and facilities ........................................ 209 
9.1.3 Vulnerable storage of school records .................................................... 210 
9.1.4 Loss instruction days .............................................................................. 210 
10.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... 212 
10.1 CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................... 212 
10.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................... 216 
 xi 
APPENDIX A…. ................................................................................................................ 223 
APPENDIX B…. ................................................................................................................ 224 
APPENDIX C…. ................................................................................................................ 225 
APPENDIX D…. ................................................................................................................ 227 
APPENDIX E… ................................................................................................................. 228 
APPENDIX F….................................................................................................................. 231 
APPENDIX G… ................................................................................................................. 233 
BIBLIOGRAPHY….. ............................................................................................................... 234 
 xii 
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Key Hurricane Information on Dominica ....................................................................... 10 
Table 2. International and Regional Conventions and Agreements on Rights to Education ........ 12 
Table 3.  Major Disasters in the Last 40 Years ............................................................................. 55 
Table 4. Funding facilities Available to Developing Countries for Ex-ante Disaster Funding .... 59 
Table 5. Documents Subjected to Preliminary and Detailed Analysis ......................................... 80 
Table 6. List of Elite Officers Interviewed ................................................................................... 82 
Table 7. List of School from which Principals were Interviewed ................................................ 83 
Table 8. Summary of Emergent Themes .................................................................................... 104 
Table 9. Categories of Disaster-related Document Themes ....................................................... 108 
Table 10. Education Expenditure, Dominica, 2006 - 2010 ......................................................... 115 
Table 11. Treatment of Primary School Maintenance Budget Surpluses, Dominica, 2007 - 2011
..................................................................................................................................................... 116 
Table 12. Impacts of LIH on Education Categorized by NVIVO Nodes or Themes ................. 144 
Table 13. Frequency of Respondents' School Affected by Hurricanes Dean and Ophelia, 
Dominica ..................................................................................................................................... 145 
Table 14. Agents who Addressed Hurricane Impacts on Education, Dominica ......................... 146 
Table 15. Summary of Findings.................................................................................................. 162 
 xiii 
Table 16. Summary of Study Conclusions and Recommendations, Dominica .......................... 218 
 xiv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure  1. Map of Dominica as the Study Area and Depicting its Rugged Topography ................ 7 
Figure  2. Classification of Forms of Education Emergencies ..................................................... 28 
Figure  3. Classification of the Main Features of Education in Emergencies............................... 29 
Figure  4. Classification of the Features of Education about Emergencies .................................. 31 
Figure 5. Developmental Approach to Education Emergencies (based on Pigozzi, 1996, 
description only) ........................................................................................................................... 47 
Figure 6. Understanding Education and Chronic LIH .................................................................. 52 
Figure 7. Conceptual Framework (Problem Structuring) for Education and LIH ........................ 72 
Figure 8.  Respondents/Targets and Data Collection Methods used in this Study ....................... 77 
Figure 9. Path of Hurricane Ophelia and its Proximity to Dominica ........................................... 85 
Figure 10. Trajectory of Hurricane Dean and its Proximity to Dominica, 2007 .......................... 86 
Figure 11. School Building Inspection NVIVO Node Classification Window, Dominica .......... 95 
Figure 12. Research Development Process ................................................................................. 100 
Figure 13. Official Documents Clustered by Word Similarity, Dominica ................................. 106 
Figure 14. Disaster-related Policy Themes and Sub-themes Located in Official Documents, 
Dominica ..................................................................................................................................... 108 
Figure 15. National and Ministry of Education Expenditure Gaps, Dominica ........................... 114 
 xv 
Figure 16.  Institutional and Organizational Arrangement for Disaster Management, Dominica
..................................................................................................................................................... 119 
Figure 17. Role of the MOE in School and Educational Institutions Emergency Management, 
Dominica ..................................................................................................................................... 121 
Figure 18. Impacts of LIH on Education, Dominica .................................................................. 125 
Figure 19. Word Tree for "Funding and its Derivatives" in Interview Response of Senior Public 
Officers ....................................................................................................................................... 130 
Figure 20. Priorities and Priority Determinants during LIH, Dominica ..................................... 137 
Figure 21. Principals Interviews Clustered by Word Similarity, Dominica ............................... 142 
Figure 22. Impacts of LIH, Dean and Ophelia on Schools, Dominica ....................................... 144 
Figure 23. Purlin to Roof Hurricane Ties by Roof types in Selected School Buildings, Dominica
..................................................................................................................................................... 155 
Figure 24. Ring-beam to Rafter Hurricane Tie in a School Building ......................................... 156 
Figure 25. Key Roof Vulnerabilities in a School Building, Dominica ....................................... 157 
Figure 26. School Flooring Unattached and Unsecured to Foundation Pillar, Dominica .......... 158 
Figure 27. Close Proximity of School to River, Dominica ......................................................... 159 
Figure 28. School and Library Flooded during Hurricane Ophelia, 2011, Dominica ................ 159 
Figure 29. Location of Records in Inspected Schools, Dominica............................................... 160 
Figure 30. Storage of School Records and their Vulnerability to Hurricanes, Dominica .......... 161 
 xvi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to thank the Almighty for all the gifts He gave for this journey and the tremendous 
blessings I enjoyed - life, love, laughter, guidance, great friendships and a great school. 
No amount of gratitude can suffice for the unwavering love and support of my wife, 
Dorcas who has been my rock; managed the home front while I embarked on this journey, and 
who, despite battling Cancer was adamant that I complete this journey. You have been 
everything to me and I know we will get through this together. 
I offer special gratitude to our children Sigelle, Thain and Sherissa for their patience, and 
the ability to endure long absences and remain a great source of love and support. 
I thank the OAS, the Centre for Latin American Studies, the Administrative & Policy 
Studies Department, University of Pittsburgh and the Government of Dominica for their 
financial support, school principals and colleagues for letting me in on their experiences. 
 I thank Carol Capson and Shelly Kinsel for their humanity and the many small things 
they did to assist but with huge consequences.  
I thank Professor Maureen McClure my mentor, friend and academic advisor for guiding 
my journey as a citizen, scholar and practitioner.  Like you said, I still have your “biggest faults.”  
I am grateful to my Dissertation Committee: Prof. Maureen McClure – Committee Chair, 
Prof. Michael Gunzenhauser, Prof. and Senior Research Scientist William Bickel, and Dr. Emily 
Vargas-Baron whose tutelage and guidance have been par excellence. 
 xvii 
I thank my childhood friend, Kelvin Dexter Trocard. All it took was a phone call. You 
are a true and enduring friend and brother.  
Finally, thanks to my in-laws and their unending support to ensure this was completed. 
 xviii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ABD   Asian Development Bank 
ADPC   Asian Disaster Preparedness Center 
ADRA   Adventist Relief Agency 
ASR   Acute, Stabilization and Reconstruction 
AusAID  Australian Agency for International Development 
CARICOM  Caribbean Community 
CCRIF   Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility 
CDB   Caribbean Development Bank 
CEP   Consulting Engineers Partners 
CERF   Central Emergency Response Fund 
CIDA   Canadian International Development Fund 
CSEC   Caribbean Secondary Education Certificate 
DAG   Disaster Awareness Games 
DFID   UK Department for International Development 
DFID-CHF  Conflict and Humanitarian Fund 
DFID-HRF Humanitarian Response Fund 
DIPECHO  Disaster Preparedness Program 
DRFI   Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance 
DRRF   Disaster Risk Reduction Fund 
ECE   Early Childhood Education 
ECHO   European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department  
ECHO   European Commission Humanitarian Organization 
EFA    Education for All 
EPU   Education Planning Unit 
EU   European Union 
FCAT   Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test 
FPN   Fonds de Parrainage Haiti 
GCE   General Certificate of Education  
GDP    Gross Domestic Product 
GFDRR  Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 
GINIE   Global Information Networks in Education 
GOCD   Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica 
HIV/AIDS  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
IASC   Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
IDP   Internally Displaced People 
 xix 
IIEP   International Institute Educational Planning 
INEE   Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies 
IRB   Internal Review Board 
ISL   Intermediate Sooner and Later 
LAMI   Low and Middle Income 
LIH   Low-intensity Hurricanes 
MDGs   Millennium Development Goals 
NEPO   National Emergency Planning Organization  
NGO   Non-Government Organization 
NORAG  Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
NZAID  New Zealand Agency for International Development 
OAS   Organization of American States 
ODP   Office of Disaster Preparedness 
OCHA   Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OECS   Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
PITT   University of Pittsburgh 
PPP   Purchasing Power Parity 
PTSD   Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
RCC Regional Consultative Committee on Disaster Management 
RER   Rapid Educational Response 
SDC   Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
SIDA   Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
SIDS   Small Island Developing States 
TCIP   Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool 
TEP   Teacher Emergency Packages 
UK   United Kingdom 
UNESCO  United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
UNICEF  United Nations Children Fund 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
WAEC  West African Examination Council 
WFP   World Food Program 
 xx 
1.0  CONTEXTUALIZING EDUCATION EMERGENCIES AND STUDY PURPOSES 
This study investigates how one small island developing state (SIDS),1 the Commonwealth of 
Dominica (referred to as Dominica), addressed education during low intensity hurricanes (LIH). 
The cumulative effects of these low-intensity hurricanes appear to make it difficult for SIDS to 
cope using their resources alone.  Low-intensity hurricanes are tropical storms that do not exceed 
Category 2 on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale. They are extremely disruptive and can result 
in substantial losses to a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank, 2006).  They 
do not attract wide media attention and international humanitarian assistance, leaving national 
governments alone to address them.   
This investigation is important because a child in Dominica will have experienced five 
major and several low-intensity hurricanes by the time she graduates out of high school. Every 
one of these hurricanes presents risks to the lives of children, and disruptions to their schools, 
instruction and learning.  Hurricanes in SIDS damage school facilities. They disrupt access to 
education, affect negatively the life chances of affected children, and strain the limited financial 
resources that would have gone to education in these islands. These resources may be required to 
deal with the impacts.   
1 SIDS are small islands that are remote from large markets, with high vulnerability to economic and natural shocks 
beyond domestic control (UNCTAD, 2011: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3620&lang=1 
1 
 
                                                 
These cyclical conditions make comprehensive educational responses challenging and 
problematic raising concerns about abilities to secure children’s right to education, which is 
enshrined in the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Since 1990, 
UNESCO, under its goal of Education for All (EFA), has been making concerted efforts to 
ensure the fulfillment of this right in member states through the attainment of universal primary 
education by 2015.  The United Nations, through its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
adopted similar goals for primary education.  UNESCO, UNICEF, the World Bank and many 
other multilateral and bilateral organizations continue to assist with the attainment of this goal 
through the Fast Track Initiative (FTI)2 and other programs. Nevertheless, evidence indicates that 
developing countries continue to have difficulties progressing towards its attainment and in fully 
securing children’s rights to education. Inadequate policy planning and implementation, limited 
financial resources, limited access to schools, poor early childhood development and primary 
school quality, high repetition and dropout rates, and gender inequities in enrollment and primary 
school completion continue to undermine educational progress in many countries, including 
SIDS. 
Every child has a right to an education. As with natural disasters, wars, conflicts and 
calamities exacerbate further slow EFA progress and undermine the rights of children to 
education. A UNESCO study concluded that manmade and natural disasters had emerged as 
2 The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is a partnership of developing countries and donors created to help low-income 
countries achieve the EFA and the Millennium Development Goal of universal completion of primary education by 
2015 (UNESCO, 2010: http://www.unesco.org/en/education-for-all-international-coordination/themes/funding/fast-







                                                 
major barriers to the accomplishment of Education for All (UNESCO, 2000a).  The 2011 
UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report found of the total number of primary school age 
children in the world not enrolled in school, 28 million (42%) live in countries affected by 
conflicts (UNESCO, 2011). Oxfam arrived at similar conclusions in its education report 
(Watkins, 2000).  
The absence of peace and stability undermine educational infrastructures and the capacity 
of states to support basic education (Tawil & Harley, 2003).  They destroy and/or disrupt 
education systems, reverse EFA progress already made, and threaten the safety, security and 
psychosocial well-being of children, their families and communities. They complicate already 
dire social and financial challenges that deprioritize education.  They divert resources away from 
education to armed conflicts and the recovery of other social and economic sectors. They trigger 
education emergencies as countries find it difficult to cope using their resources alone.   
Educational disruption undermines economic growth and worsens inequities by further excluding 
those deprived from participating in the benefits of this growth (Watkins, 2000).  
Where these emergencies are catastrophic (for example, those triggered by Category 3 to 
5 hurricanes), they attract wide media and international humanitarian assistance.  Emergencies 
caused by non-catastrophic events, like low-intensity3 hurricanes do not attract such assistance.  
For non-catastrophic events, response and recovery usually remain the full responsibility of 
affected countries.  For these countries, coping is challenging.  Moreover, even when 
3 The Saffir-Simpson Scale measures hurricane intensity based on wind strength. This scale consists of five 
categories. Categories 1 and 2 are low-intensity.  Category 3 is considered devastating, and Category 4 & 5 are 




                                                 
emergencies are catastrophic, in spite of many efforts, education still is not a major priority of 
international humanitarian responses.     
The main purposes of this study is to describe how Dominica addresses the issue of 
education during these low-intensity hurricanes (LIH), that is, how it addresses the national 
education policies of donor coordination, resource allocation and service delivery during chronic 
LIH.  
1.1 JUSTIFICATION OF THIS STUDY 
My primary motivation for this study is my own experience with Hurricane David in 1979, while 
a high school student in Dominica.  On 29 August 1979, I was preparing to commence my final 
year in high school when Hurricane David, a Category 5 storm struck.  It killed 42 people, 
destroyed 80% of the housing stock, and left 75% of the island’s population homeless. We lost 
the roof to our home.  All of our belongings including my textbooks were destroyed or damaged. 
We were without electricity for eighteen months.  Hurricane David did not destroy my school 
building but it became a hurricane shelter for nearby residents for four months.  I was out of 
school during that period. School reopened in December, 1979. No counseling support was 
available for students and teachers.  Teaching and other school activities proceeded as usual.  
Examinations to determine recommendations for the high stakes Caribbean Secondary Education 
Certificate (CSEC) and General Certificate of Education (GCE) were held as scheduled.  
Similarly, exams to determine graduation were also held.  I flunked both, despite being one of 
the top students prior to Hurricane David.  I did not meet the criteria for graduation: I was given 
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a certificate of attendance at a school leaving ceremony.  Although I eventually performed well 
at the high stakes CXC and GCE Ordinary Level in June 2008, it was not as well as I or my 
teachers had expected.  I never understood why that happened until twenty years later in 1999.  I 
was conducting an independent study entitled, “The forgotten people of disasters: Children and 
schooling in the aftermath of Hurricanes,” as part of a Master of Education Degree at the 
University of Pittsburgh (see Serrant, 1999).  As the research unfolded, I understood then the 
negative impact of hurricanes on student and their academic performance.  I wept during the 
writing process as I re-lived the trauma and the loss.  I reflected on the many assumptions my 
teachers had made about our experiences as students, and their own misunderstanding of 
children’s resilience and coping skills (and the lack thereof) during and after Hurricane David. 
The extensive impact of Hurricane Dean on school infrastructure in Dominica in 2007 
motivates this research as well.  Hurricane Dean damaged 12 schools, disrupted education for 
several weeks.  My personal experience as a Senior Public Officer at the time allowed me to 
witness considerable “red tape,” and local politics regarding response and recovery activities, 
and limited financial and technical capacities that protracted repairs over a 3-4 month period.  
How the government and the Ministry of Education addressed the events associated with 
Hurricane Dean may be instructive and requires investigation.   
This study seeks to bring education and low-intensity hurricanes (LIH) into mainstream 
thinking, discourses and research in the emerging field of education emergencies.  It provides 
insights into how finance, public works and education officials in Dominica perceive and address 
education and LIH.  This study is useful for education officials, as it provides information and 
data for incorporating education emergencies issues into mainstream Ministry of Education 
policies and planning.  Specifically, this study creates the space for considering education and 
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LIH as a legitimate aspect of education in emergencies and places it on the agenda of 
international humanitarian and disaster management agencies.  
 This study gives voice to school principals and their school communities threatened 
annually by hurricanes and inform policies that prepare schools for dealing with the persistent 
threat of LIH.  It speaks for students, whose education is disrupted, negatively affecting their life 
chances, which are often dependent on critical high stakes examinations written around the time 
these emergencies tend to occur.  Finally, it encourages the placement of children and their 
schooling at the center of discourses and actions on education during LIH in Dominica and other 
small island developing states (SIDS). 
1.2 STUDY AREA 
Dominica is considered one of the Caribbean countries most vulnerable to disasters (Collymore, 
2004, Government of Dominica, 2006; 2012).  It is a small island in the Eastern Caribbean (see 
Figure 1 (inset)); 287 sq. miles in area and located roughly 150N and 610W placing in the path of 
Atlantic hurricanes.   
Dominica is mountainous with the highest peaks rising over 4,000 feet.  Because of its 
rugged topography, Dominica receives up to 300 inches of rain per year in places.  Numerous 
rivers dissect Dominica making it extremely susceptible to landslides and other forms of slope 
failure.  Seventy percent of the island is forested and inaccessible by motorable roads.  Much of 
that forest is protected under the National Parks Act of the Laws of the Commonwealth of 
Dominica, 1975.   One such park, The Morne Trois Piton National Park was designated a World 
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Heritage Site by UNESCO, which protects the country’s foremost watersheds and help to 
manage the excess rainfall (cite). 
 
 




Because of this ruggedness and inland inaccessibility, most of Dominica’s 71,293 people4 
and school facilities occupy the narrow strip of coastland lowlands and river floodplains making 
them vulnerable to sea-surges and flooding.  Figure 1 shows the rugged topography and the 
coastal location of these communities, including the capital, Roseau. 
Economically, Dominica is a middle-income developing country with GDP of $765.4 
million (PPP), GDP per capita of $10,500 (PPP) and a 2010/2011 annual budget of EC$346.1 
million (US$127.4M).  Roughly, 5 percent of Dominica’s GDP and 17% of annual recurrent 
budget is allocated to education.  Eighty percent of educational expenditure goes to salaries and 
salaries-related allowances compared to 39% for all wages in the public service or 11.8% of 
GDP (Government of Dominica, 2010). 
1.2.1 Education in Dominica 
Since 1990, Dominica along with six other member states of the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) have been harmonizing their education systems in preparation for a 
single market and economy that was due 1 August 2011.  Foundations of our Future and Pillars 
for Partnership and Progress have been the blueprints guiding the process coordinated by the 
OECS Education Development Unit.  
  The national government is responsible for education and the Ministry of Education and 
Human Resource Development manages the education system.  The Education Act of the Laws 
of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 1997 clearly outlined this mandate for the Ministry of 
Education.  This Act is also the main policy document governing education in Dominica.  Under 
4 The New Chronicle Vol. XVI No. 3,  February 2012 Issue 
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the Act, the Chief Education Officer is accountable for the management and development of all 
aspects of education.  The Ministry of Education submits an annual budget for education to the 
Ministry of Finance.  The Ministry of Finance determines final budget figures following a 
process in which Education, like all other ministries, is invited before a Finance panel to defend 
its budget that covers administration; tertiary, secondary and primary education and supervision 
of pre-primary education.  Pre-primary, early childhood education (ECE) is largely private, with 
a recent shift in policy in favor of Universal Early Childhood Education.  There are 59 primary 
and 15 secondary schools in Dominica.  Fifty primary schools are public and seven are private-
assisted, that is, they receive annual subventions from the state.  Three primary schools are 
owned and managed, privately.  Of the secondary schools, seven are public, seven are private–
assisted and one is private.  There are 75 early childhood centers in Dominica. 
Most schools in Dominica are considered small in terms of size and enrolments.  Data 
taken from the Education Planning Unit, Ministry of Education & Human Resources, Dominica, 
show for the 2010/2011 school year, 29 of the 59 primary schools had enrollments of less than 
100 students. A further 18 primary schools had enrolments of between 100 and 150 students. 
Over 15,000 students are enrolled in primary and secondary schools, accounting for 
nearly 25% of the population of Dominica (EPU, 20115).  In 2005, Dominica attained universal 
secondary education. This resulted in the expansion of school places and the construction of 
three new secondary school buildings.  In addition to being spaces for learning, 70% of school 
buildings are also emergency shelters.  In 1998, the Organization of American States (OAS) in 
collaboration with the Government of Dominica and European Commission Humanitarian 
5  This is taken from the database of the Education Planning Unit (EPU). Data is still being input from the annual 
questionnaires received from schools. 
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Organization (ECHO) retrofitted several school buildings under a three-year project to assist in 
reducing their vulnerability to hurricanes and as hurricane shelters (Government of Dominica 
and OAS, 1998).   
1.2.2 Hurricane frequency in Dominica 
Data provided by Hurricane City, a website dedicated to providing historical information on 
hurricane in the Caribbean, revealed that over the last 139 years, 49 hurricanes have either hit 
directly or brushed Dominica (Williams, 2010).  Table 1 shows key hurricane information on 
Dominica, which according to this table, is brushed or hit directly every three years at average 
wind speeds of 108 miles per hour. This is Category 2 or low-intensity storms on the Saffir-
Simpson Hurricane Scale. 
 
Table 1. Key Hurricane Information on Dominica 
Descriptions Data 
Frequency - Brushed or hit Every 3 years 
Average years between direct hits 10 years 
Average wind strength when hit 108 mph 
Statistically, next direct hit 2012 
Last hit Erick (40mph) 3 September 2009 
Period most frequently hit 24-30 August, annually 
Source (Raw data only): Williams, 2010: Hurricane City: http://www.hurricanecity.com/city/dominica.htm 
 
Given, Dominica is hit most frequently during the period 24 – 30 August, which is 
usually one week before the start of the school year, hurricanes inevitably disrupt schools.  In 
addition, the hurricane season lasts well into the first 3 to 4 months of the school year.   
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 Given the psychosocial impacts on children, including disruption and displacement, 
hurricanes negatively affect student academic performance (Holmes, 2002).  Moreover, they 
undermine student access and their rights of children to education. Because children constitute 
about 25% of the population of Dominica and are considered among the most vulnerable, it is 
especially essential to investigate policy responses to education during low-intensity hurricanes 
in Dominica.   
As a useful introduction, it is necessary to trace the origin and evolution of education 
emergencies.  The following section provides a brief historical trajectory of education in 
emergencies.  It identifies the types and forms of education emergencies, the impact of 
emergencies on education, and the importance of education during emergencies. 
1.3 ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION EMERGENCIES 
The term, “education emergencies” first appeared during UNESCO’s 1996 Mid-Decade meeting 
in Amman, Jordan.  This meeting highlighted the need to deliver basic education during 
“situations of crisis and transition” (UNESCO, 2000a, p. 7; Kagawa, 2005, p. 488).  It 
recommended the creation of safety zones during conflicts, better understanding of the role of 
education in conflict management and prevention, and the development of education to meet the 
needs of traumatized and displaced peoples (Kagawa, 2005). 
Education emergencies as a concept had its origin, however, in the need to provide 
educational services for refugees displaced because of World War II (Kawaga, 2005). Several 
conventions, as depicted in Table 2, were the impetus for the emergence of the field.  The 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1949 and 1951 Geneva Conventions provided 
for the rights of children to education with and without war.  They also provided for their 
protection, the protection of their schools and their rights as refugees during and after conflicts 
(Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003).  Since then several other international and regional conventions 
and agreements have been adopted further guaranteeing children’s rights to education.  Table 2 is 
a menu of these convention and agreements. 
Table 2. International and Regional Conventions and Agreements on Rights to Education 
 
During the 1990s, in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the 
dismantling of Yugoslavia, education emergencies gained prominence.  The break-ups of Balkan 
States triggered waves of ethnic cleansing and related atrocities, displacing large populations 
Year Conventions & Agreements Organization 
1924 The Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child League of Nations 
1950 European Convention on Human Rights   
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 26)  United Nations 
1951 Convention relating to Status of Refugees developed as the  
1939/1945 wars and its additional protocols (1977) 
 
1960 UNESCO Convention against discrimination in education UNESCO 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Education UNESCO 
 Protocol   
1979 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women 
United Nations 
1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights Organization of African 
Unity 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional protocols 
(1989 - 2000) 
United Nations 
1990/2000 Education for All (EFA) by 2015 and gender parity by 2005 UNESCO/World 
Education Forum 
2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) United Nations 
2007 Convention of Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Optional 
Protocol 
United Nations 
2011 Charter of Civil Society for the Caribbean Community CARICOM 
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internally6 (IDPs) and as refugees7including children. The Rwanda genocide and conflicts in 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Mozambique, Colombia, and El Salvador further displaced large 
populations including children whose educational needs were only partially met within host 
countries8 (Gezelius, 1998; Jeria, 1998; Smawfield, 1998; Sommers, 2003; Zeesman, Pearlman 
& Quick, 2008).  Educational services should be provided for IDPs and refugees in keeping with 
Universal Declarations and Conventions on children’s right to education; the 1948 United Nation 
Universal Declaration of Human Right, the 1949 and 1951 Geneva conventions, and the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international instruments (Sinclair, 2002; 
Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003).  
Historically, education emergencies being rights-based have been closely associated with 
the provision of educational services, during and after conflicts, primarily but not exclusively in 
refugee and IDP situations. Emergencies interrupt the provision of and enjoyment of rights to an 
education (INEE, 2004; Sinclair, 2002).  Therefore, the provision of educational services during 
emergencies should satisfy the rights of children to an education even in adverse conditions. 
During the World Education Forum held in 1990, in Jomtien, Thailand, UNESCO and 
many other agencies and nations reaffirmed the rights of children to a basic education and 
adopted the goal of Education for All (EFA) by 2015 (UNESCO, 2000b).  The United Nations 
adopted a similar goal as part of its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), thereby 
heightening urgency for action while reaffirming educational access for all within the global 
development agenda.   
6 Internally displaced people (IDPs) include children who have been displaced from their homes and communities as 
a result of war, conflicts and natural calamities but who remain within their national borders.  
7 Refugees include children and parents who have been displaced from their countries across international 
boundaries into host countries. 
8 Host countries are nations that receive refugees. 
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The formation of the RAPID ED working group, which hosted a series of meeting on 
emergency response, and the Declaration on Principles of Education in Emergencies and 
Difficult Circumstances proposed at the Oslo/Hadeland Conference were initiatives that 
contributed to the rise of education emergencies as an area of international focus (Nicolai & 
Triplehorn, 2003). 
 USAID established the Global Information Networks in Education (GINIE) at the 
University of Pittsburgh’s School of Education. GINIE was a virtual learning community for 
education innovation for countries in crisis and transition (Pigozzi, 1999; Nicolai & Triplehorn, 
2003). GINIE provided website support from 1992 to 2002 for educational interventions during 
and after conflicts, complex emergencies and natural disasters.  
In 2000, the World Education Forum meeting in Dakar, Senegal expanded the scope of 
education in emergencies to include “natural disasters” (UNESCO, 2000b; Sinclair, 2002; INEE, 
2004). Natural calamities, which are the same as natural disasters, were now seen as “a major 
barrier towards attaining Education for All.” Among its twelve strategies, the Forum agreed to 
“meet the needs of education systems affected by conflicts, natural calamities9 and instability 
and conduct educational programs in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and 
tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict” (UNESCO, 2000b, p. 19).   
By 2000, at the Inter-Agency Consultation on Education in Situations of Emergency and 
Crises meeting convened in Geneva by the International Bureau of Education (IBE) and 
including several international agencies and non-governmental organization (NDOs), the Inter-
Agency Network for Education Emergencies (INEE) was established.  
9 Italics are my inclusion and are used to highlight the inclusion of natural calamities, the same as natural disasters as 
part of the new scope of education emergencies. 
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 In 2004, after wide-ranging national, regional and international consultations involving 
teachers, students, parents, government official and affected communities in over 50 countries, 
INEE produced the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early 
Reconstruction.  These are benchmarks for practitioners working in education emergencies 
covering education access and learning environments, teaching and learning, teachers and other 
education personnel, and education policy and coordination (INEE, 2004).  These benchmarks 
institutionalized education emergencies at the level of international field practitioners and 
international agencies involved (Bromley & Andina, 2009).  However, the quest for worldwide 
applicability and implementation of these standards INEE ignored education-related issues that 
are specific to certain countries or regions, such as HIV/AIDS in Africa (Bromley & Andina, 
2009).  Further, they ignored the complex nature of education emergencies, and the diverse 
cultural and contextual situations in which they occur.  They also reinforced the often-heard 
observation that international agencies tend to ignore national governments during their 
assistance to countries experiencing emergencies, particularly in the case of conflicts (Sommers, 
2009). 
From 2004 onward, several efforts were made to begin to consolidate the work of 
education emergencies.  Kagawa’s (2005) literature review represented the first attempt to take 
an academic approach to the field, trace its evolution, and establish frameworks for research and 
study.  This review, however, did not include any distinct theoretical frameworks.  At the same 
time, beginning with the work of Sinclair (2002), UNESCO’s International Institute for 
Educational Planning (IIEP) spearheaded a body of research work on education emergencies.  
These works were mainly case studies, either single cases or multiple cases; however, most were 
non-comparative.  They focused on fragile states, and conflict and post-conflict situations. Most 
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of these states were located in Asia, Middle East and Africa and two in Latin America - 
Colombia and El Salvador. These studies focused on student certification (Kirk, 2009); donor 
engagement (Brannalley, Ndaruhuste & Rigaud, 2009) as well as on the opportunities conflicts 
provided for education reform and innovation (Nicolai, 2009). It also included an assessment of 
the pre-packaged, standardized programs that have become the staple for education emergency 
response, globally, irrespective of context (Penson & Tomilson, 2009). These pre-packaged 
standardized programs include child-friendly spaces, school feeding programs and Teacher 
Emergency Packages (TEP). 
In addition, from 2004 onward, a number of major natural disasters also diverted 
attention away from conflict-driven education emergencies.  These included devastating 
earthquakes in Pakistan (2005) (centered in Pakistan-administered Kashmir); Sichuan, China 
(2008) and Haiti (2010); catastrophic hurricanes in Grenada (2004) and Myanmar (2008) and the 
Asian Tsunami (2004).  Notwithstanding, conflicts continued to dominate discourse on education 
emergencies. The 2011 EFA Global Monitoring Report, identified conflict as the single most 
important factor undermining the attainment of Education for all by 2015 (UNESCO, 2011).  
What changed was the approach to managing emergencies resulting in the development of the 
“cluster approach” (IASC, 2010).  
The United Nation Inter-Agency Standing Committee10 instituted the cluster or sectoral 
approach in 2005.  The cluster approach is a sector-based, inter-organizational approach to 
10 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is a unique inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and 
decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. The IASC was established in June 1992 in response 
to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance. General Assembly 
Resolution 48/57 affirmed its role as the primary mechanism for the inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance.  
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humanitarian responses.  It was found that gaps in sectoral lead agencies resulted in 
unpredictable humanitarian responses, and the cluster approach was instituted with the hope that 
lead agencies would coordinate the work all other member agencies to improve humanitarian 
responses during emergencies (IASC, 2010).   
Sectoral organizations form clusters headed by lead agencies. Initially, there were nine 
such clusters. These were logistics; emergency telecommunications; camp coordination and 
management; emergency shelter; health; nutrition; water, sanitation and hygiene; early recovery 
and protection.   However, these initial nine clusters did not include sectors where leadership and 
accountability were already clear. These were Agriculture led by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO Food led by World Food Program (WFP); refugees led by UNHCR, and 
education led by UNICEF, the child emergency arm of the United Nation System. UNESCO is 
the education arm.  Because education had already organized itself into a working cluster, it was 
not included11 in the cluster organization of the United Nations. By 2006, however, IASC 
established education as a global cluster with UNICEF and Save the Children UK designated 
lead agencies (IASC, 2010).  IASC provided guidelines and Terms of Reference (TORs) for the 
operations of these clusters.  
As of June 2010, about 38 countries were implementing the cluster approach to 
emergencies. By then, UNICEF headed 22 of these 38 clusters.  Natural disasters triggered 
eleven of these 38 emergencies (IASC, 2010).   
 
11Fieldwork I conducted in Haiti 7-12 March 2010, following the 12 January 2010 devastating earthquake there 
revealed the education cluster was located and meeting in Delmas at UNESCO’s head office outside MINUSTAH, 




                                                                                                                                                             
1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS  
By the time, today’s Grade K students graduate out of high schools in Dominica, they would 
have experienced at least five major hurricanes and many low-intensity ones.  Each year between 
August and November, these low intensity hurricanes destroy school buildings and materials, 
disrupt schooling and instruction and threaten the safety of children and teachers.  Given these 
chronic low-intensity hurricanes (LIH), how then does the government of Dominica address 
three major national education policies: donor coordination, resource allocation and service 
delivery? Because of the persistent physical and fiscal threat hurricanes pose, describing how the 
government currently responds in these areas can inform senior leadership.  It can also inform 
the donor community, countries and regions experiencing similar risks and vulnerability. 
Although governments are responsible for protecting their citizens from disasters, 
(Comfort, 2003; Luchi & Esnard, 2008; Osei, 2007; Sinclair, 2002), the national government of 
Dominica does not appear to have an articulated response strategy for education during low-
intensity emergencies.  In order to begin to design one, it is essential to know how the 
government responds currently. This will require analysis of inter-agency role and 
responsibilities, interaction, decision-making and resource flows across the Ministries of 
Finance, Public Works and Education, the three key agencies involved in response in Dominica.  
The goal of this study is to prepare a descriptive and analytical account of how the Government 
of Dominica addresses education during low-intensity hurricanes (LIH). 
Based on the espoused definition of education emergencies as the inability education 
systems of countries to cope with conflicts or disasters using their resources alone (Nicolai & 
Triplehorn, 2003), the notion that chronic low intensity hurricanes do not attract media attention 
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and humanitarian assistance; their preponderance and cumulative impacts on Dominica, I 
developed four propositions to guide this inquiry. 
1.5 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
1. Because low-intensity hurricanes are recurrent, Dominica has in a place explicit 
policies and structures that anticipate and guide action for chronic low-intensity, 
education emergencies. 
2. The Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica has adequate financial 
resources to address chronic low-intensity, education emergencies. 
3. The education sector in Dominica receives top funding priority during chronic 
low-intensity, emergencies.  
4. Services delivery for chronic low-intensity, education emergencies in Dominica 
are timely and efficient. 
 
These propositions are based on several assumptions. It assumes the threat of hurricanes 
to education in Dominica is well known; their recurrence and possible impacts even at low 
intensities are understood and considered during planning, and that education is treated as a 
priority during LIH, given children’s vulnerability to them.  It assumes policies and frameworks 
for donor coordination and financial allocations and service delivery (preparation, response and 
recovery) exist and are well-implemented because of prior planning activities and Dominica’s 
recurrent exposure to hurricanes.  
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The chapter which follows explores the concepts associated with education emergencies, 
the theoretical frameworks that have been developed in response to them, and the gaps in the 
literature involving emergencies triggered by hurricanes. It proposes frameworks for 
understanding recurrent, chronic disasters and for investigating education during low-intensity, 
hurricanes in Dominica.   
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2.0   CONCEPTUALIZING EDUCATION EMERGENCIES 
Education emergencies are adverse situations that usually affect education negatively and lead to 
its disruption and/or collapse.  These are “situations where children lack access to their national 
and community education systems due to the occurrence of complex emergencies or natural 
disasters” (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003, p. 3). These emergencies “overwhelm the capacities of 
society to cope by using its resources alone” (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003, p. 11).   
Resource constraints, therefore, partly define emergencies, and international and national 
responses to them.  Countries affected by education emergencies have tended to rely on external 
resources to cope, respond and engage in reconstruction activities. The literature indicates that 
external resources received for educational purposes tend to be temporary, short-term quick fixes 
that do not address the longer-term needs of education systems during emergencies (Penson & 
Tomilson, 2009; Pigozzi, 1999; Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998;).  These temporary, short-term 
quick fixes are incongruent with the varied and complex nature of education emergencies.  
Comfort (2004) in analyzing response coordination and organizational performance during 9/11 
in the United States downplayed the importance of resource availability.  The demand for 
assistance relative to the capacity to respond to that demand appeared to be more important in 
that particular emergency response, and its response coordination and performance (Comfort, 
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2004).  It appears, the ability to move the resource in the direction in which it is required, and the 
amount in which it is needed are important in emergency response and in particular in this case.  
Capacity appears to be a resource issue during other emergencies as well.  Because of 
limited local resources to cope and dependence on external assistance, education emergencies 
have tended to be driven in large part by international humanitarian organizations like Save the 
Children, PLAN, Child Fund and Catholic Relief Services (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003; Save the 
Children, 2007). These are funded by bilateral and multilateral agencies such as USAID and 
UNICEF that possess some of the required resources to tackle immediate educational and 
developmental needs of children from infancy to basic education across the various types of 
emergencies. 
2.1 TYPES OF EMERGENCIES - LOUD, SILENT, COMPLEX 
According to Kagawa, education emergencies are “loud,” “silent” or “complex” (Kagawa, 2005).  
“Loud emergencies” are “natural” disasters, war or conflicts that destroy educational 
infrastructure and disrupt the provision of schooling (Kagawa, 2005).  The Sichuan Earthquake 
of 2008 that killed over 10,000 school children as their schools collapsed and the 2010 Haitian 
earthquake which destroyed 50% of schools there are classic examples of loud emergencies.  The 
occurrence and effects of these emergencies are very visible and they are often sudden and 
catastrophic unlike “silent” emergencies that are pervasive, prolonged and often less visible. 
 Silent emergencies are those situations that have indirect but negative impacts on 
education, such as poverty, HIV/AIDS and street children (Pigozzi, 1999).  They often exist prior 
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to the occurrence of loud emergencies, which often exacerbate them.  They affect access to 
education, perpetuate gender and ethnic differences, and undermine the capacity of governments 
to finance education adequately (Kagawa, 2005).   
When loud and silent emergencies combine, or reinforce each other, then complex 
education emergencies occur.  This is often the case in developing countries. Haiti’s poverty, 
weak governance and large number of out-of-school children were silent emergencies by the 
time of the earthquake on 12 January 2010.  The earthquake only made worse an already bad 
situation, destroying 50% of school buildings (UNICEF, 2010).  Most of these were located in 
the Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, and Leogane regions, the areas hardest hit and with the highest 
concentration of school buildings. Various studies indicate the education systems of countries 
with education emergencies are already in crisis or suffer silent emergencies by the time they are 
struck by loud emergencies (see Nicolai, 2009; Retamal & Richmond. 1998). Education 
emergencies, in particular complex emergencies have varied complex impacts. 
2.2 IMPACT OF EMERGENCIES ON EDUCATION 
As noted, disasters and emergencies destroy school buildings and disrupt educational access and 
participation for large numbers of children (ADPC, 2008; Holmes, 2002; INEE, 2004;).  They 
destroy learning materials and school records (Serrant, 2011), are traumatic for children 
(Fietelberg, 2007; Joseph, 2006), affect their academic performance (Pane McCaffery, Karla, 
Zhou, 2008), and kill teachers and teaching staff (Machel, 1996; Sommers, 1996). 
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2.2.1 Disruption of access and participation 
Nine years after the Rwandan genocide and civil war, 25% of all primary school age children 
were still out of school (Sommers, 2009).  Six months after Hurricane George devastated Central 
America in 1998, many students were still out of school (Serrant, 1999).  About 1140 (380 
schools) and 682 (227 schools) respectively, were damaged and destroyed. Over 400,000 
students or 50% of the primary school enrolment were affected (USAID, 1998).  Sommers 
(2009) estimated that in 2003, between 43 and 48 million of the world’s refugee and IDP 
children and youth were not in school.  It was estimated that in 2008, more than 67 million 
children worldwide were still out of school (UNESCO, 2011). 
 Disasters also destroy learning materials and schools’ and students’ records.  When I 
visited Haiti, 7-12 March 2010, I observed, school and students records littered across the rubble 
of school buildings destroyed because of the earthquake of 12 January 2010 (Serrant, 2011). This 
means schools’ and students’ records were forever lost unless these were stored in some remote 
locations.  
2.2.2 Psychosocial impact 
Disasters and emergencies are traumatic for children (Joseph, 2006; Feitelberg, 2007). Three 
years after Hurricane Ivan hit the Cayman Islands in 2004, 34 percent of 129 children (11 - 16 
year olds) surveyed suffered from full Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 22% suffered 
partial PTSD, and 54% were depressed (Fietelberg, 2007).  Trauma stemmed from the event 
24 
 
itself, its direct impact on their lives, the social and academic disruption, and the dislocation they 
experienced as a result of damages to their schools.  
A study of the impacts of Hurricane Mitch on the mental health of Hondurans found 
22.1% of the population were identified as psychiatric cases, 18.3% had major depression and 
11.1% post-traumatic stress disorder. This study also showed that factors such as the level of 
exposure, socioeconomic status, and previous mental disorders are significantly associated with 
the level of psychological distress (Caldas de Almeida, 2002). Trauma also affects students’ 
academic perfomance. 
2.2.3 Impact on academic performance 
Studies on the impacts of disasters on student academic performance showed mixed results 
(Pane, McCaffrey, Karla, & Zhou, 2008).  A study on the impact of the 2004 hurricanes season 
on the FCAT scores of Grades 4 - 10 in Florida revealed statistical but no practical difference in 
student performance between high and low impact hurricane-affected schools (Baggerly & 
Ferretti, 2008).  This study did suggest however, that student support and counseling in the wake 
of the hurricanes and the safe place schools provided could have contributed to the results of the 
study.  It also suggested that low-performing students may have been displaced to other states.  It 
may also be that a before-after method of investigation would have been better for studying the 
impacts of hurricanes on academic performance.  
Another study attempted to measure the adverse effect of 1999-2000 hurricane season on 
student performance on end-of-year tests and the attainment of school accountability standards in 
North Carolina (Holmes, 2002).  The results showed that 20 more schools would have met those 
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standards had the 1999-2000 hurricanes not occurred in North Carolina.  The study however, did  
not isloate the other factors, like household adjustment factors that may have impacted on 
students performance.   
2.2.4 Death of teachers and staff 
In some situations, school staffing becomes inadequate because of death and injuries to teachers 
as a result of these disasters and emergencies (Sommers, 1996). During the Sichuan Earthquake 
in 2008, Yingxiu Elementary School, located near the epicenter of the quake lost most of its 70 
teachers, and 473 students.  Institutional memories and years of teaching experiences are lost 
because of these deaths (INEE, 2004). 
Given these impacts, re-establishing education services, from initial education and 
preschool to tertiary education, during disasters and emergencies is critically important.  The 
following section outlines the importance of providing education during emergencies and it 
establishes the rationale for why it should be a top priority. 
2.3 IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION IN SITUATIONS OF EMERGENCY 
Education is essential during emergencies.  It affords child protection by offering safe spaces, 
serves a psychological function for dealing with trauma, and helps to structure student lives as 
well as ensuring children remain in school and complete their school years, if at all possible.  It is 
a medium for conveying survival messages, ensuring child development, and reaffirms 
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educational access and participation as a universal right.  These conventions require states to 
honor this right during conflicts and natural calamities like earthquakes and hurricanes (Pigozzi, 
1999; Sinclair, 2002; Kagawa, 2005). 
 Educational services often play an essential role in child protection. School can reduce 
children’s exposures to risks, such as rape or recruitment as child soldiers (Pigozzi, 1999; Smith 
& Vaux, 2003; Kagawa, 2005; Aguilar and Retamal, 2009; Gates & Reich, 2010).  Schools can 
be safe places for children. However, they are sometimes subject to violent attacks during wars 
and conflicts as was the case in Chechen, Russia, and recently the Gaza Strip (Peterson, 2001; 
Ahmad & Vulliamy, 2009).  Grenades and rockets were thrown into schools, because it was 
thought they were shelters for military targets (Peterson, 2001). 
Education in situations of emergencies usually serves an important psychosocial function. 
Schools provide a sense of normalcy for children during emergencies and are places for 
expression, play and engagement with their peers (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; UNESCO, n.d.; 
UNICEF, 2004).   Schools can give shape and structure to students’ lives, instill community 
values, and promote peace and interdependence.  The presence of schools in situations of 
emergency signals a degree of stability, and a return to normal roles and relationships within 
families and communities (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009).  “Restoration of access to education is 
crucial for the psychological development of war-affected children and adolescents and those 
affected by natural disasters” (UNESCO, n.d). 
 During and after emergencies, education provides channels for conveying survival 
messages and developing skills for conflict resolution and peace building (Petal, 2008; Sinclair, 
2002).    Peace education is often incorporated into school curriculum and teaching guides. Once 
27 
 
conflicts are over, peace education is increasingly used during the reconstruction process 
(Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; WAEC, 1998.).  
2.3.1 Forms of education emergencies 
A systematic review of the literature revealed two major forms of writings about education 
emergencies – education-in-emergencies and education-about-emergencies. At present, they 
remain two separate approaches, the former advocated by emergency practitioners working in 
the field and the latter mostly by educators. Figure 2 shows these two branches.  
 
 
Figure 2. Classification of Forms of Education Emergencies 
2.3.1.1 Education in emergencies 
 
Education-in-emergencies provides educational access and services to children during 
emergencies – teaching/learning spaces, programs and materials.  It includes the provision of 
“formal and non-formal education to children and youth whose access to education systems has 
been destroyed or interrupted by war and other calamities” (Sommers, 2003, p.1).  As shown in 
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Figure 3, education in emergencies comprises emergency programs, teaching and learning 
materials, provision of school spaces, as well as psychosocial support for teachers and students, 
child protection, and school feeding and health services.  It can include the rehabilitation and 
eventual re-introduction of child soldiers into schools (Kagawa, 2005). 
 
  
Figure 3. Classification of the Main Features of Education in Emergencies 
 
Education in emergencies, however, constitutes temporary stopgap measures; short-term 
assistance is provided until humanitarian agents in education move on to other emergencies, or 
when the bright lights of the media fade (Pigozzi, 1999; Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998;).  
Much of this assistance, like learning materials like logical blocks is imported and expensive, 
making their use unsustainable and possibly not culturally or linguistically appropriate to the 
children and their families (Penson & Tomilson, 2009).  Because they are often externally 
produced they may not reflect local contexts and realities (Sommers, 2003).  They are inputs 
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from international agencies, since affected countries usually lack the resources and the systems 
to produce their own rapidly (Sommers, 2003).  These resources are what international 
humanitarian agencies deem countries will need in order to cope with disasters.  They are, 
however, directed at response and early recovery and not at re-construction, or 
mitigation/prevention.   
Education about emergencies adopts a longer term, more preventive approach to 
emergencies using knowledge and information transmitted through the curriculum.  
2.3.1.2 Education-about-emergencies 
 
Education-about-emergencies involves the inclusion of information about disasters and 
emergencies in existing school curricula.  It focuses on curriculum content, delivery and 
assessment.  It involves teaching students about disasters and emergencies, equipping them and 
their families with information, skills and attitudes to prevent and/or prepare for them (Petal, 
2008). By providing information about disasters and the environment, schools prepare 
generations of children to prevent and reduce natural disasters (Cardona, 2004; Clerveaux & 
Spence, 2009; Morrisey, 2004; Murdock, 2004; Petal, 2008; RCC, 2007; Reser, 2004).  Figure 4 




 Figure 4. Classification of the Features of Education about Emergencies 
 
In addition to being places for restoring access, reducing childhood traumas, and 
providing disaster and environmental education, education-about-emergencies treats schools as 
places to teach peace and build social relations that reduce ethnic and other tensions that lead to 
war (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Pigozzi, 1999; Retamal & Adeo-Richmond, 1998; Vargas-Barón 
& McClure, 1998; WAEC, 1998).  Aguilar and Retamal (2009) proposed a humanitarian 
curriculum that includes literacy, numeracy as well as recreation, play and games but as part of 
temporary stopgaps until countries can reconstruct their education system.   
Whether as separate disciplines, or infused into existing curriculums, education-about-
emergencies uses interactive curriculum delivery methods.  These include the use of games, 
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sports, plays and art incorporated into teaching about emergencies, disasters and the 
environment.   
Clerveaux and Spence (2009) used interactive Disaster Awareness Games (DAG) to 
teach Caribbean students about disasters, using a pre- post-test design to measure students’ 
performance on disaster information. It was shown that student recall improved after playing the 
games.  The argument is that students armed with information about disasters would better assist 
their families and schools in preparing for, and preventing disasters and emergencies (RCC, 
2007, Petal, 2008).  The assessment method neglected to consider the real life interactions and 
collaborations that occur during emergencies or when the game is played. 
Children can become “disaster reduction catalysts” and key actors in the development of 
a “culture of safety” (Petal, 2008).  Education-about-emergencies, then, shifts approaches to 
disasters and emergency from response to prevention, from being reactive to being proactive, 
from a post-disaster to a pre-disaster focus.  It is, however, mostly information-based and 
premised on the argument that armed with information, children and their families will be able to 
anticipate, prepare for and manage the adverse impacts of disasters.  
Comfort (1997) has argued for the pivotal place of information in decision-making about 
disasters and disaster response, particularly regarding the flexible disbursements of resources in 
response to hazardous disasters.  Huggins’ (2007) study on hurricanes in the Eastern Caribbean 
highlighted the importance of information, in his case geo-informatics, in decision making 
regarding disasters, and in linking response to mitigation in an informational feedback loop using 
information technology.  Neither, however, has linked information acquisition or dissemination 
to education or the education system, particularly at the primary and secondary level. Education 
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is taken as the process of instruction and learning, while education system constitutes the 
infrastructure, material, personnel and organizations that facilities the process.   
Comfort (2004) highlighted the importance of coordination (organizational and 
institutional) in effective disaster response, stating that the prior existence of these coordinating 
attributes improved responses during disasters (Comfort, 1999).  However, incorporating this 
essential social relation attribute into emergency management behavior across generations does 
not appear to be explicit in her work.   
Alexander (2003, 2008), on the other hand, highlighted the importance of education and 
training in emergencies but at the level of higher education and targeted at disaster managers, to 
improve their competence in disaster management.   
Because of these two major forms of education emergencies, two distinct response 
approaches have emerged: the humanitarian-response and developmental approaches. 
2.4 APPROACHES TO EDUCATION EMERGENCIES 
The two major approaches to education emergencies exist - the humanitarian-response 
approaches and the developmental approaches. While they are discussed below as if they were 
distinct and separate – humanitarian-response approaches are necessary precursors to 
development approaches - the former is short-term, quick, interim and relief-oriented. The latter 
is long-term and transformative.  
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2.4.1 Humanitarian-response approaches 
Early writers on education emergencies, such as Aguilar and Retamal (1998) and Aedo-
Richmond and Retamal, (1998), and later Aguilar and Retamal (2009) grounded their work in a 
human rights-based, humanitarian approach to education emergencies.  Initially, they embraced 
emergency thinking that assumed education, unlike search and rescue, food, water and health did 
not rise to a level of urgency.  It did not require urgent attention since not having it was not a 
matter of life and death. It could wait.  A groundbreaking report, Machel Report, on the impact 
of armed conflict on children may have helped to change all that although others may have been 
working on this issue simultaneously.  
Machel (1996) found that wars and conflicts had debilitating effects on children, their 
families, livelihoods, and education; conflicts displaced children and their families either as 
refugees or internally within their country borders.   Many of these children die or become 
malnourished, developmentally delayed and suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders (Machel, 
1996). The 2011 UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report found that schools were important 
places for dealing with childhood traumas, and their operations symbolized therefore a return to 
normalcy for children and their communities. They were places for protecting childhoods, and 
rehabilitating child soldiers.  They were also places where children, who lost their social support 
systems, and especially their families, could find support (Machel, 1996).  Schools were essential 
in educating students away from the fractured ideologies and negative identities that contribute 
to causing often cyclical or chronic conflicts and wars (Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998).  
 Education, therefore, was a mechanism for building peace, overcoming violence and 
improving respect for human rights (Salmi, 2000; Sommers, 2009; Vargas-Barón & Bernal, 
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2005).  Given the importance of education, refugee communities tended to establish their own 
schools rapidly.  Rwandan refugees in Tanzania who escaped the 1994 Hutu -Tutsi genocide 
established their own schools without outside resources, indicating the importance of education 
and culture to parents during emergencies (Sommers, 1999). 
In part because of the Machel Report (1996), the United Nations eventually declared 
education the fourth pillar of humanitarian assistance joining food, shelter, health care at the UN 
Special Session on Children in 2002 (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009;  United Nations, 2002).  
 As the fourth pillar, education initially became a compendium of emergency learning spaces like 
“tents” including emergency education programs such as “Rapid Ed”12 and “Return to 
Happiness;”13 and Emergency teaching and learning materials like “PEER”14 and “Teacher 
Educational Package or School-in-a-Box”15 (Miller & Afolter, 2002; Sommers, 1999; Toole & 
Aguilar, 2006; UNICEF, 2003; UNICEF, 2005; UNICEF & University of Pittsburgh, 2005;).  
PEER also established “education development centers” to assist with longer-term educational 
development, especially in countries such as Somalia that lacked educational infrastructures, 
centers for curriculum and materials development and teacher training. Several efforts also 
included the registration of unaccompanied, abandoned and orphaned children.  
Under the leadership of Pilar Aguilar, UNICEF conceptualized and established child 
friendly spaces (CFS)16 that sought to improve child development, initiate or continue 
12 Rapid Ed is a three-phase response program developed by UNESCO, UNHCR & UNICEF – recreational, non-
formal and formal education, in that order (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003) 
13 UNICEF program of games and health activities designed bring back fun to the lives of children affected by 
disasters and emergencies (UNICEF, 2010b) 
14 Developed by UNESCO, Program for Education for Emergency and Reconstruction (PEER), developed School in 
the Box which was first rolled-out  in Somalia in 1993 (Aguilar &Retamal, 1998).  
15 A literal box containing teaching and learning materials for a class of 80 children, which UNICEF compiled for 
use in CFS (Sommers, 2003). 
16 These are tents located in refugee centers or IDP camps that are cordoned off for teaching and learning activities. 
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educational activities, provide health and nutritional services and protect children from abuse and 
crime UNICEF & University of Pittsburgh, 2005; Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2002; Save the 
Children, 2003; SIDA, 2002; UNICEF, 2003).  Since then, school feeding programs have 
expanded and attention has been given to the rehabilitation of child soldiers, and more recently, a 
“humanitarian curriculum” has been developed (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Kagawa, 2005; 
Maier, 2005). The humanitarian curriculum integrates temporary school curricula for reading, 
writing and arithmetic with psychosocial support through recreation, play and games (Aguilar & 
Retamal, 2009).  Aguilar & Retamal (2009) also proposed the use of recreational kits, child peer-
group living arrangements for mutual support, and the mobilization of existing social care 
systems for children.  This includes support for foster and extended families, particularly for 
unaccompanied and orphaned children.  As humanitarian responses, they are driven largely by 
international and intergovernmental humanitarian agencies. 
International intergovernmental and humanitarian assistance agencies like UNHCR, 
UNICEF and certain bilateral agencies including USAID, SIDA, NORAG and others as well as 
international NGOs such as Save the Children have driven initiatives for education in 
emergencies.  They have provided short-term programs for children, leaving longer-term issues 
of national education systems and their recovery to the future.  However, the transition from 
humanitarian assistance to sound educational policy planning and program development is rarely 
effective and timely.  This has occurred in part because education has been given a low priority 
during emergencies. Furthermore, education is often in crisis long before conflicts emerge or 
natural calamities strike. Once the bright lights of the media are gone agencies move to the next 
conflict or natural calamity educational needs are overlooked (Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998). 
An exception to this situation was found in El Salvador where educational policy planning begun 
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during its war was accelerated and completed within the “window of opportunity” of from 18 to 
24 months after the cessation of hostilities. The Salvadoran educational reform was highly 
successful in improving educational systems because of this timely reform process (Vargas-
Barón & Bernal, 2005). 
With the exception of El Salvador, early humanitarian approaches failed to use 
emergencies as “windows of opportunity” to transform national education systems, particularly 
in nations where education contributed to emergencies such as armed conflicts (Vargas-Barón & 
McClure, 1998; Pigozzi, 1999; Vargas-Barón & Bernal, 2005).  Interventions were designed to 
deal rapidly with the emergencies but generally they did not address the long-term and complex 
needs of education (see Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Nicolai, 2009).  They also failed to address 
social, economic and gender inequalities that created differentials in educational access and 
performance, thereby reinforcing social inequities, such as poverty, that contribute to 
emergencies (Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1996).  As medical-relief models, they undertook quick 
assessments of education emergencies and conducted rapid interventions without a long-term 
commitment to addressing the problems that made education vulnerable and/or 
counterproductive in the first place (Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998).  Consequently, they did 
not deal with the fundamental causes of vulnerabilities and threats, the silent emergencies that 
existed before the emergency arrived. Such silent emergencies would continue long after 
humanitarian assistance left and would become continuing catalysts for future loud and complex 
emergencies. Humanitarian specialists and their agencies attempted to treat temporarily the 
effects of emergencies, ultimately leaving affected countries highly vulnerable to future natural 
calamities and other complex crises.   
37 
 
Eventually, other models (phased, child-centered and sectoral models) emerged to revise, 
correct or replace the anomalies in initial humanitarian-response approaches.  These were the 
Rapid Educational Response (RER), the Acute, Stabilization and Re-construction (ASR), The 
Immediate Sooner and Later (ISL) Matrix, The Circle of Learning and the Cluster Approach. 
2.4.1.1 The Rapid Educational Response Model (RER) 
UNESCO, UNHCR and UNICEF developed the RER as a three-phase model to be used in the 
immediate aftermath of the large-scale displacement of children and their families after disasters 
and emergencies (Aguilar & Retamal, 1998; Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003).  The first phase 
consists of recreational programs.  Phase 2 featured non-formal education services, and finally 
Phase 3 focused on formal education.  These phases were based on the 1995 UNHCR revised 
guidelines for educational assistance to refugees (Aguilar & Retamal, 1998).  Nicolai & 
Triplehorn (2003) challenged this phase notion of RER, stating that all three could be 
implemented at the same time with the implication that at some point education for refugee and 
displaced children would not exist.   
The implementation of the RER model in West Timor in 1999 among East Timor 
refugees revealed other issues, including the absence of clear guidelines for protracted program 
implementation.  The “tent schools” set up to implement RER were never integrated into the 
existing school system and those tents became targets during the conflict. Camps, where they 
existed, were considered no longer safe and were closed.  
The Acute, Stabilization and Reconstruction (ASR) model was then proposed by Marc 
Sommers in 2003 instead of the RER.  It made primary education the second tier priority rather 
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than the third as in the RER model, thereby improving the priority status of formal education 
during emergencies.  
2.4.1.2 The Acute, Stabilization and Reconstruction Model 
The ASR is a three-phase model as well (Sommers, 2003), including acute, stabilization and 
reconstruction phases (ASR). Unlike the RER, where formal education constituted its final 
phase, with the ASR, formal education was included in the second phase.  With ASR, formal 
education enjoyed a higher priority.  In addition, ASR also included a reconstruction phase. 
Neither, however, provided criteria regarding the beginning, length or termination of their 
phases, resulting in considerable ambiguity.   In general, the acute phase involved recreation 
activities coupled with literacy and numeracy programs.  During the stabilization phase, formal 
education and especially primary education was to be reactivated.  For the reconstruction phase, 
education systems were to be re-established following the cessation of conflict.  It was 
recognized that these phases overlap (Sommers, 2003).  The ASR model appeared to be most 
applicable to conflict, but like its predecessor, it lacked guidelines or specific implementation 
activities.   
An Immediate, Sooner and Later (ISL) Matrix was developed by Sinclair & Triplehorn, 
in 2003 to guide the implementation of these phased models (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003).   
2.4.1.3 Immediate, Sooner and Later (ISL) Matrix 
The ISL Matrix is a list of education related-activities to be undertaken immediately, sooner, and 
later following disasters and emergency responses.  The ISL matrix removed ambiguities in the 
RER and ASR models and focused on what actually needed to be done, that is, core educational 
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needs in response to disasters or emergencies, irrespective of the situation. In addition to an 
academic component, the matrix outlined supplies, management, capacity building and a 
building operations system. This Matrix included activities for child and social protection and 
psychosocial support with detailed lists of what needs to be done, a feature that had been 
neglected in the RER. INEE adopted this matrix as part of its compendium of Minimum 
Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction, particularly 
in its Toolkit on Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness (INEE, 2010). It was incorporated 
into the work of the Overseas Development Institute as part of its Humanitarian Practice 
Network, a forum for improving humanitarian action.   Notwithstanding these refinements, the 
model, like its predecessors, lacked clear guidelines for protracted implementation, and it did not 
make children and their learning the center of disaster and emergency response in education. It 
focused instead mainly on child protection and humanitarian needs.  In response to this criticism, 
“the Circle of Learning model” emerged (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003).   
2.4.1.4 Circle of Learning Model 
Save the Children UK developed The Circle of Learning in (date).  It placed children’s cognitive 
and psychosocial well-being at the center of disaster and emergency response.  It connected 
children’s education at the primary level to formal education structures, non-school and out-of- 
school programs as well as humanitarian assistance and advocacy (see Nicolai & Triplehorn, 
2003).  It rectified the isolation of “tent schools” as had occurred in West Timor.  It placed 
learning spaces for children at the center of IDP camps, as was the case in Haiti, to highlight the 
Circle of Learning approach (Personal Observation, 8-14 March 2010).  It literally surrounded 
children with support.   This concept was first designed and implemented in Kosovo refugee 
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camps in Albania and Macedonia in 1999 as “Child-Friendly Spaces” (Madfis, Martyris & 
Triplehorn, 2010).  Since then it has become a staple of UNICEF’s emergency education work, 
and a major aspect of responses to education emergencies worldwide (Penson & Tomilson, 
2009).   
However, all of the three-phase models, the ISL Matrix and the Circle of Learning, 
shared several weaknesses.  There was a delayed engagement with the existing education system.  
Instead, these initiatives established new programs that they attempted to incorporate into 
existing structures.  All of these programs featured short-term heroics and responses based on 
rapid assessments of education needs. They were designed and implemented by international 
agencies, often with little consultation with the national governments that would be responsible 
for schooling after the agencies left (Nicolai, 2009).    
As a result of concerns regarding maintenance of effort and sustainability, the United 
Nations adopted a sectoral-collaborative methodology called “the cluster approach” as a way to 
begin a more long-term engagement with national governments in situations of conflicts or 
emergencies. 
2.4.1.5 Cluster Approach 
As noted earlier, the Cluster Approach was instituted in 2005 by the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee.  It was developed because of observed lapses and gaps in sectoral leadership, 
accountability and predictability in emergency response (IASC, 2006).  It sought to strengthen 
partnerships among NGOs, international organizations, International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movements and UN agencies.  The clusters brought together teams responsible for 
coordinating humanitarian responses around nine sectors – logistics; emergency 
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telecommunications; camp coordination and management; emergency shelter; health; nutrition; 
water, sanitation and hygiene; early recovery and protection.  These clusters operate at the global 
level as well as the country level where emergencies exist.  They are coordinated through lead 
agencies.  Save the Children and UNICEF were designated to be the co-heads of the education 
cluster (IASC, 2006).  This global cluster approach masks the diverse and complex nature of 
emergencies, emergency triggers and their impacts, and it has weakened the importance given to 
national and local contexts during emergencies.  
A recent evaluation of the cluster systems implemented in Haiti, Myannar, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Occupied Palestinian Territory and Uganda found that the single most 
important value of the approach was information sharing. Box 1 outlines the key findings of this 
evaluation. In the case of Haiti, it served as a mediator to resolve conflicts, improve 
communications and relations (Streets, Grunewald, Binder, de Geoffroy, et al., 2010).  Box 1 
shows selected findings for the evaluation of the Cluster Approach (see Streets, Grunewald, 
























The impacts of the cluster approach appear to be mixed but it signaled the first real 
attempt to work directly with governments and other organizations with long-standing 
involvement in education in affected countries.  It signaled also the shift to development 
Box 1: Selected findings from the Evaluation of the Cluster Approach 
1. Partnership between UN agencies and other international humanitarian actors has 
become stronger, especially as NGOs increasingly assume co-lead or co-facilitator 
roles. 
2. Coverage of humanitarian needs has improved in some thematic areas. Depending 
on the country context, this includes gender-based violence, child protection, 
disability, water and sanitation, and nutrition. 
3. Gaps in humanitarian assistance are better identified and duplications are reduced. 
As a result, humanitarian actors can better target their assistances and resources are 
used more efficiently 
4. Inter-cluster coordination is ineffective in most cases and there is little integration of 
crosscutting issues.    
5. Poor cluster management and facilitation in many cases prevents clusters from 
reaching their full potential. Thus, clusters are often process - rather than action 
oriented. 
6. In their current implementation, clusters largely exclude national and local actors 





approaches that made national governments and school communities centers of education 
response and reconstruction and took a long-term, transformative approach (see Pigozzi, 1998). 
It found there was a general tendency for clusters working in education emergencies to 
bypass national government and work directly with communities and international or national 
NGOs or both, particularly where it is believed government action or inaction may have 
contributed to the emergencies (Sommers, 2003). 
 In a study of donor agencies’ support for education in fragile and conflict-affected states, 
results showed that in Liberia, donor agencies bypassed the state and provided monetary or non-
monetary support directly to implementing agencies and NGOs (Brannelly, Ndaruhutse & 
Rigaud, 2009).  Further, of the five agency programs highlighted in this study, only three 
included an education component (Brannelly, Ndaruhutse & Rigaud, 2009).   
The developmental approaches remain the expressed objective and desire of major actors 
in education emergencies such as UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR and Save the Children (see 
Aguilar & Retamal, 1998).  However, the expressed long-term commitment of many 
international agencies to the use of developmental approaches to education during emergencies 
has also been questioned given the preponderant use of standardized programs that are 
implemented rapidly, notably through child friendly spaces, school feeding programs and the use 
of educational kits (Nicolai, 2009).  
Aguilar and Retamal (2009) believed the psychosocial and protection dimensions of 
developmental approaches were being neglected in favor of literacy, numeracy and life skills, 
highlighting the continued dichotomy between the humanitarian-response and developmental 
approaches.  Development approaches, then, focus on the long-term engagement and 
transformation of education particularly where education may have contributed to conflicts or 
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where it ignored risks and vulnerabilities associated with disasters and emergencies.  
Understanding and working within local realities is essential to developmental approaches.   
2.4.2 Developmental approaches 
Developmental approaches to education response, recovery and reconstruction were proposed in 
the mid-nineties (Aguilar & Retamal, 1998; Pigozzi, 1999; Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998;). 
These approaches advocated for the transformation of education policy and programs, 
particularly in complex emergencies involving conflicts and genocide (Sommers, 2003).  They 
also involved reforming and reconstructing education rather than reconstituting previous 
educational systems. They proposed the use of disasters and emergencies as “windows of 
opportunity” (Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998) for “transforming education along the lines 
envisioned by the Jomtien World Conference on Education for all” (Pigozzi, 1999, p. 4).   
In the ideal situation, the developmental approach would feature child-centered 
education. Teachers would be respected and supported to provide learning environments that 
foster relevant, quality education.  The education system and the curriculum would be gender 
sensitive and attentive to equity and diversity issues.  Financial resources would be distributed 
more equitably.  Parents and communities would be respected as partners in the education 
process.  Community resources would be incorporated into teaching and learning materials 
(Pigozzi, 1999).  All of the foregoing requires time and contextual knowledge.  Ideal situations, 
of course, rarely occur.  
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In a compendium of case studies, involving ten countries,17 Nicolai found that 
educational transformation during and after conflicts was a difficult and protracted exercise 
(Nicolai, 2009). Transformation required partnership among all actors including national 
governments, donors, NGOs, communities, and community-based organizations.  Government 
policies and support remained critical windows of opportunity for transformation (Nicolai, 
2009).   
This transformation treats education as context-situated.  It not only supports healthy 
children’s growth and development; it also emphasizes the development of their cognitive and 
social skills. It helps to promote good governance and democratic ideals as well as the 
application and adherence to the rule of law - local, national and international. It constitutes 
healing, restoration and prevention. Finally, it includes communication, information and involves 
the media (Pigozzi, 1999).  Clearly, this presents education as it should be and is admittedly 
utopian.   Its key element is that children, and not just their learning, are central to any response 
in education emergencies; intervention should be long-term and should consider local contexts, 
anticipatory rather than reactionary, adaptive rather than transformative.  Figure 5 presents the 






17 These ten countries were Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Kosovo, South Africa, Southern Sudan, Sri 
Lanka, Rwanda & Uganda ( Nicolai, 2009a) 
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 Figure 5. Developmental Approach to Education Emergencies (based on Pigozzi, 1996, 
description only) 
 
This approach exhibits several shortcomings.  It is still a post-emergency approach, 
which in reality is proving difficult to implement since education is not addressed at the onset of 
the emergencies. This delay creates opportunities for the reestablishment of the old education 
system without needed improvements. I found on visiting Haiti that schools were already in 
operation while the Education Cluster was still in response mode following the 12 January 2010 
earthquake (Serrant, 2010, Personal Observation, Haiti, 7-14 March 2010).  It may not deliver 
the kind of educational transformation that policy makers might envision.  The approach makes 
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children not schools the center of attention, thereby downplaying the transformation of existing 
spaces central to the lives of children.  In this formulation, the developmental approach is 
reactionary rather than anticipatory. It is too focused on conflict-induced education emergencies 
or those triggered by catastrophic natural disasters, neglecting chronic, low-intensity triggers like 
low-intensity hurricanes. 
Developmental approaches assume that leadership will be forthcoming on the part of 
humanitarian and international organizations. Unfortunately, these organizations are not 
designed to provide long-term support or intervention during emergencies. As a result, they lack 
the policy, institutional and financial frameworks and personnel with experience that are 
essential for working with local lead agencies such as Ministries of Education, teacher training 
colleges and institutes.  They operate mainly as channels for providing external assistance to 
meet immediate educational needs, opting instead for bilateral and multilateral agency 
contractors that are usually international NGOs or development firms as lead agencies for 
developmental approaches that work to transform education during and sometimes for a while 
after emergencies (Sommers, 2003). 
2.4.3  Developmental approaches and non-government organizations 
NGOs such as Save the Children, PLAN, Child Fund, Catholic Relief Services, and Adventist 
Relief Agency (ADRA), are among the key organizations involved in education emergencies.  
Many of these were already operating in affected countries before the outbreak of conflicts and 
emergencies.  By 1999, there were 46 NGOs working in education in Afghanistan.  They focused 
mostly on primary and non-formal education service provision.  More than 28 of these NGOs 
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took on quasi-governmental roles in Afghanistan.  More than 50 NGOs made up the education 
cluster working in Haiti during the week of 7-12 March 2010.  Many of these, like Save the 
Children, Catholic Relief Services, PLAN, Pahre–Haiti, and Fonds de Parrainage National 
(FPN),  had been working in the area of education before the 2010 earthquake (UNICEF, 2010a). 
Most NGOs work directly with communities because of the fragility and weaknesses of the 
government and the reluctance of many international agencies to invest in public health, 
education and nutrition services.  Education Cluster leaders, and INEE and IASC guidelines 
advocate working directly with communities to re-establish educational services (IASC, 2006; 
INEE, 2004; Save the Children 2004).  Unfortunately, much of the work on education 
emergencies has been conducted in regions experiencing conflicts and war – Afghanistan, 
Somalia, Colombia, Rwanda, East Timor and Mozambique, among others.  In these situations, 
the entire fabric of children’s lives – their homes, schools, health centers and religious 
institutions – have been destroyed (Machel, 1996).  Education emergencies related to natural 
disasters have not enjoyed the level of attention and investment as have emergencies related to 
armed conflicts.  
However, education emergencies are common in regions experiencing sudden, 
catastrophic natural disasters such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, which destroyed 50% of 
schools and killed more than 270,000 people (UNICEF, 2010a).  As of early 2011, more than a 
million people were still living in tents, down to about 800,000 in November, 2011 (UNICEF, 
2011)  Such catastrophic events are often sudden but rare. Conflicts, on the other hand, are 
prolonged and usually leave adequate time for response before another conflict event occurs. 
Hurricanes are different.  The section, which follows, highlights these differences. 
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2.5 HURRICANES AND EDUCATION EMERGENCIES 
This section highlights gaps in the literature regarding education emergencies triggered by 
chronic and cyclical low-intensity hurricanes. The recurrent nature of hurricanes and their 
cumulative impacts, combined with silent emergencies like poverty exacerbate education 
emergencies, making it difficult for affected countries to cope using their own resources. This 
situation in turn contributes to endemic cycles of poverty (Anwar, 2008). 
2.5.1 Non-priority during hurricanes   
Restoring education systems becomes difficult and long-term because as mentioned before, 
chronic low-intensity, education emergencies rarely attract wide media attention or humanitarian 
assistance.  Moreover, although education was officially declared as the fourth pillar of 
humanitarian assistance in 2002, it still is not a high priority for agencies and specialists in the 
field of humanitarian assistance (Esnor, 2010; Madfis, Maetyris & Triplehorn, 2010).   Between 
2006 and 2009, more than $15 billion were disbursed globally for humanitarian assistance under 
the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF); however, only 2% was devoted 
to education emergencies (OCHA, 2010). Education was ranked 26th on CERF’s disbursement 
list.  Clearly, the money did not follow the policy declaration of education as the fourth pillar.  
Many specialists in humanitarian assistance and their agencies consider education to be 
developmental and the responsibility of national or local governments.  Thus, education 
emergencies are poorly funded in general, SIDS such as Dominica have inadequate resources to 
meet educational needs resulting from cyclical low-intensity hurricanes, and their frequent and 
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recurrent nature poses serious policy and financial problems for national and local governments 
(see Government of Dominica, 2006). 
2.5.2 Frequency of hurricanes 
In the long term, the Caribbean region experiences on average 0.4 to 1.0 major hurricanes per 
year (Pielke Jr., Rubiera, Landsea, Fernandez, & Klien, 2003).  Dominica, on the other hand, has 
a 10% chance of being hit by a hurricane annually compared to South Florida which has the 
highest propability of about 15% (op cit).  Dominica is brushed or hit by hurricanes almost every 
three years (Williams, 2010).  This means that children will experience about 4 hurricanes and 
their disruptions to their education by the time they graduate from high school.   
The more exposed children were to hurricanes the more likely they were to show higher 
levels of PSTD and depression (Feitelberg, 2007).  Hurricanes have, as already noted, negative 
impacts on student academic performance. Hurricanes affect children’s life chances expecially 
when they coinincide with terminal stages of secondary education or around the time of high 
stakes examinations.  Evidence reveals that since 1980, hurricanes in the Caribbean are 
increasing in frequency and intensity (Goldenberg, Landsea,  Mestas-Nunez, Gray, 2001).   
Often countries are preparing for new hurricanes while they are recovering from earlier 
storms (Anwar, 2008).  Dominica had back-to-back major hurricane in 1979 and 1980 and low- 
intensity hurricanes in 2007 and 2008.  In 2008, in the space of one month, four hurricanes hit or 
brushed past Haiti highlighting the cumulative effects.  Anwar (2008), in his discourse on 
recurring natural disasters on chronic poverty contends, “The repeated nature of natural disasters 
is such that for every small gain that results from public and private initiatives there are many 
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larger losses” (p. 287).  The experiences with hurricanes in the Caribbean are therefore, chronic 
given the frequency with which they occur and their relative invisibility with respect to the 
international humanitarian community.  Figure 6 depicts a framework for understanding the 
recurrent, cumulative and chronic nature of response of low intensity education emergencies. 











Figure 6. Understanding Education and Chronic LIH 
 
Whereas most disasters and emergencies, particularly conflicts and earthquakes, are 
unpredictable, hurricanes are predictable, can be forecast and tracked using reconnaissance 
aircrafts and satellite imagery.  The accuracy with which their speed, direction and wind strength 
are measured has improved markedly over the past 30 years (Barrett, Leslie & Fielder, 2006).   
Furthermore, they have a dedicated annual season and can be anticipated and prepared for.  
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Proactive approaches in combination with reactive activities can be adopted to reduce their 
impacts.   
In their discourse on reframing disaster policy for vulnerable communities, Comfort, et al 
(1999, p. ) noted, “we must change the policies of today that rely heavily on sending assistance 
only after tragedy has occurred, assistance must be sent before to aid.”  This is crucial since 
emergency or disaster management remains the responsibility of national and local governments. 
2.5.3 The role of national governments 
A review of the literature on the roles and responsibilities of formal and non-formal actors 
involved in emergencies in developing countries shows that national government or their agents 
play a leading role and are often at the apex of a hierarchy of disaster management (Freeman  & 
Kunreuther, 2002; Khan & Rhaman, 2007; Osei, 2007).  Of the 32 articles reviewed, 26 
identified national governments as the main actors (see Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006; Luchi & 
Esnard, 2008; Osei, 2007; Sinclair, 2002). National governments were identified as responsible 
for setting legal, policy and plan frameworks or (Aldunce & Leon, 2007; Chhetri, 2001).   With 
respect to education emergencies, national governments are responsible for pre-and post-disaster 
activities because education is mainly a public responsibility in most countries. An exception to 
this rule is Haiti with a dysfunctional education system that is 80% private in nature.  
Government roles might include designing school facilities for hurricanes and 
earthquakes; planning for recovery, restoring damaged buildings and providing temporary spaces 
for destroyed and damaged schools (Sinclair, 2002).  However, the lack of financial and 
technical resources especially but not only in SIDS weakens the capabilities of national 
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governments to deal with disaster and emergency management (Khan & Rahman, 2007; 
McEntire & Myers, 2004). 
This next section, then, reviews the literature on the economic and financial impacts of 
emergencies in developing countries vulnerable to disasters and emergencies.  
2.5.4 Economic impacts of disasters on developing countries 
A review of the literature on disaster impacts confirms developing countries suffer heavier losses 
than their developed counterparts (Rasmussen, 2004; Ghesquiere & Mahaul, 2007; McNabb & 
Pearson, 2010).  An analysis of  a large sample of  natural catastrophes between 1980 and 2004 
found that fatalities were higher in low and middle income (LAMI) countries than in more 
developed nations (Linneroth-Bayer, Mechler & Gflug, 2006).  Similarly, losses as a proportion 
of  gross national income (GNI) were higher and correlated negatively with per capita income 
(op cit).  Small countries were found to be particularly vulnerable, with the islands of the Eastern 
Caribbean being among the most disaster-prone (Collymore, 2004; Cummin & Mahul, 2009; 
Rasmussen, 2004).   Table 3 shows the extent of the impact of major disasters on small islands 









Table 3.  Major Disasters in the Last 40 Years 
Year Natural Disasters Country Region Estimated Direct 
loss (US$M) 
Direct Loss (% 
of GDP) 
LARGE ECONOMIES 
2005 Hurricane (Katrina) USA North America 125,000 1.1% 
1995 Earthquake Japan East Asia 100,000 3.2% 
1998 Flood China East Asia 30,000 0.7% 
1992 Hurricane (Andrew) USA North America 26,500 0.4% 
SMALL ISLAND ECONOMIES 
1988 Hurricane (Gilbert) St Lucia Caribbean 1,000 365% 
1991 Cyclone (Val & Wasa) Somoa Oceania 278 248% 
2004 Hurricane (Ivan) Grenada Caribbean 889 203% 
1990 Cyclone (Ofa) Somoa Oceania 2000 178% 
1985 Clyclone (Eric & 
Nigel) 
Vanuatu Oceania 173 143% 
2010 Earthquake Haiti Caribbean 8,000 114% 
2009 Tsunami Somoa Oceania 120 22% 
Source: Ghesquiere & Mahul, 2010 
 
As Table 3 shows, the impacts on small island economies are almost four times their 
GDP in some cases.  They were more than 12 times as exposed as the average country 
(Rasmussen, 2004).   
Of the 6,000 natural disasters recorded globally during 1970 – 2002,  about 75% of the 
events and 99% of the people affected were in developing countries (Rasmussen, 2004).  During 
that same period, 34 of the 44 natural disasters recorded in the Eastern Caribbean were due to 
storms or hurricanes.  The average cumulative damage was 66% of GDP compared to a 
worldwide average of 21%.  Further, it was observed that the poorest and most marginalized 
communities in these countries were the most affected by disaters (Goes & Skees, 2003).  This 
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situation is likely to worsen with the increasing frequency of hurricanes especially in the North 
Atlantic (National Center for Atmospheric Research, 2007; Hatton, 2010). 
The increase in frequency of  weather-related catastrophic disasters and the increasing 
exposure of developing countries to them is expected to result in major economic impacts 
(Gurenko & Lester, 2004).  Especially in developing countries, disasters result in the immediate 
contraction of economic output, worsening of external and fiscal balances, and increased poverty 
(Rasmussen, 2004).  National governments face liquidity constraints after these disasters 
(Ghesquiere & Mahaul, 2007).  Disasters also weaken revenue bases, hamper tax adminstration 
and collection; increase pressure on spending and increase the devolution of resources to short-
term disaster relief operations (Hofman, 2007).  National governments also face pressure to 
provide compensation or financial support to populations and sometimes the business sector to 
restore destroyed buildings (Hofman, 2007; Hofman & Brukoff, 2006).   
In addition to their effects on economic welfare, disasters also affect the social welfare of 
countries (Vakis, 2006).  The poor are made poorer as a result of lost income, lost capital in 
terms of property and equipment, and the death of family breadwinners.  Affected countries have 
found several ways to respond financially to these economic impacts.  The section which follows 
identifies some ways in which they respond. 
2.6 CURRENT FINANCIAL RESPONSES 
To meet immediate expenditure needs, disaster-prone developing countries have relied on post-
disaster or ex-post funding in the form of grants and loans from external sources (Cashin & 
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Dyczewski, 2006; Hofman, 2007).  They also divert limited budgets and development funds, 
take on additional loans, and/or accept international aid for humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction (Cashin & Dyczewski, 2006; Goes & Skees, 2002; Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 
2007).  They also establish contigency funds but often these are inadequate.  In 1996, the 
Government of Mexico established a catastrophe reserve fund (FONDEN).  In 2005, the fund 
was exhausted forcing the government to turn to international facilities for supplementing its 
reserve fund  (Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 2007).  Having established a Calamity Relief Fund 
and a National Calamity Contingency Fund, India resorted to international humanitarian 
assistance after the 2004 Asian Tsunami, despite having refused assistance initially (Price & 
Mihir, 2009). 
International aid or humanitarian assistance appears to be driven by the anticipation of 
aid among affected countries and the moral difficulty donors face in witholding such aid 
(Hofman & Brukoff, 2006).  International assistance has been shown to be inadequate because of 
the increase in the numbers and impact of major disasters and their cumulative costs throughout 
the world (Smillie & Minear, 2003).  It is generally believed also that “little new money” is 
actually dedicated to humanitarian assistance because existing funds are simply repurposed to 
meet emergency needs (Wathne & Hedger, 2010).  Additionally, humanitarian aid pledges for 
many countries experiencing humanitarian emergencies greatly outstrip actual commitments 
(Wathne & Hedger, 2010).   
Developing countries have been criticized for their over-dependence on ex-post responses 
and financing.  Often these take the form of humanitarian aid and remittances from the diaspora 
because of limited domestic fiscal resources available to these governments and to communities 
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(Gurenko & Lester, 2004).  This may also be due to the manner in which disasters are perceived 
and treated. For example, an evalution of the World Bank’s assistance to natural disasters shows: 
Countries affected by disasters, as well as the donors that try to help them, including the 
Bank,  have generally treated disasters as interruptions in development rather than as a risk 
that is integral to development. At the country level, few Country Assistance Strategies 
(CAS) and Poverty Reduction  Strategies (PRSs) mention disaster risks even in countries 
that have experienced multiple events resulting in major disasters. At the project level 
objectives have mainly provided for short-term fixes and rarely addressed the root causes of 
the disastrous impacts of natural disasters (World Bank IEG, 2006, p. xxi).  
 
Ex-post assistance for emergency relief and resconstruction, though essential, has failed 
to reduce exposure to disaster risks, and to ensure sufficient recovery funds for governments and 
individuals (Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler & Pflug, 2006, Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 2007). 
According to Mahul & Gurenko, “when it comes to funding natural disasters ex-post financing is 
not the right approach.”(2006, p. 3)  Estimates show that countries will save seven dollars on 
recovery cost for every dollar spent on disaster risk reduction (ADB, 2008).  Donor communities 
are recognizing the need therefore, to place greater emphasis on prevention and preparedness, 
and consequently on ex-ante or pre-disaster funding (Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler & Gflug, 2006; 
Freeman, n.d.).  The overall objective of ex-ante funding is to mitigate long-term impacts of 
disasters and to shift responsibility for risk reduction away from national governments to 
individual citizens and households.  The following section discusses ex-ante funding. 
2.6.1 Ex-ante financing 
The financial instruments generally available for emergency assistance had been classified as ex-
ante and ex-post (Association of Caribbean States, 2007).  Ex-ante financing covers prevention 
and mitigation or pre-disaster activities.  Ex-post financing covers recovery and reconstruction or 
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post-dasaster activities (Freeman, n.d.).  Financial investments are essential on both sides of 
natural disasters or other emergency events (before and after) since they often cannot be 
prevented.  Reducing their impacts usually requires ex-ante funding for pre-disaster activities, 
specifically for prevention and preparedness.  The Association of Caribbean States  (2007)  
produced a list of ex-ante and ex-post disaster financing mechanisms. It identified nine ex-ante 
instruments which governments can access for risk reducation and transfer.  Table 4 is a 
summary description of these instruments.  They include loans, grants, contingeny financing, 
catastrophe bonds, earmarks, SWAps, and insurance.  Table 4  aslo describes the scope of each 
of these instruments as well as the institutions responsible for managing them. 












This is available to member states at up to $5 million to take an 
integrated approach to reducing and managing risks to natural 
disasters before a disastrous event. Among the areas for which it 
is available is preparedness to enhance a country’s readiness to 
cope quickly and effectively during an emergency; risk and 
vulnerability assessment and reduction; adopting risk transfer 







World Bank In addition to emergency assistance, these loans fund free-
standing investment projects for disaster  prevention and 
mitigation in countries prone to specific types of emergencies. 
Prevention and mitigation projects include developing national 
emergency strategy; establishing adequate insitutional and 
regulatory frameworks; risk and vulnerability research and 
assessment;  reinforcement of vulnerable structures and 
adjusting building and zoning codes; and the acquisition of 





Facility for the 
Caribbean 
(DMFC) 
Grant Caribbean Development 
Bank 
These grant funds promote natural hazard risk reduction in 
member states. USAID provided $3 million to augment CDB 







Donor Entity and 
Recipient Government 
These are transactions in which the insurer undertakes to make 
payments to  an investor in a specified portfolio of securities. In 
return the investor assumes the insurers liabillities in the event 
of a disaster. What is to be financed is decided on by both 
parties and supports a single sector policy and expenditure.  
Catastrophe  Risk  Financial institutions  The party transferring the risk issues a special bond.  In the  
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Source: Association of Caribbean States (2007) (data only) 
 
Ex-ante financing has been shown to have decided advantages over ex-post financing.  It 
tends to guarantee a more rapid access to capital in the short and long run, and it avoids 
budgetary diversion and additional loans (Goes & Skees, 2003).  It is designed to provide  
incentives for disaster planning and mitigation (Kunreuther & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2002; Skees et 
al., 2002).  It also provides immediate liquidity to governments for post-disaster relief and the 













event of a disaster, interest payment by the insurer may be 
called or the insurer may receive a percentage of the bond’s 
principal depending on the magnitude of the catastrophe and the 
terms of the contract. It is issued by insurance companies to 
spread risks by transferring some of the risk through capital 
market by floating catastrophe bonds where the risks are too 






IMF;  International 
Finance Corporation 
(IFC) 
Payments are made if triggers with respect to some 
weather outcomes are exceeded over a specified period of time. 
The IMF is currently developing this mechanism for low-
income countries and the IFC is conducting market feasibility 







(e.g. FONDEN in 
Mexico) 
These initiatives involve the establishment of disaster funds 
with adequate resources to meet critical needs without altering 
normal public finance at the national, regional and local levels. 
They are used to reduce the negative effect of natural 







Local communities and 
governments 
These mechanisms channel resources to communities that need 
them most; to reduce the vulnerability of impoverished groups: 
1. Social or municipal funds – financed by national 
ministries, multi or bilateral agencies, and disbursed 
through municipal or local entities; 
2. Community development projects financed by 
national and international NGOs or other agencies; 
3. Micro-enterprise and small business credit programs; 
4. Informal financing mechanisms such as local informal 
credit markets or systems for pooling resources (e.g. 
sous-sous or partner in the Caribbean (Beddoe, 
Bernard, Rohlehr & Seepersad, 2001) 
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If may be asserted that countries must be financially prepared for disasters through securing 
financial resources in anticipation of the occurrence of disasters and emergencies. 
In an Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) overview of natural disaster risk in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Charveriat notes,  
“…financial preparedness requires the quick mobilization of low-cost fund to finance 
emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruciton activities through insurance, national 
reserve funds and contingency financing.  It also involves a quick disbursement capacity 
of funds at both the national and local levels as well as transparent  procurement practices 
to maximize the efficiency of reconstruction funds (2000, p. 76). 
 
In addition to being able to access financial resources, having the ability to disburse these 
funds is of critical importance.  However, the IDB focus is still ex-post  A review of literature 
between 2000 and 2010 on ex-ante financing for catastrophic events appears to show a 
preference for risk transfer through insurance.  These studies include Michler-Kerjan (2001); 
Keepi & Tyson (2002); Goes & Skees (2003); Gurenko & Chester (2004); Linnerooth-Bayer & 
Mechler, (2007); Cummins & Mahul (2009). 
2.6.2 Insurance 
The literature identifies three forms of insurance available for hedging disaster losses or risk 
transfers.  These are traditional insurance18, reinsurance19 and CAT bonds20 (Keipi & Tyson, 
2002; Kunreuther & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2002; Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 2007).  They are 
18 These are local or regional commercial entities that cover risk for a premium. 
19 These are the insurance companies’ insurers. Insurance companies with inadequate capital insure their own risks 
with larger insurance companies like Lloyds of London (Hofman and Brukoff, 2006). 
20 These are contract-based bonds taken with investors on capital markets using a Special Purpose Vehicle. A 
principal sum is paid and  held in bond and paid out to insurers should disasters occur (Ghesquiere & Mahul, 2010).  
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construed as ex-ante financing because they are taken out before disasters (Hoffman & Brukoff, 
2006).  However, they mature after disasters or emergencies.  They appear, therefore, to be ex-
post funding insurance. However, they have the advantage of influencing disaster prevention 
activities, although indirectly because they often have risk reducton pre-conditions that are to be 
met before for coverage is approved.   Meeting these conditions often reduce the cost of 
premiums (Kunreuther & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2002; Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 2007).  At the 
same time, insurance may constitute moral hazards in the sense that people may tend not to take 
preventive action because they are covered by insurance or because governments act as insurers 
(Kunreuther & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2003).  Notwithstanding, insurance has been depicted as 
expensive for developing countries, making them averse to insurance (Kunreuther & Linnerooth-
Bayer, 2003). 
 Administrative costs, marketing expenses and risk management services of insurers or 
reinsurers are high (Kunreuther & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2002).  The insurance pool must be larger 
than those at risk, which is not the case in developing countries.  Individual households in 
developing countries  are unable to afford catastrophic insurance, and they become dependent on 
their governments and their own savings, if any, to recover from their losses due to natural 
disasters.   
National governments in developed countries tend not to insure their assets against 
disasters, operating instead as risk neutral (Kunreuther & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2002; Ghesquiere & 
Mahul, 2010).  In addition, they often act as insurers for homeowners and businesses 
(Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 2007).  This neutrality does not appear to hold for developing 
countries and SIDS are too small to diversify risks.  The high level of indebtedness of some of 
these countries also makes securing credit difficult.  Governments spread risks across 
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generations through taxation to cover disaster losses but earmarking of funds make reallocation 
of local funds during disasters difficult as well (Ghesquiere & Mahul, 2010,).   
 A review of the management of catastrophic flood events in emerging economies, 
shows a desire for national governments like Poland’s and India to transfer responsibilities for 
disasters to “second level administative authorities” (Kunreuther & Lineerooth-Bayer, 2002, p. 
630).  Financial support and institutional capabilities are not passed on from central levels, 
leaving districts and communities to depend mainly on local funds and mutual support 
mechanisms, and international and national agencies and NGOs, where they exist (Kusumasari, 
Alam & Siddiqui, 2010).  International agencies tend, therefore, to step in to meet the financial 
shortfalls related to disasters and emergencies in developing countries.  However, they are 
increasingly moving toward the provision of ex-ante support.  Most of these international ex-ante 
disaster assistance arrangements are bilateral. OCHA confirms the difficulty of  accessing ex-
ante funding and identified ten international disaster assistance sources of such funding.  
2.6.3 International disaster assistance 
Several developed countries and their regional affiliates have bilateral arrangements and 
institutions to assist developing countries and small island states with ex-ante funding for 
disasters.  These countries and (their institutions) are Australia (AusAID); Canada (CIDA); The 
United Kingdom (DFID-CHF, HRF, DRRF); European Union (ECGHO & DIPECHO); Japan 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Norway (NORAD); Sweden (SIDA); Switzerland (SDC), New 
Zealand (NZAID) and the United States (USAID) (OCHA, 2007).   
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These insitutions earmark the activities for which funds are available.  DFID, SIDA, 
SDC, DIPECHO and DFID specify disaster preparedness in their funding protocols.  AusAID, 
CIDA, DFID–CHF; DFID – HRF;  Japan; NORAD, SIDA, and USAID disburse finances to or 
through local or international NGOs, UN agencies or international organizations such as the Red 
Cross.  EU-ECHO; EU-DIPECHO; DFID – DRRF; SDC; and Japan provide funding directly to 
disaster prone regions or countries.  These are either investment funding, development funding 
or funds earmarked for risk reduction (OCHA, 2007).   
The SDC provided assistance to Eastern Europen Countries, specifically.  The European 
Union (ECHO & DIPECHO) provides funding to six specific regions in the Caribbean, Latin 
America and Asia.  NZAID provides assistance for Pacific Islanders to attend regional and 
international conferences to strengthen their local ownership of disaster-related development 
processes (OCHA, 2007).  
Earmarking appears to be one of the distinctive features of ex-ante funding for disasters 
(Wathne & Hedger, 2010).  This results in the disconnection between domestic and foreign 
polices (Walker & Pepper, 2007; Ghesquiere & Mahul, 2010; Freeman, n.d.).  In addition to 
disaster assistance, developing countries are now being encouraged to include disaster risk 
reduction and preparedness in development loans or grants proposal.  The World Bank and its 
regional affiliates have prepared strategic and action plans for financing Natural Disaster 
Assistance (World Bank IEG, 2006).  The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) developed policies and action plans for the inclusion of risk reduction 
in development loans with countries (ADB, 2004; ADB, 2008; CDB,2009).  In addition, the 
CDB instituted a program for Proactive Assistance for Risk Reduction and Climate Change 
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Adaptation among member states (CDB, 2009).  This promotes the implementation of risk 
reduction measures, including preparedness, mitigation and prevention.   
Thiry–nine countries and eight international organizations established a Global Facility of 
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) under the management of the World Bank, to assist 
developing countries with the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action21, 2005-2015.  
The fourth priority of the Framework advocates for the reduction of disaster losses through the 
adoption of disaster risk reduction strategies (GFDRR, 2010).  Its functions include 
mainstreaming disaster risk reduction by including related strategies in development projects.  
The fund consists of three tracks. Track III serves as a source of funding for countries in the 
immediate aftermath of disasters for disaster recovery and reconstruction (GFDRR, 2010).  It 
also advocates for the development of the insurance sector in developing countries, particularly 
for insuring homes, small businesses and agriculture through its Disaster Risk Financing and 
Insurance (DRFI) Program (GFDRR, 2010).   
 Two catastrophic risk insurance facilities were developed in conjuction with the 
GFDRR.  These are the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) and the Turkish 
Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP). 
The CCRIF is a regional insurance facility that provide short-term financial support to 
Caribbean member states affected by hurricanes and earthquakes.  The facility was begun with 
donor funding from international aid agencies such as the EU, the World Bank, and the 
21 The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) is a 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural hazards for 
building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters. It was adopted by 168 Member States of the United 
Nations in 2005 at the World Disaster Reduction Conference, which took place just a few weeks after the Indian 




                                                 
governments of developed countries including Japan, Canada, UK, France, Ireland and Bermuda 
and membership fees by participating governments.  Through this facility, member countries of 
the Caribbean are able to purchase catastrophic insurance at the lowest possible prices 
(Ghesquiere & Mahul, 2007; 2010; Auffret, 2003).  Disbursement, however, gives preference to 
intense and rare disaster events like hurricanes measuring at least Category 3 on the Saffir 
Simpson Scale.  Low intensty hurricanes are not covered under this facility. While CCRIF 
provides funding directly to national governments in the event of disasters or emergencies, the 
TCIP is tailored to households. 
The TCIP  was established in 2000 as a consortium of 29 insurance companies in Turkey. 
They provide households with insurance to meet government’s mandated insurance coverage for 
all homeowners at affordable premiums.  According to TCIP,  the compulsory earthquake 
insurance reduces the burden on the national budget and the need for additional taxes (TCIP, n.d; 
Linnerooth & Mechler, 2007).   
Another facility is the global Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) that was set up 
as a central donation facility where contributions can be made year round.  It facilities the 
prompt response of the United Nations in situations of emergency by providing the financial 
support to be able to do so (United Nations, 2007).  OCHA is responsible for managing the fund.  
From 2006 to 2010, only about $26 million (1.5%) of the $1.8 billion of CERF funds were 
disbursed to the education sector (United Nations, 2007b). UNICEF was the major recipient of 
education sector funding.  It was mainly spent on African and Asian countries for under-funded 
education emergences or rapid responses. Many countries, however, often resort to Emergency 
response loans to deal with disasters. 
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2.6.4 Emergency Response Loans 
Direct ex-post loans or the diversion of monies from already disbursed development loans appear 
to be common instruments for financing disaters (Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 2007). These 
authors believe that governments generally are able to lower the impacts of disaster events by 
setting up their own, though inadeqate, calamity or contingency loans or funds using domestic 
resources.  As noted earlier, India established its own Calamity Relief Fund and National 
Calamity Contingency Fund; however, these proved inadequate after the 2004 Asian Tsunami 
(Price & Mihir, 2009). 
The World Bank and regional development banks like the Asian Development Bank and 
the Caribbean Development Bank have developed emergency response policies and funds as a 
result of the failure of existing pre/post–disaster mechanisms to deal with disasters (ADB, 2004; 
CDB, 2008).  The World Bank disbursed over $14 billion, and the Asian dvelopment bank 
disbursed 5.6% of their loans for natural disaster response and rehabilitation to developing 
countries by 2002 (Kunreuther & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2003). 
New loans can be difficult to obtain after disasters because of severe damages to the 
economy, uncertainty regarding national economic prospects, and governments’ inability to 
repay these loans (Keipi & Tyson, 2002).  Loans result in increased indebtedness at times when, 
as Table 3 shows, countries have suffered large economic losses from disasters.  A related 
alternative approach is the refinancing of existing loans (op cit).  Refinancing, however, distorts 
the goals of the original credits and may reduce the efficacy of the execution of orignial projects.  
Refinancing is perceived as bad mangement because it tends to divert funds from original 
objectives to emergency uses and fosters a dependence on ex-post financing (Keipei & Tyson, 
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2002). Other more creative, grassroots microfinancing instruments like microinsurance have 
emerged to fill the funding gaps. 
2.6.5  Microinsurance  
 Microinsurance is another financial instrument that is available for ex-ante disaster funding.  
Available to households and businesses, microinsurance may reduce dependence on national or 
sub-national governments for disaster insurance.  Indirectly, microinsurance may reduce disaster 
costs to national governments but it may increase them directly to individual citizens and 
households, particularly the poorest, who are among the hardest hit during disasters. 
The concept of microinsurance gained prominence when the United Nations declared  
2005 as the Year of Microcredit (Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer & Peppiatt, 2006).  Microinsurance 
provides “low income households and businesses with affordable and accessible insurance for 
death, health expenses, loss of small scale assets, livestock and crops in the event of a flood, 
typhoon or natural disasters” (Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer & Peppiatt, 2006, p. 3).  This is 
important because it reduces dependence on national governments and their finances.  However, 
as credits, these must be repaid.  Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer and Peppiatt (2006) identify two 
types of  micro insurances - traditional and index-based insurance22.   
In summary, emergency responses are affected by resource availability and the capacity 
for resource disbursement (Comfort, 2004). Developing and SIDS appear to lack both. 
International assistance (often in the form of humanitarian aid) that was once abundant is 
22 Index-based insurance are contracts written against a physical trigger such as rainfall as measured at a regional 
weather station (Kunreuther & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2003). 
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dwindling due to the prevalence and high cost of disasters (Save the Children, 2007; World 
Bank, 2006).  Bilateral funding agreements between developed countries and their poorer, 
vulnerable counterparts serve as safety values but these are mostly earmarked funds which are 
not always congruent with the priorities of national governments.  The failure of ex-post funding 
is shifting focus to ex-ante funding through development projects and insurance.   
Disaster risk reduction insurance matures as ex-post funding, but it can lower premiums 
since its pre-condition reduces risks and vulnerability to disasters or emergencies. However, 
those premiums remain relatively high and unaffordable for households in developing and small 
island developing states. Governments, therefore, bear the greater responsibility for disaster 
recovery forcing some into regional insurance facilities to mitigate their own losses. 
2.7 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE  
The literature on education emergences and emergency financing can be summarized as follows: 
1. Research and work in education emergencies have focused heavily on loud or 
complex emergencies and mostly on those resulting from wars and conflicts. 
2. Education emergencies triggered by high intensity, natural calamities and in 
particular hurricanes are less prevalent in the literature reviewed, and chronic low-
intensity hurricanes appear to be virtually absent. 
3. During emergencies and disasters, educational infrastructures are often destroyed 
or suffer extensive damage causing widespread disruptions for many children, 
families, educators and communities. 
4. The recovery of national education systems has not been treated as top priority 
during emergencies. Instead, standardized programs and strategies focusing on 
child protection developed by international humanitarian agencies tend to 
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dominate humanitarian responses. Many are implemented alongside existing 
education systems. 
5. Emergency education is underfunded, and financial allocations for education are 
often cut during austerity after crises. Educational infrastructures are often in 
disrepair long before emergencies, leaving them at a major risk for additional 
damage, destruction and disruption. 
6. Very little emergency financing is directly available or earmarked for the 
recovery of education systems. However, a few bilateral and multilateral agencies 
have funds earmarked for education. They are insufficient to meet the needs for 
education reform and systems rebuilding, especially in SIDS and other developing 
nations. 
7. Education emergency responses often do not address the fundamental factors that 
created the emergencies in the first place. 
 
The absence of low intensity, chronic education emergencies in the literature on 
education emergencies, creates challenges for the development of a conceptual framework for its 
study among SIDS.  The absence of humanitarian assistance during chronic low intensity, 
education emergencies and the problems inherent in ex-post financial arrangements shifts 
attention away from the humanitarian approach towards a developmental approach that places 
the focus on national governments to deal with such emergencies.  It also shifts focus away from 
post to pre-disaster preparedness for emergencies.  Such an approach places low intensity, 
chronic education emergencies within the development realities of SIDS that have limited 
funding, recurrent emergencies, and education systems in crisis that are especially vulnerable to 
damage, destruction and disruptions.  Such an approach breaks new ground and leads to the 
proposal for an emergent conceptual framework based in part on personal experience and 
reflection.    
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2.8 EMERGENT CONCEPTUAL POLICY FRAMEWORK 
The absence of a body of literature or empirical research education and LIH, education 
emergencies presents a major challenge for the formulation of a conceptual framework to guide 
futher research in this area.  Grounded in a process of reflection and experience with hurricanes 
since 1979 and working within the education system of Dominica since 1982, a tentative 
framework was proposed for conducting field research.  This framework was revised as the study 
unfolded. The final conceptual framework was based on the data analyses and findings of this 
study and is shown in Figure 7.   
The “quick-fix,” humanitarian approaches to education emergencies have not addressed 
adequately the long-term problems of chronic low-intensity hurricanes especially in SIDS such 
as Dominica.  This was because there has been no thorough examiniation or research into how 
countries address the issues for education. What was not known is whether international 
humanitarian organizations are involved in addressing this issue and if so how, given their heavy 
involvement in high intensity, prolonged or conflict-related education emergencies. Given, 
national governments bear ultimate responsibility for disaster management (Ahrens & Rudolph, 
2006; Freeman & Kunreuther, 2002; Khan & Rhaman, 2007; Luchi & Esnard, 2008; Osei, 2007; 
Sinclair, 2002) and SIDS are already financially constrained, it was anticipated that only small 
amounts of local funds will be allocated for disaster management, particularly for sudden, 
catastrophic emergencies because they are rare.  It was unclear how funding issues play out in 
situations where disaster events are anticipated, recurrent and the impacts are cumulative, as was 
the case of low-intensity hurricanes.   
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The framework assumed that national governments through their various ministries have 
full responsibility for disaster or education emergency management.  It shows the involvement of 
international and regional development or humanitarian agencies and partners  though limited 
and the missing dimension of financial, LIH and education policies and plans.  Figure 7 depicts 
this framework for structuring the problem of education and LIH .  
 
Figure 7. Conceptual Framework (Problem Structuring) for Education and LIH 
 
This framework argues that it is the damage and destruction of school buildings, the resulting 
disruptions for children and their teachers and responses to them that constitute education 
emergencies associated with chronic, low-intensity hurricanes.  It assumes the location and site 
of these buildings, the adherence to building codes and standards or the constructions may be key 
factors in risk and vulnerabilities to which schools are exposed.  
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This frame are grounded in two theories of disasters and emergencies, Dombrowsky’s 
(1981) theory of disasters as an expansion of Carr’s (1932) work as the “collapse of social and 
cultural protections” and Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort’s (2001) theory of disaster as “political 
and administrative failures.” Both argue disasters are not the events but the collapse of 
protections (Dombrowsky, 1981) and in failed political and administrative decisions. Together 
with Pigozzi’s development approach, these from the basis for the adapted development 
approach being proposed for sustainably addressing education during LIH. 
Limited finances may be affecting the kind and quality of building materials and 
supervision during construction, maintenance and repairs, and adequate personnel to monitor 
adherence to building codes and standards.  The rugged topography may be forcing the location 
and siting of school buildings along river flood plains, the narrow coastal plains and in close 
proximity to steep slopes making them vulnerable to landslides, floods and sea surges associated 
with low intensity hurricanes. The research procedures were designed to investigate these 
assumptions and arguments guided by the four propositions outlined earlier. 
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3.0  RESEARCH PROCEDURES 
3.1 EPISTEMOLOGY AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
This mixed-method case study is policy-oriented. It is an investigation into how the 
Commonwealth of Dominica addressed education during chronic, low-intensity hurricanes 
(LIH).  Epistemologically, it conforms to the pragmatic paradigm.   Pragmatism focuses on lines 
of action.  It utilizes methods of research that are seen to be most appropriate for studying the 
phenomenon at hand, that is, education, government assertions, actions and their consequences 
with respect to low-intensity hurricanes.  “The essential emphasis is on actual behaviors (lines of 
action); the beliefs that undergird those behaviors (warranted assertions) and the consequences 
that are likely to follow from different behaviors (workability),” (Mertens, 2005, p. 36).  
Effectiveness, rather than truth, is the objective, that is, establishing that the results “work” with 
respect to the problem for which solutions are being sought (Mertens, 2005).   
Pragmatists, therefore, are free to study what is of value to them, do so in different ways 
that they deem appropriate and in ways that bring about positive consequences within their value 
system (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2009).  They search for useful points of connections between 
existing behavior, the beliefs that drive them and the consequences of alternative behaviors 
(Mertens, 2005).  These behaviors and beliefs are the foundations of policy positions and policies 
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that address or solve public policy problems like education during LIH.  What counts, then are 
results or responses, the corresponding behaviors and the beliefs that drive them.     
Much of disaster policy focus has been on response and recovery rather than mitigation 
and preparedness.  Response and recovery have depended mostly on external assistance from 
friendly governments, international humanitarian and donor agencies in the form of grants, loans 
or fund transfers.  There is need for change.  “Disasters have become a policy problem of global 
scope…we must therefore change the policies of today that rely heavily on sending assistance 
only after tragedy has occurred” (Comfort, et al. 1999, p. 39).  A shift to mitigation and 
preparedness would be anticipatory, provide assistance before disasters and would reduce costs 
significantly.  Every dollar invested in mitigation and preparedness results in savings of seven 
dollars on response and recovery (ADB, 2004).  It makes economic sense, therefore, to rethink 
existing policies.  Issues regarding policies, however, are complex, wicked and messy.       
Analysts are rarely faced with a single, well-defined problem with readily definable 
boundaries. Instead, they are faced with a tangled net of multiple problems, which, 
distributed throughout the policy-making process, are products of the interaction 
between external conditions and stakeholders who interpret the same external 
conditions in unknown ways (Dunn, 1997, p. 286). 
 
Policy problems should be approached, therefore, from the perspective of what is known 
as well as what is unknown about them.  Being unknown, “the origin of a social problem lie in 
the probes that declare it to be a problem” (Lindbolm, 1990, p. 36).  Social problem solving is a 
process of applying knowledge as well as a process of probing what to do in the presence of the 
unknown (see Lindblom, 1990, p. 29 - 44).  This study applied probative strategies to define 
determine government’s actions with respect to education during low-intensity hurricanes, the 
assertions that drove them and their consequences.  It will determine the extent to which there 
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has been policy and practice changes that reflected emphasis on mitigation and preparedness in 
addressing education during low-intensity hurricanes using a single case.  
3.2 DATA COLLECTION 
No one source of evidence, on its own, is sufficient in single case studies. The use of multiple 
sources of evidence or mixed methods, each with its strengths and weaknesses, is a key 
characteristic of case study research (Graham, 2010).  Mixed-methods usually utilize multiple 
sources of information to establish a chain of evidence and strengthen the construct validity of a 
study (Yin, 2004).  They help to understand policy problems that exist in complex educational 
settings (Mertens, 2005).  Mixed-methods are compatible with pragmatism, and combine the use 
of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods (Mertens, 2005; Tashakkori & Teddle, 
2002).   
Pragmatism provides, therefore, an underlying philosophical framework for mixed-
method research (Tashakkori & Teddle, 2002).  It allows researchers to use methods or 
combination of methods that work best for answering their research question (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Consequently, I reviewed official documents to identify and analyze 
documented policies that addressed education during low-intensity hurricanes (LIH) and the 
extent to which they guided action on education during emergencies.  I interviewed key agents in 
the Ministries of Finance, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Public Works in Dominica to 
determine and analyze their perspectives, roles and responsibilities.  I also interviewed school 
principals for their perspectives and experiences with education during low-intensity hurricanes 
76 
 
(LIH).  Finally, I inspected school buildings affected by low-intensity hurricanes (LIH) to 
determine the extent to which hurricane protective features were installed or re-installed during 
repairs and rehabilitation.  Appendix E is a summary of these data collection and analytic 
strategies and Figure 8 below outlines categories of respondents/targets, data collection and 








The remainder of this Section provides details on these mixed methods: documents 
reviews and interviews and inspections as well as data collection strategies and analyses based 
on Figure 8. 
3.3 SINGLE CASE METHODOLOGY 
A single case study investigates an entity – individual, community or country to answer specific 
research questions, sometimes stated loosely, using a range of evidence available in the case 
setting to answer these questions (Graham, 2010; Yin, 2004).  Single case studies are prevalent 
in education emergency research.  The edited works of Retamal & Aguilar (1998) are a 
compendium of case studies and commentaries.  Case studies lend themselves to in-depth 
research (Yin, 2004).  In-depth research is essential as a foundation for policy and programmatic 
interventions.  In the case of Dominica, this is important for investigating and understanding the 
dialectics and complex contexts of education during low-intensity hurricanes.  I selected 
Dominica because it is considered one of the most vulnerable countries in the Caribbean due to 
its high risk for volcanoes, earthquakes and hurricanes (Collymore, 2004; Government of 
Dominica, 2012, Rasmussen, 2009).  
Second only to Florida, Dominica has a 10% change of being hit or brushed by a 
hurricane each year with average wind speed of 108 miles per hour, that is, Category 2, or low 
intensity hurricane on the Saffir Simpson Scale (Williams, 2010).  Dominica could be brushed, 
therefore, or hit directly every two and a half years.  This means students would experience about 
five low-intensity hurricanes by the time they graduated out of high school.   
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Dominica represented, therefore, a rich data source for studying education and low-
intensity hurricanes.  I also selected it because I was familiar with that case and because it was 
expensive to include other cases since my research budget was limited.   Given the dearth of 
policy-related research on education during low-intensity hurricanes (LIH), this study established 
a foundation for future studies.   This foundation would serve as a model for conducting similar 
research elsewhere.  Given the varied and complex nature of the research context, I used mixed-
methods data collection to identify, corroborate and validate findings, and to capture the rich data 
and complexities of this phenomenon (Yin, 2004).   
3.3.1 Official documents 
Official documents contained the essential policies that revealed government’s perceptions about 
disasters and LIH as well as identifying and analyzing its policy positions on these in Dominica.  
I conducted preliminary word searches of these documents using search tools embedded in 
Microsoft Word and Protected Document File (PDF) to identify relevant key words related to 
hurricanes, disasters, emergencies and education in emergencies.  Appendix A is template for 
initial data collection.  Where they existed, I analyzed these documents in more detail using 
Computer –Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) which are discussed fully 
in Section 1.4 on Data Analysis and Presentation.   Table 5 shows the list of these preliminary 






 Table 5. Documents Subjected to Preliminary and Detailed Analysis 
Documented subjected to preliminary analysis Documents subjected to detailed analyzed  
Budget and budget estimates and addresses 
from 2004 to 2012 
 
Budget addresses, 2005/06; 2007/08; 
2009/10; 2011 and 2012 
Medium Term Growth and Social 
Protection Strategy 2006, 2008 and 2012-
2014 
Medium Growth and Social Protection 
Strategy, 2006  
Medium Growth and Social Protection 
Strategy,  2012-2014 
 
Maintenance Policy and Manual (School 
Plant), 2011 
Maintenance Policy and Manual (School 
Plant), 2011 
 
Maintenance Report (Inception), 2011 
 
Maintenance Report (Inception) 2011 
Education Sector Plan, 2005 – 2010 
 
 
Plan to reduce the vulnerability of school 
buildings in Dominica, 1995 
 
 
National Disaster Plan, 2001 National Disaster Plan, 2001 
Education Act 1997  
 
All documents were in electronic formats to facilitate these searches.  Their selection for 
detailed analysis was based on these LIH words and terms: “risk reduction, vulnerability, 
preparedness, response, mitigation (prevention), hurricanes, recovery, emergencies, repairs, 
education and disaster management.”  Where one or more of these words or terms appeared, 
documents were analyzed further.   Further analyses identified word or term frequencies and 
their contexts using an inductive approach (See Boyatzis, 1998).   
Inductive approach is data driven, and involved identifying and coding themes as they 
emerged from the reading of documents and transcripts (Boyatzis, 1998; Silverman, 2000).  This 
approach; a) condenses raw textual data into a brief, summary format; b) establishes clear links 
between the research objectives and the summary findings derived from the raw data; and c) 
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develops a framework of the underlying structure of experiences or processes that are evident in 
the raw data (Thomas, 2007, p. 237). 
I used these key words and terms identified earlier to code and map themes, policy 
positions and perspectives on education during LIH.   Other documents helped explore these 
themes further, for example, budget documents, 2004 – 2012 helped to determine the availability 
and allocation of financial resources and their implications for education during LIH.  These 
documents also helped shape the content and scope of interviews described in the section which 
follows.   
3.3.2 Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with elite or senior public officers in three Ministries: Finance; 
Education, and Public Works to determine how key actors addressed education during LIH.  
Interviews focused on their actions, assertions behind those action and their consequences.   
Elite interviews are interviews with people who occupy senior management and board 
level positions within organizations or who are in close proximity to power (Harvey, 2011; 
Morris, 2009).  Interviewers, then, need to gain the trust of these elite respondents in order to 
collect high quality data (Harvey, 2011).  These interviews establish “conversational 
partnership” using key questions, follow-up questions and probing questions (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005, p. 79).  I developed a number of key questions to guide these elite interviews.  These are 
presented in Appendix D. 
 Harvey (2011), Morris (2009) and Rice (2010) provided useful guidance for conducting 
elite interviews given the uneven power relationship between elites and interviewers, and the 
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challenge associated with gaining access to these elites.  These included building good rapport, 
projecting a positive impression and being transparent, adjusting ones style to make the elite as 
comfortable as possible (Harvey, 2011).   As a senior public officer, I worked or interacted with 
most of these public officers over the past seven years.  They were easily accessible therefore; 
and readily agreed to be interviewed and to have them recorded.  I invited respondents to review 
the interview questionnaires beforehand and to raise any questions they might have had.  
Interviews lasted at least thirty minutes and were conducted at times and in places convenient to 
interviewees.  All were conducted in their offices.  
I interviewed nine elite or senior public officers within those three Ministries.  Table 5 
lists these officers and their respective Ministries/Agencies.  Two officers were from the 
Ministry of Finance; three from the Ministry of Education and four from the Ministry of Public 
Works.  
Table 6. List of Elite Officers Interviewed 
Ministries/Agencies Elite or Senior Public Officer interviewed 
Ministry of Finance Financial Secretary 
Budget Controller 
Ministry of Education Permanent Secretary 
Chief Education Officer  
Senior Executive Officer /Accounting 
Ministry of Public Works  Chief Technical Officer 
Chief Engineer 
Chief Architect 
Building Maintenance Officer 
 
I selected these agencies and elites because of the primary roles they played in managing 
low-intensity hurricanes in Dominica and because they were involved in the formulation and 
implementation of related policies and plans.  Primarily, the Ministry of Finance was responsible 
a) emergency funding and b) disaster contingency funding.  The Ministry of Public Works was 
82 
 
responsible for a) providing emergency transport Services, b) evacuation; c) damage assessment 
and data gathering; c) demolition of unsafe buildings; and d) road and gutter clearances.  The 
Ministry of Education had support roles that included a) response readiness and plan 
implementation; b) public information and education; c) public service announcements; d) 
emergency shelters; d) damage assessment; and e) evacuation.   
Interview questions for these elite officers included: What they did?  How they worked 
within and across agencies?  How they assessed impacts?  What were the resources available for 
addressing emergencies and education during low intensity hurricanes, and how these resources 
got to affected areas?   Appendix B is the interview schedule.  
I also interviewed eleven principals from nine LIH-affected schools to analyze their 
experiences and perspectives on education during chronic, low-intensity hurricanes.  Appendix B 
shows the interview schedule.  Two schools changed principals during the inter-hurricane period.  
I interviewed both as each experienced one of the low-intensity hurricanes analyzed in this study.   
Table 6 lists the schools from which these eleven principals were interviewed and the hurricanes 
they experienced. 
Table 7. List of School from which Principals were Interviewed 
Hurricanes  Schools  
Hurricane Dean (2007) Campbell Primary 




Vieille Case Primary 
Wills Strathmore Steven Secondary 
Hurricane Ophelia (2011) Campbell Primary 
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Kalleb J. Laurent Primary 
Isaiah Thomas Secondary 
 
Principals were asked about their experiences and perspectives on education during two 
LIH – Hurricane Dean (17 August 2007) and Hurricane Ophelia (28 September 2011).  These 
experiences included the extent of damages their schools sustained, the guidance and support 
received, and the actions taken just prior to and in the aftermath of these two LIH and who took 
them. 
Hurricane Ophelia occurred while schools were in sessions.  Figure 9 shows its path and 
its proximity to Dominica.  The arrow locates Dominica and the inset shows the dissipation and 




 Source: Cangailsoi, 2011: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL162011_Ophelia.pdf 
Figure 9. Path of Hurricane Ophelia and its Proximity to Dominica 
 
On 28 September 2011, the center of Hurricane Ophelia was located roughly 360 km 
northeast of Dominica.  Located 250 miles Ophelia’s center, Dominica was well within its 
tropical storm range and effects.  A hurricane watch issued on 27 September 2011, however, had 
been discontinued.  Unexpectedly, therefore, Hurricane Ophelia generated heavy and persistent 
rain that resulted in extensive flooding, damages to roads, homes, related infrastructure, and 
affected schools along the West Coast (International Monetary Fund, 2012).  More than 80 
millimeters of rain fell in six hours (IFRC, 2011).  Total damages were estimated at $32 million 
or 6.5% of GDP (IMF, 2012).  Hurricane Ophelia provided rich data on how an unanticipated 
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low-intensity hurricane was handled while schools were in session.  It provided the opportunity 
to assess the hurricane preparedness of school administrators and their schools.   
Hurricane Dean, on the other hand, occurred during summer vacation on 17 August 2007, 
three weeks before the reopening of school.  Its center was located south of Dominica at the 
time.  Figure 10 shows its trajectory and proximity to Dominica (the arrow locates Dominica).  
Hurricane Dean was a Category 1 hurricane on the Saffir Simpson Scale and brought gale force 
winds and heavy rains to Dominica.  There were two fatalities as a result and over $60 million 
(EC$162 million) in damages (UNDP, ECLAC & IICA, 2007).  Hurricane Dean provided the 
opportunity to assess government’s response in addressing damages losses and disruptions 
schools sustained just before the new school year commenced.  
 
Source:  Franklin, 2008:  http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL042007_Dean.pdf 




Hurricane Dean damaged twelve schools. These schools are shown in Table 6.  I 
interviewed seven principals.  Five principals were unavailable because one passed away, three 
retired, and the other migrated.   Ophelia, on the other hand, affected five schools:  These are 
also shown in Table 3.  I interviewed four principals. One principal retired and was unavailable 
for an interview.  
 Affected school buildings were inspected to document adherence to building standards 
and codes in their construction and repairs, and to assess their vulnerabilities to hurricanes.  
Section 1.3.3 describes these inspections. 
3.3.3 Inspections 
Building features and structures that conform to standards and codes constitute partial protection 
against damages and destruction during emergency events.  These include walls to column ties23 
and other hurricanes ties that fasten roof members to each other.  With the assistance of the 
Ministry of Education’s Building Maintenance Officer, I developed a guide for collecting 
inspection data.  Appendix C is a copy of this guide or inspection form.  This guide focused on 
the relative location of school buildings and facilities, the conditions of their walls, windows and 
roofs, and type of construction materials.   I assessed the vulnerability of these buildings and 
facilities to floods, landslides and sea surges.  I also observed the presence or absence of 
hurricane ties.  These observations were recorded on these inspections forms.  I also 
photographed evidence of these key hurricane protective features.    
23 Ties are metal plates and features that fasten building features or members, like roofs and walls to strength their 
resistance to hurricane force winds particularly where there are cleavages between these members as between a 
rafters and purlins in a roof.  
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My skills and personal experiences in research and data collection as a former policy 
analyst and Senior Planning Officer in Dominica enhanced the quality of data collection, analysis 
and interpretation.  I acquired the necessary data collection skills from my conduct of supervised 
research and policy evaluations.  I also acquired expertise in field methods from my work in 
policy research and evaluation in Dominica and during my Ph.D. coursework in disciplined 
inquiry, education and program evaluation and survey methods.  I screened official documents 
carefully to ensure they were relevant to this study before conducting detailed analyses.  I 
conducted all interviews to ensure consistency in focus and tone.  I explained the purpose and 
relevance of this study to respondents and developed good rapport with them.  Consequently, 
they spoke freely and openly during their interviews.  
 I systematically inspected affected buildings and recorded observations. Field notes of 
activities, decisions and experiences during interviews constituted part of my data collection 
strategy, analysis and presentation.  Section 3.2 describes this data analysis procedures and 
presentation.  
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
Initially, four propositions were developed at the end of the literature review to guide this study.  
These were:  
1. Because low-intensity hurricanes are recurrent, Dominica has in a place 
explicit policies and structures that anticipate and guide action for chronic 
low-intensity, education emergencies. 
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2. The Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica has adequate 
financial resources to address chronic low-intensity, education 
emergencies. 
3. The education sector in Dominica receives top funding priority during 
chronic low-intensity, emergencies.  
4. Services delivery for chronic low-intensity, education emergencies in 
Dominica are timely and efficient 
As data collection and analysis proceeded, however, these propositions seemed 
incongruent with the qualitative nature of this study.   Propositions are theoretical orientations or 
study guides developed out of a large body of research (Yin, 2009).  Initial propositions were 
based on catastrophic disasters research making them inapplicable for guiding research on low-
intensity hurricanes.  With limited research on education and low intensity hurricanes, 
developing relevant, robust and meaningful propositions became problematic.  As an alternative, 
I opted for identifying themes inductively because qualitative data is more amenable to thematic 
data analysis.     
Data analysis is “a systematic search for meaning…a way to process qualitative data so 
that what has been learnt can be communicated to others” (Hatch, 2002, p. 148).  It is organizing 
and interrogating data in ways that allow for “seeing patterns, identifying themes, discovering 
relationships, developing explanations, making interpretations, mounting critiques or generating 
theories” (Hatch, 2002, p. 148).   
As an analytical strategy, I used thematic analysis, explanation building and descriptive 
statistics (Yin, 2004, 2009) to describe and explain how Dominica’s government addressed 
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education during low-intensity hurricanes.  Appendix E is a summary of these three analytical 
strategies.   
Thematic analysis is a process of encoding qualitative information using themes.  A 
theme is “a pattern found in the information that at the minimum describes and organizes 
possible observation or at the maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon” (Boyatzis, 1998, 
p. iv).  Themes could be semantic (explicit) or latent (interpretive).  Semantic themes are 
identified within the explicit or surface meaning of data but nothing beyond what respondents 
say or what was written (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  Latent themes go beyond semantics and begin 
to identify or examine underlying ideas, assumptions and conceptualizations that shape and 
inform the semantic content of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  The use of simple quotes to 
support or refute themes is semantic.  Drawing meaning and analyzing these quotes as they relate 
to the research in question constitute latent themes.  Document themes, for example, were 
analyzed to determine and explain Dominica’s government’s roles and responsibilities in 
managing education during low intensity hurricanes. 
Explanation building identified causal links that helped to explain a case, that is, the how 
and whys of that case (Yin, 2004).  Such an approach was seen as likely to cause the researcher 
to wander away from the focus of the research (Yin, 2004).  Identifying themes consistent with 
study objectives reduced the likelihood of this deviation.  Descriptive statistics further enhanced, 
supported or refuted data during the analysis. 
Descriptive statistics, like range, percentages, averages, deficits and surpluses were used 
to analyze trends in national budget, the education budget, the school plant maintenance and 
repairs budgets.  These were essential for verifying information or data that emerged from the 
literature, interviews and official documents.  While elite officers in education, for example, 
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consistently highlighted the inadequacy of funds to address education during LIH, data showed 
that between 2004 and 2010, with the exception of three years, Dominica had annual budget 
surpluses of between $800,000 and $4 million.   It showed the difference between perception and 
reality.  
I used tables, photographs, graphs, maps and thematic models to present inspection, 
interview and document data and information.  
3.4.1 Official documents  
Data from ten official documents were subject to thematic analysis.  All ten documents were in 
PDF format and uploaded into NVIVO 9 software.   NVIVO 9 is a Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS).  Like all CAQDAS, it not primarily a data 
analysis software, but facilitates the collation, organization and presentation of qualitative data 
for interpretation and analysis particularly through coding or themes (Rademaker, Grace, & 
Curda, 2012).   Analysis remains the responsibility of the researceher  (op cit).  Themes have to 
be determined manually but NVIVO will allow for the collection of materials related to a theme 
into a single container called a node.  Once themes have been organised into containers, NVIVO 
can also produce thematic models or word similarity linkages to show the relationships among 
coded themes in a text or material.   
Key word-themes or nodes associated with disasters, emergencies or education in 
emergencies were identified in these documents.  Following from the preliminary word search, I 
used disaster and emergency-related words like “vulnerability” and “risks” as initial nodes.  As I 
read and re-read the material, new nodes, like “capacity improvements,” embedded in documents 
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also became themes.  Through this process of re-reading, adjusting, re-working and recoding a 
total of three key or parent nodes or themes emerged, each consisting of a hierarchy of child and 
parent nodes (see Figure 2).  Child nodes are related sub-themes that I categorized into themes or 
parent nodes.  These three parent nodes were a) vulnerability and risk reduction, b) disaster and 
emergency funding; and c) capacity improvement.  The resulting thematic networks or models 
were analyzed as whether they focused on pre-emergency or post-emergency activities or both.  
Descriptive and explanatory accounts linked policies, impacts and responses. 
Descriptive statistics were used to analyze education budget allocations, school 
maintenance and contract budget data collected from Annual Budget estimates documents.  
These documents became essential context builders for interview analyses.   
3.4.2 Interviews  
This study was awarded exempt status since it did not include respondents who were considered 
protected human subjects, like children under 18 years, under the University of Pittsburgh’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Regulations.  In accordance with these regulations written 
consent was not required since respondents were also public officials.  I made direct contact with 
respondents to obtain oral consent for participation in this study, and explained the study 
objectives to each respondent.  I assured each that their information would be treated with the 
confidentiality outlined in the University of Pittsburgh IRB protocols for handling post-interview 
data and information.  Interviews were conducted over a school year and audio-recorded with 
respondents’ permission.  
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I uploaded all interviews from the audio recorder directly into a personal computer and 
transcribed them into Microsoft Word Professional Suite.  These transcriptions followed the 
interview schedule question and response format for ease of data collation and analyses (See 
Yin, 2009).  Similar questions were posed to respondents based on categories to facilitate data 
coding and analyses in NVIVO 9.  Senior Public Officers and principals as a category, for 
example, had similar questions posed to them.  This approach increased chances for effective 
thematic analysis and validation across interviews (Yin, 2004).     
I read each transcript through to ensure I was familiar with the data.  I coded interview 
materials using key words from the interview questions as nodes.  I re-read and refined coded 
materials as new themes emerged.  The result was a hierarchy of nodes called tree nodes 
consisting of parent nodes (theme) and their child nodes (sub-themes) (cite this terminology).  I 
coded, for example, the word “priority” and gathered under this node all interview references to 
priority (theme). These nodes were further divided into child nodes (sub-themes) such as “What 
was priority,” “What was considered in establishing priorities.” Safety, health and safety became 
sub-themes As new materials emerged, themes were adjusted, re-worked and re-coded and 
changed resulting in three major or parent interview themes: a) hurricanes had adverse impacts 
on education and limited policy responses; b) inadequate financing to address education during 
LIH; and c) education is deprioritized during LIH. 
Using nodes or themes, I developed thematic networks or NVIVO models of interview                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
data to depict hierarchies, manifest and latent themes and synergies among respondents.  Like 
documents, interviews were modeled using word similarity tools in NVIVO 9 to determine 
thematic congruity among interviews.  Building inspection data was also analyzed in NVIVO.   
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3.4.3 Building inspections 
In the ten schools I inspected, I recorded the presence or absence of features that complied with 
building standards and codes.  I also assessed the location of affected schools, their facilities and 
their vulnerabilities to hurricane risks.  This data was uploaded into NVIVO 9 as a Node 
Classification called School building inspection, and analyzed using descriptive statistics and 
presented as tables, graphs and charts.  
Node Classifications are NVIVO spreadsheets for collecting, analyzing and presenting 
variable and attribute data.   Figure 11 is a photo of NVIVO window of the Node Classification 
for inspection data for ten schools.  Each column is a variable containing attribute data for each 
of the ten schools I inspected.  Column A was minimized to protect the identities of the 
principals whose schools I inspected.   
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 Figure 11. School Building Inspection NVIVO Node Classification Window, Dominica 
 
I photographed key observations I made including breaches in building standards and 
codes.  Data from inspection were cross-referenced with interviews from public work officers 
who were responsible for post-hurricane or disaster damage assessment, and recovery.  I 
highlighted gaps between what should be and what was, and discussed their implications for 
vulnerabilities to LIH. 
Overall, in analyzing this study data, I paid particular attention to the contexts in which 
these nodes or themes were embedded to understand the policy stances and their implications for 
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addressing low-intensity hurricanes.  The terms “vulnerability and risk reduction,” for example, 
appeared in the Medium Term Growth and Social Protection Strategy, 2006 & 2012 -2014 
documents.  These are ex-ante or pre-hurricane terms.  When read in context, however, much of 
the approach to low-intensity hurricanes appeared to focus on ex-post activities of response and 
recovery rather than ex-ante.  Ex-ante activities are pre-hurricane and focus on mitigation, 
preparedness and include vulnerability and risk reduction. 
3.5  BIASES AND LIMITATIONS 
As Dominica’s Senior Planning Officer, I brought experiences and biases that may have 
influenced my data interpretation and explanation.  Hurricanes Dean and Ophelia, for example, 
may have left unresolved issues associated with unnecessary delays in rehabilitation works.  My 
experience with Hurricane David as a senior high school student in August 1979 may have 
resulted in additional biases.  My home, textbooks were damaged.  There was a four-month 
disruption at my school.  During that period it was used as an emergency shelter. My academic 
performance declined dramatically.  I performed poorly on graduation examinations24.  These 
may have influenced my probes and data interpretation, including case selection.   
Since research in education during low-intensity hurricane is relatively new, establishing 
a rich database became essential.  An in-depth case study provided that rich data and the 
foundation for future related studies.  I focused on the Eastern Caribbean, particularly Dominica 
24 In Dominica, special examinations different from exit exams were administered in 1979 for graduation.  I 
performed creditably on the exit examinations, though not as well as expected.  I flunked graduation exams. 
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because I had access to that rich data and because the experiences were not too unlike others in 
the region, the Pacific and Indian Ocean.  Resources to expand this research study, however, 
were limited.    
This study was designed to address and offer recommendation to better address a chronic 
policy problem.  Aware of potential biases and limitations, I committed to reducing them and to 
improve the validity and reliability of the findings using, for example, mixed methods, quotes 
and triangulation of documentary, interviews and observation data.   My interpretation therefore, 
was based on my understanding of the data and information I collected, and their analyses, my 
experience and the literature.  
3.6 INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
Limited policy research and literature on education and low-intensity hurricanes exists.  
Consequently, I relied on my first-hand experience with low-intensity hurricanes in Dominica 
and the broader literature on education in emergencies to make sense of the data.  Much of that 
literature, however, has focused on conflict-based emergencies, mostly in fragile states like 
Somalia (2009), and Rwanda (1998).  They focused as well on the severe effects of catastrophic 
events on education systems, like Haiti (2010), New Orleans, Louisiana (2005).  
Little attention has been paid to LIH because often they are localized. They do not attract 
media attention or that of the international humanitarian community.  Their impacts and 
responses were invisible to public scrutiny.   
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I relied as well on the broader disasters and emergencies literature to carve out the 
theoretical groundings for my interpretations of education during low-intensity hurricanes in 
their Dominican context.  
I based my interpretations on Dombrowsky’s notion of disasters as “the collapse of social 
and cultural protections” (Dombrowsky, 1981).  Like Dombrowsky, I accepted the distinction 
between disaster events or triggers and the disasters themselves, in this case, the difference 
between the LIH itself (the trigger) and its destructions and disruptions (the disasters or 
emergency).  I believed that protection from destructions and disruptions is a human 
responsibility and that disaster-relevant policies, strategies, institutional capacities and their 
implementation are critical elements of that protection.  Public managers and decision-makers 
were responsible, therefore, to ensure protection from disasters.   I concurred, as well, with the 
position of Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort (2001).  
Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort (2001) described disasters and emergencies as “managerial 
and administrative failures.” This involved failure to adopt policies, make decisions to reduce 
disasters and manage events before they escalate into emergencies which resulted in the collapse 
of protections.   Pigozzi’s (1999) however, believed “decentralizing of children” away from the 
education focus was the central problem in education in emergencies. 
I used Pigozzi’s (1999) Developmental Approach to frame my perspective on education 
in emergencies.   As a mitigation and protective measure, this approach placed children at the 
center of conflict-based education in emergencies. An equitable, peace-based education would 
make children catalysts against conflict-based emergencies.  Its transformative stance, however, 
did not address chronic, low-intensity hurricanes.   
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This investigation adapted Pigozzi’s Approach into the Adapted Developmental 
Approach.  This new approach placed child protection at the center of education policy, 
development, planning and implementation in adapting to a context of chronic, LIH and to 
reduce their vulnerabilities and risks to low-intensity hurricanes.  This adapted developmental 
approach would also improve financial and institutional capacities for addressing effectively the 
complex and dynamic nature of education during LIH.  Adaptation is grounded in the work of 
Comfort (2007).  
 Comfort (1999) argued for adaptive response systems in sudden and rapidly- evolving or 
dynamic events like earthquakes and catastrophic hurricanes.  She focused on the dynamics of 
post-disaster response and recovery and adaptations in effective response to catastrophic and 
dynamic events, like earthquakes.  Low-intensity hurricanes, however, are slow and predictable, 
leaving ample adjustments and preparation time before they interact with existing protections.  
They are chronic and may require greater focus on pre-disaster activities or adaptations that 
anticipate and incorporate them into public policies, plans and operations.  This would constitute 
the ex-ante policy shift that called for assistance before disasters occur (see Comfort, et al, 1999). 
These ex-ante adaptations are important because of the economic and financial 
challenges Dominica face as a small island developing states.  This study will show that it is the 
perception that Dominica lacked the financial resources to sustainably address low-intensity 
hurricanes (see Section 2.8: Theme 5).  
Ground in pragmatism, this study sought to use the data collected to a) identify 
government behaviors (lines of action); b) identify the assertions associated with these behaviors 
(warranted assertions); and  c) the consequences that are likely to follow from these or other 
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behaviors(workability) (Mertens, 2005).  Figure 5 outlines the interpretive process based on the 




Figure 12. Research Development Process 
 
 The ten documents reviewed in this study were selected from the population of possible official 








































terms were subject to inductive thematic analysis to decipher their policy foci.  Interviews with 
elite or senior public officers and school principals followed. 
The interviews conducted with nine elite officers and eleven principals sought to broaden 
understanding of and assertions embedded in documented policies and approaches to address 
education during low-intensity hurricanes in Dominica.  It sought to assess performance on 
response, recovery as well actions taken for averting future emergencies.  Schools buildings were 
inspected to assess performance. 
Inspection of ten school buildings provided disaster mitigation data on hurricane 
protective features installed ex-post.  Many protective features like hurricane ties were not 
installed.  School roofs, in particular, were vulnerable and at risk for hurricane damage.  
Moreover, schools were located in areas vulnerable to landslides and flooding from nearby 
rivers.  
These findings were organized into themes or nodes identified under each data collection 
strategy – document reviews, elite interviews, interviews with principals and inspections.  Ten 
themes or nodes emerged: Three document review themes, three elite themes, three principals’ 
themes and one building inspection theme respectively.  These themes were:  1). Vulnerability 
and risk reduction policy; 2). Proposed policy for establishing vulnerability and contingency 
funds; 3 Improve capacities; 4). Adverse impacts on education and limited policy responses; 5). 
Inadequate financing to address education in emergencies; 6). Education is deprioritized during 
emergencies; 7). Damaging impacts on schools; 8). Multiple actors; 9). Mitigation strategies; 10) 
Post-emergency vulnerability and risks persist.  
 As I explored themes in the findings chapter, I used material coded in NVIVO 9 under 
each for substantiation, refutation or contradiction.  Under the “vulnerability and risk reduction” 
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theme, for example, I cut and pasted material directly from documents nodes in NVIVO 9 where 
they coded to affirm my arguments.  I dissected these quotes to reveal their policy themes and, 
therefore, the lines of action, warranted assertions and their workability.  Even though, for 
example, “vulnerability and risk reduction” appeared to be the asserted approach to disaster and 
emergency policies in Dominica, latent thematic analysis showed actions were more in line with 
response and recovery.  The results were reactive strategies that did not pre-empt hurricanes but 
increased costs and indebtedness, demonstrated a lack of financial preparation and the absence of 
plans and contingencies.  Similar approaches were taken using quotes from interviews, excerpts 
and charts from documents, and charts or photographs from inspections.   
“The researcher’s personal experiences and insights are an integral part of the inquiry and 
critical to understanding the phenomenon” in qualitative analysis (Patton, 2002, p. 40).  As a 
participant-researcher, I included my personal experiences to substantiate or refute data claims.   
I was personally aware, for example, that responsibilities for education during LIH had not been 
assigned to any officer or unit with the Ministry of Education, neither were they contained in any 
policies or plans.  Where I probed interviewers for clarification on responses, in this manuscript, 
I italicized those probes to document my involvement as a participant in this study.   Finally, I 
explored the literature as well to better describe contexts, make meaning of themes, provide rival 





4.0  FINDINGS 
This chapter presents my findings on how the government of the Commonwealth of Dominica 
addressed education during chronic low-intensity hurricanes.  These findings have been 
organized into the four data collection categories.  Each category has been organized into themes 
identified inductively using NVIVO 9 and listed in the previous paragraph.  They present a 
picture of the problem, lines of action, beliefs behind those actions and their consequences.  I 
described each theme to outline the perspectives under each data collection strategy.  The 
findings and results in this chapter address the topic question, “How does the Government of the 
Commonwealth of Dominica address education during chronic, low-intensity hurricanes?” Table 
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 I presented documents reviews as one set of three themes; interviews as two sets of 
themes: three elite themes and three principals’ themes.  Finally, I presented building inspections 
as one theme.  Section 4.1 deals with the document themes. 
4.1 DOCUMENT REVIEWS  
National laws and policies are essential for planning and guiding education continuity 
during disasters or emergencies (INEE, 2010).   Those laws and policies reveal intent but also 
assertions.  It was important therefore, to assess the extent to which official documents contained 
such laws and policies to guide action and reveal policymakers assertions.  Key word similarity 
analysis of these official documents revealed thematic consistency.   Thematic consistency was a 
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extent to which documents contained cross-cutting themes. The more intense the network, that is, 
the higher the line densities the greater the thematic congruence. 
 
 




With the exception of the National Disaster Plan, 2001; the Maintenance Policy and 
Manual and Maintenance Progress Reports, all other documents shared similar words, terms or 
their derivatives.  The National Disaster Plan, 2001 was a dated plan document and its vernacular 
would have been incongruent with more recent documents like the Budget Addresses 2005 – 
2013, for example.  The School Maintenance and Policy Manual documents were consultancy 
reports.  As expected they possessed similar words and terms because they reported on the same 
activity.  Their vernacular, however, seemed dissimilar to other documents I reviewed.   
 Once similarities were established, documents were then coded by nodes or themes in 
NVIVO 9 as described in Section 1.4.1.  Again, in NVIVO 9, nodes are containers for categories 
or codes that link rich data into sub-themes and themes (Richards, 1999).  
Ten sub-themes or child nodes, shown in Figure 2, emerged from these documents.  
These were further coded into three parent nodes or themes shown in Figure 2 as well.  These 
parent nodes were “vulnerability and risk reduction;” “disaster and emergency funding” 
and “capacity improvement.”  Child and parent nodes formed a hierarchy of nodes or network 
depicted in Figure 14 as an NVIVO model.  Arrows connected child nodes to parent nodes.   
Child nodes were labeled as their source document, for example GSPS 2012 – 2014 and NDP, 
2001.    
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 Figure 14. Disaster-related Policy Themes and Sub-themes Located in Official 
Documents, Dominica 
 
These themes and their sub-themes or child nodes are shown in Table 9 for easy 
reference.  The rest of this section outlines the key findings under each of these three document 
themes.  
Table 9. Categories of Disaster-related Document Themes 
Vulnerability and risk 
reduction 
Disaster & Emergency 
Funding 
Capacity Improvement 
Reducing vulnerabilities External funding Improving capacity for 
disaster management  
Upgrading School 
facilities 
Establish vulnerability fund  





Drills and exercises Financial impact  
Risk insurance Risk insurance  
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4.1.1 Theme 1: Vulnerability and risk reduction policies 
Vulnerability and risk reduction strategies have become key policies for addressing disasters 
among regional and international financial and development institutions disasters (ADB, 2008; 
CDB, 2004, INEE, 2010; Mahul & Gurenko, 2006; World Bank, 2006,).  These policies are, for 
example, pre-hurricane strategies and activities designed to mitigate hurricane and disaster 
impacts.   It is estimated that every dollar spent on mitigation, risk and vulnerability reduction 
results in a seven dollar savings on disaster response and recovery (ADB, 2008).   
Policymakers in Dominica seemed well aware of the significance of vulnerability and 
risk reduction in hurricane and disaster management.   Five sub-themes or child nodes related to 
vulnerability and risk reduction policies appeared in official documents I reviewed.  These were 
1) reducing vulnerabilities; 2) upgrading school facilities, 3) risk and vulnerability reduction 
strategy; 4) drills; and 6) exercises and risk insurance.  The term “vulnerability” appeared twice.  
Terms near in meaning, like “environment enhancements,” were coded as vulnerability 
and risk reduction.  Upgrading school facilities appeared in one document and the conduct of 
“drills and exercises” appeared in another.  Each was coded as it appeared.  All of these terms 
together were coded as vulnerability and risk reduction.  
The Medium Term Growth and Social Protection Strategy (GSPS) outlined government’s 
key policies and positions on vulnerability and risk reduction.  The GSPS, 2012-2014 stated for 
example, 
Government will seek to reduce environmental vulnerability and improve disaster 
prevention and management, through a combination of risk reduction, impact mitigation 
and other measures, including: Effective implementation of the Physical Planning Act 




Four pre-hurricane terms are mentioned here: vulnerability, prevention, risk reduction 
and mitigation.  Government proposed also the establishment of funding facilities for 
“addressing vulnerabilities and undertaking environmental enhancements after disasters, as 
well as environmental insurance…which will result in a relatively speeding response to 
hurricanes and reduce dependence on ad hoc and slow donor and international assistance 
(GSPS, 2006; GSPS, 2012-14).   
Overall, however, vulnerability and risk reduction policies as presented in official 
documents did not explicitly consider education during low-intensity hurricanes.  Rather, these 
documents focused on disasters in general with no reference made to education or schooling.  
This generic policy approach to addressing disasters masks the nuances and complexities 
associated with hurricanes and in particular LIH including funding as reflected in Theme 2: 
Proposed policies for the establishment of vulnerabilities and contingency funding  
4.1.2 Theme 2:  Proposed policies for establishing vulnerability and contingency funds 
Funding remains one of the perennial issues in disaster and emergency management, worldwide.  
This is due to the inadequacy of disaster funding globally, the high financial and economic 
impacts of disasters and dwindling international humanitarian assistance (Smillie & Minear, 
2003; Wathne & Hedger, 2010; World Bank, 2006).    
Official documents showed policymakers in Dominica were aware of disaster and 
emergency funding issues and proposed policies to address them.   Five sub-themes or child-
nodes with regards to funding emerged:  These were; 1) vulnerability and contingency funds, 2) 
risk insurance; 3) external funding, and 4) risk insurance. Those themes appeared in four 
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documents as identified in Figure 2.  They appeared in the GSPS (2006); and then again in the 
GSPS in 2012. They appeared in the budget address of 2007 and again in 2011.  There seemed to 
have been a five year gap in the appearance and reappearance of these policies in official 
documents.  These occurred at the around the same time as Hurricanes Dean, 2007 and 
Hurricane Ophelia, 2012 when attention and conversations about low-intensity hurricanes are 
heightened.  With respect to this proposed vulnerability fund, for example, the Growth and 
Social Protection Strategy (GSPS) (2006) stated,    
For combating environmental vulnerability, the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica 
will explore, under the aegis of the Barbados Program of Action (BPoA) or the Association of 
Small Island States (AOSIS), the establishment by the World Bank of a special vulnerability fund 
for SIDS stricken by hurricanes. Other international financial institutions and donor agencies can 
enhance the fund as part of their contribution to the BPoA.  The fund can then seek environmental 
insurance for small islands. This would result in a relatively speedy response to hurricanes and 
other environmental disasters and reduce dependence on ad hoc and sometimes slow donor and 
international assistance for this purpose (GSPS, 2006). 
 
This policy tied combating “environmental vulnerabilities” and “environmental 
insurance” to funding.  Although Dominica proposed this environmental funding, the World 
Bank would be responsible for its establishment and under the aegis of either the Barbados 
Program of Action or the Association of Small Island States.  Dominica’s role would only be 
exploratory.  The umbrella organization for this fund was still ambivalent.  Other international 
financial institutions and donor agencies would contribute to this fund which would then be used 
to buy “environmental insurance” for small island states.  This of course would mature after 
disasters or emergencies, and would in effect be a rapid response fund.  Unless vulnerability 
reduction is tied to premiums, insurance coverage would not of itself reduce those (Hoffman & 
Brukoff, 2006).   
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This proposed fund would also reduce dependence on “ad hoc and slow international and 
donor assistance” but by corralling assistance from these very agencies before disasters or 
hurricanes.  In this sense, this would not reduce dependence on external funding.   It would 
simply shift canvassed funds from ex-post, that is response and recovery to ex-ante phases, that 
is mitigation and preparedness but would still expend them ex-post.   
 The proposed contingency fund would also be established in part with external funds.   
In describing this fund, the GSPS (2012-14) stated, 
Aside from hurricanes and volcanic eruptions, Dominica is prone to earthquakes, landslides, river 
floods, and heavy seas that often cause damage to the transportation network and cause 
environmental degradation.  Provision will be made within the public investment program for a 
Natural Disaster Contingency fund to cover the costs of repairs and environmental enhancements 
necessary after such environmental mishaps.  As soon as it is deemed feasible, the Ministry of 
Finance will set aside five per cent of the Public Sector Investment Project (PSIP)25 for purposes 
of starting such a fund and make a similar annual allocation to it.  Efforts will be made to 
supplement the resources of this fund from external sources (GSPS, 2012). 
 
The term “environmental enhancement” alludes to mitigation and vulnerability reduction 
but only after disasters or “environmental mishaps.” This contingency fund would be established 
locally using five percent of the annual estimates of the Public Sector Investment Projects.  It 
would however, be allocated for this purpose only as “soon as it was deemed feasible.”  
Additionally, this fund would be supplemented with external funds much like the vulnerability 
fund.   
Analysis of these policies and official statements showed low-intensity hurricanes were 
considered serious threats.  They failed to propose, however, corresponding actions that would 
address those threats before rather than after.   Instead, the government reacted to these storms 
25 Annual capital projects within the public sector are referred to as Public Sector Investment Projects. 
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and their impacts.  The National Budget Addresses for 2011 and 2012-2013 captured this 
reactive approach: 
Government continues to exercise tight expenditure controls where possible. However, storms 
and heavy rains necessitated some unanticipated expenditures to undertake rehabilitation works 
(BA, 2011). 
 
The ceiling for the overall increase in both Government-guaranteed and Central Government debt 
is limited to 1.5 percent. Total disbursed outstanding debt increased by $29.8 million or 3.4 
percent, making the net increase in the total debt in excess of the ceiling. This is attributed to 
loans contracted to meet the cost of rehabilitation of damages caused by Tropical Storm Ophelia 
and the Layou floods26 (BA, 2012-2013). 
 
As revealed here, government’s exercised tight fiscal control without due consideration 
for low-intensity hurricanes or storms.  This resulted in “unanticipated expenses.”  Supposedly, 
the events that triggered them, therefore, were “unanticipated” even though low-intensity 
hurricanes occurred annually in Dominica.  By failing to consider them, plan appropriately and 
make the necessary financial provisions, government resorted to loans which in turn increased 
the national debt.  These loans were used for response and recovery despite public policies that 
proposed novel approaches of mitigation, and vulnerability and risk reduction.   
Overall, policy or official statements indicated shifts in the way government thought 
about addressing hurricanes and disasters.  The policy focus was on mitigation and vulnerability 
and risk reduction.  Policy statements, however, were non-binding and used terms, like 
“government will explore” and “as soon as it is deemed feasible” and proposed actions that 
were incongruent with this new thinking.  Policies acknowledged the complex nature of the 
funding issues involved.  They failed, however, to demonstrate commitment to the establishment 
of local funding initiatives that would reduce dependence on external funds and external funding 
26 In 1997 the Carholm-Huxley landslide dammed the Matthieu Gorge and river, trapping tons of water which 
eventually collapsed in 2011 destroying the entire lower Layou River Valley, a major banana and tourism region and 
creating hardship for the nearby fishing community of Layou. It stalled road transportation as a result of 
sedimentation and persistent flooding from heavy rains and hurricanes. 
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agencies.   Budget analyses indicated there might have been financial resources available locally 
that could have been committed to addressing low-intensity hurricanes. 
Dominica’s National Budget showed there were annual surpluses for 2003 - 2010, the 
period for which data was available.  Figure 15 shows the budget performance for Dominica.  As 
depicted, the Ministry of Education, for example, had annual budget surpluses ranging between 
$800,000 and $4 million for the period 2003 – 2010.  There were budget deficits for only two of 
these years.  These were 2007 and 2008, and amounted to $95,000 and $304,000 respectively.  
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Raw data only) 
Figure 15. National and Ministry of Education Expenditure Gaps, Dominica27 
 
27 Data for 2006 was not available 
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The Ministry of Education was often allocated the largest share of the national budget 
annually.  Between 2006 and 2010, for example, it received 13 – 25% of total allocations.  
According to Table 10, this was equivalent to 4 - 9% of the annual Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).  More often than not, the Ministry received priority budget funding which made these 
surpluses likely.   
Table 10. Education Expenditure, Dominica, 2006 - 2010 
CATEGORIES 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TOTAL EDUCATION BUDGET ($000) 75,643 50,474 65,775 59,760 62,431 
Total Education Expenditure as a 
percentage of National Budget 
24.3 16.3 22.7 18.6 12.8 
Total Education Recurrent Expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP in current 
prices 
 
4.7 6.2 4.6 4.4 5.0 
Total Education Capital Expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP in current prices 
 
3.8 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.2 
Total Education Expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP in current prices 
9.0 7.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 
Source: Education Planning & Development Unit, 2012 
In addition to overall budget surpluses, between 2007 and 2011, surpluses were also 
recorded on the primary school maintenance budgets.  These are shown in Table 11.  These 
surpluses however, were transferred out of maintenance for undisclosed reasons to undisclosed 
programs and activities.  In two cases, they were transferred in April and May, before the close 
of the financial year which ended on 30 June.  The Ministry, therefore, had sufficient time to use 
these funds as allocated to improve building structures as a protection and hurricane mitigation 





Table 11. Treatment of Primary School Maintenance Budget Surpluses, Dominica, 2007 
- 2011 
Source: Ministry of Education & Human Resource Development (Raw data only)  
 
 The Ministry of Education did not budget for education during low-intensity hurricanes, 
even though it was legally responsible for addressing it.  This is true even when re-allocating 
surplus funds.   These could have been reallocated to address education during low-intensity 
hurricanes.  While policies or official statements expressed the desire to establish funding 
initiatives to address emergencies, government still depended on external funds, including loans 
to supplement these funds.  At the same time, it failed to commit fully to the use of local 
financial resources to establish these funds.  As Theme 4 will show, this may have been due to 
the weak institutional capacity, therefore, weak advocacy for policy shifts and official statements 
made to address education during low intensity hurricanes in Dominica.  
 








Difference ($) Remarks 
2006/07 285,550 1,003,167 952,451 50,716 $50,000 virement warrant.28 taken 
from head in May 2007 
2007/08 594,927 1,049,778 972,759 77,019 $47,900 virement warrant taken from 
head in June 2008 
2008/09 952,207 1,095,872 1,021,946 73,926 $73,925 virement warrant taken from 
head from April to June 2009 
2009/10 518,223 1,115,848 1,016,828 99,020 $93,700 virement warrant taken from 
head in June 2009 
2010/11 1,492,640 1,144,873 1,123,480. 21,393 
 
  
TOTAL 3,843,547 5,409,538 5,087,464 322,074   
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4.1.3 Theme 3:  Capacity improvement 
The ability to move resources in the direction in which they are required, and the amount in 
which they are needed are important in disaster responses (Comfort, 2004).  Local capacity to do 
so appeared to be a major resource issue during emergencies (Comfort, 2004).  It is the inability 
of societies to cope using their resources alone that makes education in emergencies such a 
serious problem for national governments (Kagawa, 2005).  Because of these limited local 
resources to cope and dependence on external assistance, education in emergencies tends to be 
driven in large part by international humanitarian organizations. These include Save the 
Children, PLAN, Child Fund and Catholic Relief Services (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003; Save the 
Children, 2007), among others.  Bilateral and multilateral agencies such as USAID and UNICEF 
funded these emergencies since they possessed the resources required to tackle immediate 
educational and developmental needs of children from infancy to basic education.  They also 
stepped in because of the capacity gaps. 
Official documents were critical of the weak institutional capacities for managing 
disasters in Dominica and recommended improvement.  The Medium Term Growth and Social 
Protection Strategy (GSPS) documents for 2006 and 2012-14, for example, highlighted these 
criticisms.  Accordingly,  
The Office of Disaster Management (ODM) falls short of meeting its stated mission and 
objectives in preventing, mitigating and preparing for potential disasters in Dominica 
(GSPS, 2006).  
 
The National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) will continue applying 
measures, within the frame of its Disaster Management Strategy and Emergency 
Management Plan, i.e. preventing, mitigating and preparing for potential disasters in 




The Office of Disaster Management (ODM) was unable to meet its stated mission and 
objectives of vulnerability and risk reduction, that is, disaster prevention, mitigation and 
preparation.  Government made recommendations for improvement but it appeared that by 2012, 
ODM’s umbrella organization, the National Emergency Planning Organization (NEPO) had not 
completed implementation of proposed disaster vulnerability and risk reduction measures.  
Further, at a meeting of NEPO held on 1 June 2013, however, the Prime Minister raised 
hurricane preparedness capacity concerns. 
I am still not satisfied with our preparedness efforts and it is reflective in the various 
committees that are charged with the responsibilities as enshrined in the disaster plan and 
these committees fail to meet and those who meet, do so one or two days before this 
meeting. I am seeing reports dated 28th, 29th and 30th (May) 2013. We all know that the 
hurricane season begins on June 1st and I would really like to urge those who are 
members of those committees to convene meetings continuously. It doesn’t have to be 
just before the first of June, because the disaster committees are not only charged with 
preparing for the hurricane season, you are charged for any event including flooding, fire, 
major slides which has been occurring throughout the year (Government Information 
Service, 3 June, 2012). 
Slipshod approaches driven by inappropriate attitudes to disaster preparedness appeared 
to be a serious problem despite policy change efforts to improve capacity in the past seven years 
particularly at the ODM and NEPO. 
  NEPO is made of representatives from public sector ministries; service and non-
government organizations (NGOs) and is responsible for managing disasters in Dominica.  These 
included the Ministry of Education; Public Works; Rotary and Kiwanis clubs, Girl Guides, Boys 
Scouts among others.  The Minister responsible for National Security chaired that organization.   
The Prime Minister was recommended to chair the organization for improved effectiveness.  
The National Emergency Planning Organization (NEPO) is organized into fifteen sub-
committees or sector task forces responsible for key sector or emergency areas. These include 
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the Heath Services; Welfare; Emergency Shelter; Search and Rescue and Transport, Evacuation 
and Equipment. Figure 16 is an organogram of the National Emergency Planning Organization 
(NEPO), its affiliated committees, sub-committees or task forces at the national, districts and 
communities levels.  The Office of Disaster Management (ODM) is NEPO secretariat 
responsible for implementing NEPO’s decisions.    
 
Figure 16.  Institutional and Organizational Arrangement for Disaster Management, 
Dominica29 
 
29 This organogram was developed based on my reading of the National Disaster Plan, 2001. 
  The broken lines indicate the policy recommendation to place NEPO under the direct responsibility of the Office of     
the Prime Minister. 
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  These roles were designed to ensure the safety of school spaces, children and teachers 
but were secondary under arrangements for managing disaster nationally. The education sector 
was a secondary and not primary agency in disaster organization and management in Dominica.  
It constituted, however, the largest public sector ministry and owned most of the buildings 
operating as emergency shelters in the state.  As the organogram showed it was not a key 
taskforce under the National Emergency Preparedness Organization (NEPO).  The Education 
Permanent Secretary, however, was a member of NEPO’s Advisory Committee (NDP, 2001, p. 
13).  The Chief Education Officer was a member of the National Emergency Executive 
Committee (NEEC), and three NEEC Sector Task Forces namely the Emergency Shelters; Public 
Information and Education and Economic Stability (p. 14).  None of these taskforces were 
related to education.  Additionally, the National Disaster Plan, 2001 made provision for an 
Education Division Representative to sit on Damage Assessments Task Force, one of the 
National Emergency Executive Committee Sector Task Forces.  At the time of this study, such a 
representative had not been appointed.  In addition, education and school personnel had not held 
membership in District or Community Emergency Committees, even though most schools were 
emergency shelters.    
Under the National Disaster Plan (2001), the Ministry of Education had no primary 
responsibilities for disaster and emergency management (see p. 23).   Rather, its roles and 
responsibilities as outlined in National Disaster Plan (2005, p. 52) and shown in Figure 17 were 
characterized as secondary.    These were 
a. Selection and maintenance of school buildings to be used as shelters and their 
staffing in areas where necessary. 
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b. Ensure that information on emergency Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
is distributed to educational Institutions. 
c. Ensure schools are prepared to deal with all disasters and enforce fire and 
earthquake drills. 
d. Liaise with DEC and obtain information on local disaster plans.  
e. Assist in preparing, participating and assessing joint annual exercises with all 




 Figure 17. Role of the MOE in School and Educational Institutions Emergency 
Management, Dominica 
 
 Officially, the Ministry of Education itself had not assigned any of these 
responsibilities to its technical units; neither were they included in its official plans or operations.  
The Ministry of Education Strategic Plan, 2012-2015, for example, made no reference to 
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education during low-intensity hurricanes or any disasters.  The dated Education Sector Plan, 
2005-2010 which was up for revision did not make any reference to them either.    
 The Education Act, 1997 made only one reference to disasters or emergencies.  
Section 34 (1) of that Act gave the Minister of Education and Chief Education Officer 
responsibility for schools closures during disasters including natural disasters which would 
include low-intensity hurricanes.  In accordance with the Act, principals could also seek approval 
for school closures during these emergencies.  Where the Minister or Chief Education Officer 
could not be reached, principals could close schools and submit reports ex-post outlining their 
reasons.  Section 51 (2) (b) of the Education Regulations 2011, reaffirmed this responsibility for 
the Minister and Chief Education Officer but failed to mention the principal’s role.   
 Overall, the Office of Disaster Management (ODM) and NEPO had difficulties 
meeting their stated mission and objectives of disaster prevention, mitigation and preparation on 
account of the weak institutional capacity and attitudes of those responsible.   Recommendations 
for capacity improvements had not been fully implemented five years after they were first 
proposed.  The National Disaster Plan, 2001 assigned education in emergencies roles and 
responsibilities to the Ministry of Education, but failed to provide the organizational autonomy to 
fulfill its obligations like the dissemination Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to educational 
institutions.  Rather it had the Ministry tied up in five other task forces that were unrelated to 
education.   The Ministry of Education, in turn, had not incorporated any of these responsibilities 
into its policies, plans and operations nor had it assigned any of them to its technical units. 
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4.1.4 Summary of document reviews 
In summary, official documents contained policy references to mitigation, vulnerability and risk 
reduction as government’s key approaches to addressing disasters.  These signaled a shift in 
policies that would addressed disasters before they occur.   These included proposed programs 
and funding initiatives that would facilitate implementation of these policies.   They were 
expressed, however in non-binding language, like “where it deemed feasible” that reflected an 
unwillingness to commit fully to the establishment of these funding proposals.  None of these 
policies and funding initiatives, however, made direct reference to education.   Although the 
National Disaster Plan assigned responsibilities for education during disasters to the Ministry of 
Education, it did not allow for the organizational autonomy that would allow it to fulfill its 
obligations.  The Ministry was assigned roles in five other task forces that were unrelated to 
education or education during LIH.   Moreover, the Ministry had not incorporated education 
emergencies into its own policies, plans and operations.   It demonstrated with these actions, that 
education was not being treated as seriously it should during low-intensity hurricanes.  The elite 
interviews which follow substantiated these assertions.  
4.2 ELITE INTERVIEWS 
“Disasters have become a policy problem of global scope…we must therefore change the 
policies of today that rely heavily on sending assistance only after tragedy has occurred” 
(Comfort, et al, 1999, p. 39).  Elite Interviews with senior public officers in the Ministry of 
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Finance; Ministry of Public Works, and Ministry of Education confirmed low-intensity 
hurricanes were serious policy problems for Dominica.   
Nine elite officers were interviewed to explore the extent of the problem, policy issues 
and strategies for addressing education during LIH.  Table 4 identified three major themes that 
emerged.  First, low intensity disasters and emergencies had adverse impacts on the economy 
and education and policies and plans did not reflect these impacts.  Second, government 
depended largely on external funding to address LIH. Third, education was deprioritized during 
low-intensity hurricanes (LIH).  Sections 2.7 – 2.9 explored these themes. 
4.2.1 Theme 4:  Adverse impacts on education and limited policy responses   
Impacts of emergencies on education are among the most documented aspect of education in 
emergencies (see Aguilar & Retamal, 1998; 2009; Pigozzi, 1998; Sinclair, 2002; Vargas-Baron, 
1998).  They destroyed or disrupted education systems and made it difficult for countries to cope 
using their resources alone (Kagawa, 2005; Pigozzi, 1998; Vargas-Baron & McClure, 1998).  
Experience demonstrated, however, low-intensity hurricanes in Dominica did not paralyze the 
entire education system but had seriously affected essential aspects and disrupted schooling.  
Overall, interviews with elite officers confirmed low-intensity hurricanes had adverse 
impacts on Dominica.  First, they damaged the economy, the banana industry and infrastructure 
like buildings and roads through either direct gale force winds or through floods and landslides.  
According to the Financial Secretary, “Dean destroyed 4% of GDP and the direct and indirect 
costs were significant” (RE).  As shown already Hurricane Dean caused damages in excess of 
$60 million and Hurricane Ophelia about $32 million (UNDP, ECLAC & IICA, 2007; IMF, 
124 
 
2012).  Second, they adversely effected education.  Figure 18 is a thematic model depicting 
effects on education identified in elite interviews.  The arrows connect sub-themes or child nodes 




Figure 18. Impacts of LIH on Education, Dominica 
Four sub-themes emerged when elite officers were asked to identify the impact of low-
intensity hurricanes on education.  First, they damaged school facilities. Second, they disrupted 
normal schooling.  Third, they disrupted instruction and curriculum achievement.  Fourth, they 
diverted resources away from education.  They also identified the specific causes of these sub-
themes as depicted in Figure 9.   Normal schooling was disrupted, for example, because school 
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buildings were used as emergency shelters or transportation to schools was disrupted.  Heavy 
rains and disruption in water services and flooding also caused disruptions (RE).  One Elite 
Officer within the Ministry of Finance explained:  
Disruption of services! The normal course of events, if it rains heavily, especially in rural areas, 
children are not going to go to school.   In some cases, the water system is affected even in 
Roseau, given the problems we have with sedimentation.  When there is no water or we have this 
over outflow, and so on, the students are sent home if there is no water depending on the nature of 
the school.  If it is too dark and if it is going to prove a safety issue for students, they will be sent 
home particularly if they have to walk home cross rivers and over long distances and so on.  So it 
is a problem, also, the uncertainty of some of those storms sometimes causes decisions to be 
made in terms of the pre-closure of schools.  That’s another problem. Schools are also used as 
hurricane shelters and would have to be closed and children sent home in preparation (RE) 
 
The Ministry of Education’s Permanent Secretary and the Ministry of Public Works’ 
Chief Technical Officer also identified school disruptions as key impacts. They occurred 
frequently, and as a result, instruction time was lost.  They noted:  
Well, because children have to go home early, then you lose time in the classroom with these 
children and the frequency of the coming storms help to add to that problem.  If every week 
you’re preparing for a hurricane, it means every week you’re losing time in the classroom with 
the children and you know you have set dates for exams and everything (MP). 
 
Obviously because of our large school population (15,000), they will be affected and any hours or 
days lost in education are an obvious problem and will pose an impact on the education sector, 
yes. Many times when the event passes it takes a certain amount of time to repair the roads, you 




Instruction time was lost when preparing for hurricanes, irrespective of their magnitudes 
because schools were emergency shelters.  No record, however, of the frequency of these 
disruptions or number of instruction days lost as a result were ever recorded, officially.  There 
were no provisions made to enforce rescheduling those lost days.  
When asked to assess measures and policies in place to address low-intensity storms, elite 
officers believed some learning had occurred but did not result in significant changes.  Five of 
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nine officers interviewed believed, 1) attitudes and behaviors had not changed, 2) planning and 
collaboration had been inadequate at the line ministry levels30 and 3) a decision to establish a 
proposed contingency fund, for example, had not been made.   One officer explained: 
No, we haven’t move (and why? I asked) Well for the same reasons we were discussing a while 
ago. I guess we just need to come, decide, ok, let’s plan this thing properly. We know we are 
being faced with hurricanes every year. We have our experiences in the past. Let’s make the 
decision going forward (FP). 
 
 An elite officer, who acted as Secretary to the Cabinet31 of Government Ministers after 
Hurricane Ophelia, confirmed these learning gaps: 
We should have learnt more by now.  After Ophelia, I was acting Cabinet Secretary and did not 
have a clue what the road map was.  I called ODM (Office of Disaster Management) and they 
were unaware. There was no response mechanism for the financial center (7 floors).  Clearly, we 
were not fully schooled.  It is not a direct science but there must be fall back positions. People 
agitated after Isaac32, clamoring about payments and salaries for the work days lost.  We need to 
come up with a template for action.  During the October rains, we were least affected on the West 
Coast but there was a donor meeting held in Dominica and CDB (Caribbean Development Bank) 
got stuck in the Carib Territory33. We may need a suitable guest house for lodging in that part of 
the country. We are still learning. We were all personally affected by Ophelia.  It took me two 
days to get to Massacre (four miles from town) and the Layou issue (flooding) made it worse 
because of lack of communication mechanism and absence of a strategy to deal with the floods 
(RE). 
 
This account confirmed ODM’s weak capacity highlighted earlier in the document 
reviewed.  It also showed the limited cognition associated with LIH and its road map for action. 
The absence of road maps for evacuation, lack of fall back positions, contingencies or templates 
for action, lack of communication mechanisms and the absence of a strategy to deal with 
associated floods all reflected lessons yet to be learned.   
30 Each line ministry is responsible for planning and budgeting in keeping with its portfolio but these are vetted by 
the Ministry of Education to ensure they are kept with proposed national polices and budgets 
 
31 The Secretary to the Cabinet of Ministers of Government is also head of the Public Service. 
32 She makes reference to Hurricane Isaac, another low-intensity hurricane which affected Dominica in 2012.  




                                                 
Another elite officer, however, was of the opinion that Dominica was better prepared for 
handling hurricanes.  He believed preparations for hurricanes were more structured.  He based 
his position on 1) the presence of a disaster management plan, 2) frequent meetings held in 
preparation for hurricanes and other natural disasters, and 3) the issuing of warnings ahead of 
these disasters.  He explained.  
I think we are, if we go back to a couple years when we had, that wasn’t the first hurricane for 
Dominica but the one that really stands out is 1979, Hurricane David.  When you talk about a real 
national, real impact hurricane and even during that time Dominica wasn’t as prepared as it is 
right now because even with the whole disaster management plan, I mean we have meetings 
going through a year even before the appearance of a hurricane or any natural disaster.  One 
would be warnings, meetings, the whole preparation part of it is much, much, much structured 
and the thing is,  I can’t say anything negative for it, it is really, really structured. So we are very 
much prepared for any occurrence (EC).    
An education elite officer also believed, Dominica learned from its chronic exposures to 
hurricanes.  His point of reference, however, dated back to Hurricane David, a catastrophic 
Category 5 hurricane which devastated Dominica in 1979.   
Government may have learned when it came to catastrophic hurricanes but did not appear 
to have done so for education during low-intensity hurricanes.  Progress on collaboration and 
information sharing has been slow.   As shown, elite officers believed failure to decide, 
collaborate, plan and share information on LIH were at the heart of failures to better address 
education then (FP, RE).  Ministry of Finance elite officers responsible for overall supervision of 
planning in the public sector held line ministries, including the Ministry of Education, 
responsible for these failures (RE, FP).  These ministries failed, for example, to make 
contingency arrangements for addressing education during LIH.  This failure to learn meant 
appropriate contingencies for addressing it were not in place.  This resulted in unplanned, 
reactionary responses that depended on external sources of funding as Theme 5 showed.  
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4.2.2 Theme 5:  External financing of education during low-intensity hurricanes 
Finance is a critical resource in disaster and education emergency management in developing 
countries.  Globally, demands for disaster funds outweigh availability (Wayne & Hedger, 2010).  
Demands were particularly acute in small island states prone to disasters (Rasmussen, 2004, 
Collymore, 2004).  Finance also remained inadequate due to increases in the number and cost of 
disasters worldwide. This was so even with contingencies, risk insurance coverage, international 
aid and donor assistance, and funds transferred from planned activities and development projects 
to emergency response (World Bank, IEG, 2006; Wathne & Hedgers, 2010). 
Chronic dependence on external funding emerged as a key theme in elite interview 
responses.  These funding terms and their derivatives are depicted in the word tree shown in 
Figure 19.   
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 Figure 19. Word Tree for "Funding and its Derivatives" in Interview Response of Senior 
Public Officers 
 
This NVIVO 9 “funding and/or its derivatives” word tree of elite responses produced 29 
references.  These included: 
1. IMF/CBD/World Bank will provide funding for the East of Dominica (RE). 
2. Government had to seek additional funding in respond to these situations (EL). 
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3. We have gotten some grant funding from Venezuela for River Defense (EL). 
4. Submitted to funding agencies for funding for improvement of infrastructure (RR). 
When asked, elite officers identified three sources of funding, two of which were external, 
for addressing low-intensity hurricanes though not education specifically.  These were grants and 
gifts from friendly governments; loans from the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the 
Chinese government in particular, and the diversion of local fund within line ministries. 
The Ministry of Education diverted budgeted funds away from planned activities 
primarily to provide relief assistance to students for the procurement of books; to replace 
damaged uniforms and repair schools after LIH.  One education elite officer described these 
diversions:  
Of course the schools usually suffer certain forms of damage, sometimes through flooding, 
sometimes the roof, the roofs of the schools are damaged, leakages and these are things normally 
we have not budgeted for, the ministry would not have budgeted for, and so funds would have to 
be diverted from other planned projects into these avenues. Students suffer other things like their 
textbooks would bet damaged and destroyed uniforms and so the ministry has to now step in to 
assist them in order to get them back on stream to get back to school. All these are not normally 
budgeted for but in giving assistance, funds would have to be diverted from other projects that we 
had planned into the assistance that are given to students and for repairs to school after the 
damages.(VC)  
This unplanned, ad hoc approach to addressing education during LIH, focused on relief 
assistance rather than child protection; response and recovery rather than vulnerability and risk 
reduction.  This occurred because funds were insufficient and no provisions were made to 
incorporate education during LIH into the Ministry’s programs and budget.   It was neither seen 
nor treated as an integral part of education planning in a country with chronic vulnerabilities and 
risks to low-intensity hurricanes.  One elite officer in education explained; 
Money is never sufficient in the ministry of education. It is never sufficient. There is always 
something to do. Today, if we get a godfather who could say to us look what are some of the 
things they you need to do for your schools, we sure we would find uses for that money without 
wasting it but putting it to good use even with a storm, an impending storm or the direct attack of 
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a storm, we always require resources, we always require resources to do work at the school level 
(SH).          
Insufficient funds appear to be the cardinal issue and a proxy for shoddy prioritizing, 
planning and budgeting.  The assertion was that more of it would have averted the problem of 
LIH for education.  The notion of a “godfather” was a likely a metaphor for external funding 
sources for education during LIH.   This assertion absolved the ministry from its responsibilities 
and transferred them to some fictitious surrogate, “a godfather”.  Consequently, planned 
programs have had to be suspended or curtailed to address resulting impacts.   Two elite officers 
in Finance and Public Works believed the central issue was the failure of line ministries to plan 
adequately for emergencies (FP; KJ).  There appeared to be no enforcement functions either.  As 
a result, the Ministry of Finance could neither secure nor allocate the necessary funding.  
Failure to plan and budget therefore, resulted in reactive decisions that included 
dependence on external grants and loans.  Government, therefore, accessed low-interest rapid 
response loans from the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) to address the impacts of low-
intensity hurricanes but only after they occurred.  The result has been chronic borrowing and 
increased debt.  
 Four elite officers (Finance and Public Works Ministries) confirmed the use of loans to 
address these LIH (RE; FP; KJ; EL).  One of these affirmed: 
What we had to do was borrow, borrow. We had to get loans. We got funding from CDB; small 
donations from one or two countries, friendly governments but mostly we had to contract new 
loans which increased our debt. The response is mostly based on external funding (FP).  
 
    There appeared to be chronic borrowing and dependence on friendly government, the latter 
being small.  The popular approach was to “contract new loans because the response was mostly 
based on external funding” (RE).   A Ministry of Finance elite officer detailed the extent of the 
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borrowing that occurred after Hurricane Ophelia (2011) despite donations from friendly 
governments.  She explained:  
In the case of Ophelia, we had to take out loans $30 million from CDB; for the Elmshall Bridge34, 
$10 million and Layou $35 million. We also receive grants from China and other friendly 
governments (RE). 
The attitude appeared to be total resignation, general malaise and apathy associated with 
addressing low intensity hurricanes in Dominica.   She continued: 
We have no choice; there is no budget allocation for storm damage, and line ministries never 
seem to follow the process. We have no choice but to establish a disaster fund.  We should have 
one million funding for quick response. We should have air lifting capabilities, access to schools, 
paying for clearance – quick response; dependency on external, local resources – we have no 
break from these storms: Each year there is something; there were no repairs last year and then 
there is another this year (RE). 
The failure of line ministries to budget for storm damage resulted in extensive borrowing.  
In the case of Hurricane Ophelia, government borrowed $75 million which was about 30% of the 
2011 national budget (RE).  As at June 2011, the debt to GDP ratio was already 56%.  A local 
disaster fund worth $1 million should have been in place but was not because of the failure of 
line ministries to budget appropriately (RE).  There appeared to be no agency delegated with the 
authority to enforce compliance.    The Ministry of Finance specifically, the Financial Secretary 
and Budget Controller, however, supervised the budgetary process.  Permanent Secretaries35 as 
chief financial officers prepare and submit line ministries budget for the Ministry of Finance 
approval. The Ministry of Finance in turn adjusts these budgets to bring them in line with 
economic outlooks and government spending policies for the year.  In the absence of allocated 
34 This is a flat bridge that connects the Elmshall Suburb to the City of Roseau. During heavy rains or hurricanes it 
becomes impassable and the community is cut-off. There is an alternative route but it is susceptible to landslide and 
rock falls 
35 Each Ministry if headed by a Permanent Secretary or elite officer who is responsible for its management and 
financial accountability.  
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funds for LIH and response of the debt burden, government sought debt-friendly alternatives like 
grants.   However, grants were often small amounts (FP). 
Government’s grant funds to assist with hurricane response were not allocated to 
education.   It received grants from the Government of People’s Republic of China and 
Government of Venezuela for response-mitigation activities but mostly for road repairs and 
reconstruction, and for constructing retaining walls.  On Public works elite officer explained;  
I must say thank God for the initiative of the Government of Dominica, government with friends 
in these times. They really came forward seriously. We had assistance from Venezuela. We had 
assistance from the Chinese government and other government from the region but to mitigate the 
effects as far as it goes to the financial part of it. Dominica was able actually to do the necessary 
and in some instances we had Dominica actually helping out in getting some of the work done, 
although there wasn’t much finance, but the finance that was needed we were actually able to get 
it from donors. (Any loans? I probed) Not that I know of. I know there was some help from CBD 
(EC).   
  
Could it be that the apparent ease with which loans and grants were secured negated the 
desire or obligations to accept full responsibility, locally for low-intensity hurricane impacts?  
Could this have also influenced the failure to establish the contingency fund proposed in 2006?  
The Ministry of Finance elite officer discussed the challenge involved:   
We (Ministry of Finance) have been trying to set up for a number of years a Contingency Fund 
just to deal with that. We have never been able to do it (Why? I probed) because there is never 
enough funds to allocate to that contingency fund or accounts because the requests that are 
coming for things that you know that you have to do is already not enough. You have to cut back 
so much that there is never enough money to say we are going to allocate 10%. You put it in a 
special fund in the event of a disaster, we have, and you know we have that money there. It has 
never materialized. We just go and hope this year will be a good year and that God would be 
good to us (FP).  
 
  The insufficient funds debate and budget cuts resurfaced in this exchange to explain 
failures to establish this contingency fund.  The notion of LIH as “Acts of God” also resurfaced.  
“Hope and the goodness of God,” it seemed, would take care of that situation.   This magical 
thinking released government and elite officers of their primary responsibilities for addressing 
the policy problem of low-intensity hurricanes.  This is significant since government contributes 
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to the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF)36 but did not demonstrate similar 
commitment to low-intensity hurricanes.  An elite officer within the Ministry of Finance 
explained: 
 
There is a regional fund called the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF). And 
all of the governments are contributing to this, right. So I did not even remember that so that is 
one step Caribbean countries have already taken to mitigate the disasters so that’s a good point 
you made there.  
 
We can have discussions on how to expand the facility to include LIH, all kinds of disasters. It 
means the government would have to be called upon to contribute larger amounts into that fund. 
For us it is quite significant, over a million per annum. Quite significant three years we have been 
paying into that.  Last year we paid 1.9 million, almost 2 million (FP).    
 
While large catastrophic hurricanes got government’s attention and funds, chronic low 
intensity hurricanes were left to the “hope and the goodness of God.”  The rationale offered in 
this exchange is that allocating funds ex-ante for low-intensity hurricanes may be too costly.  
Notwithstanding, education was not mentioned in these conversations or decisions about LIH 
funding.   
Overall, external funds like loans, grants, and in some cases funds diverted from planned 
activities were being used to address low-intensity hurricanes.  Systematically allocating local 
funds to address them appeared to be a significant challenge for government.  In the case of 
education, funds were diverted from budgeted activities to provide hurricane relief for students.  
To what extent then should government accept full responsibility for addressing chronic, low-
intensity hurricanes? Which agency should have been made responsible and held accountable for 
ensuring the necessary funding protocols were in place?  Where should education feature on the 
list of priorities?  The latter is essential since education is considered the fourth pillar of 
36 The CCRIF is a multi-country insurance that allows Caribbean Country to pool their risk against disasters like 
hurricanes. Members pay into the fund. In    
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humanitarian response; however it was deprioritized during low-intensity hurricanes in Dominica 
as Theme 6 will show.  
4.2.3 Theme 6: Education was deprioritized during emergencies 
Schools and education are critical to the lives of children (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Machel, 
1996).  They symbolize a return to normalcy and a return to happiness during emergencies 
(UNICEF/University of Pittsburgh, 2005).  Schooling is essential for providing psychosocial 
support and child protection (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Pigozzi, 1999; Sinclair, 2002; Vargas-
Barón & McClure, 1998).  Reopening schools as soon as possible after disasters is recommended 
since education is the fourth pillar of humanitarian response (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Machel, 
1996; Pigozzi, 1996).  Moreover, children and older adults should be of special concern in the 
aftermath of disasters since they are among the most vulnerable (FEMA, 2013).  Elite Officers 
were asked to determine the extent to which education was considered priority during 
emergencies.  Specifically, they were asked: 1) what is determined to be priority?  2) How is that 
priority determined? 3) Where does education rank on the list of priorities?  Figure 20 is an 
NVIVO 9 thematic model of their responses. 
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 Figure 20. Priorities and Priority Determinants during LIH, Dominica37 
 
Overall, education was deprioritized during chronic low-intensity emergencies.  Instead 
1) physical safety of people and property; 2) health and safety; 3) restoring communications; and 
4) restoring transportation were the top four priorities.   As expected, elite officers within the 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Public Works identified physical safety or protection of life 
and property as top priorities during low-intensity hurricanes.   As a result, roads clearances to 
facilitate movement, transportation and communication during hurricanes were priorities for the 
37 First, second, third…are priority ranks. 
  F/PW/Ed are ministries within the public service: F - Ministry of Finance; PW - Ministry of Public Works; Ed - 
Ministry of Education and are the transcript sources 
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Ministry of Public Works.  The elite officer provided the rationale for the Ministry of Public 
Works priorities. 
When responding and mitigating, our primary concern would be protection of life and protection 
of property and when we say property we talking both public and private.  The area of public 
property we are most concerned about is our road, communications infrastructure to ensure we 
maintain its resilience and allow for its use so we try as much as possible in response to ensure all 
roads are motorable as quickly as possible in responding to a storm, so that people are not 
restricted in movements because that’s important especially when you are responding to 
emergencies situations. You don’t not want to have people injured and you cannot get to out of 
certain areas and so on that is always a priority for us to ensure that we restore normalcy 
communications and also where persons’ lives and properties are threatened then we respond to 
that also (EL). 
Elite officers in the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Public Works did not identify 
education as priority.  Rather, they appeared to be uncertain about where education ranked 
during LIH.   An elite officer in the Ministry of Public Works asserted: 
We need to find out or we find out really is anybody in danger in terms of life? Obviously, that 
would be our first line of response, safety. Next in line we look at transport but making sure that 
the road network is open up as quickly as possible from there we move on. So first, Safety is 
really the overriding criterion for doing our response (KJ).   
Am, I not too sure we have ranks but in terms of, maybe just looking at the general situation, our 
first priority will be that of health and safety, transportation, communications and maybe 
somewhere under there we have education (KJ).  
 
According to this elite officer, “maybe somewhere under there we have education.”   This 
is significant because the Ministry of Public Works is responsible primarily for overall response 
during disasters which included people’s physical safety. This did not seem to include the 
youngest and most vulnerable.  Most likely, it was being treated as a parental responsibility 
Outside of the Ministry of Education, the connections between safety, schooling and 
children during LIH did not seem apparent to these elite officers.  One elite financial officer 
recognized the importance of safety but suggested it was a parental responsibility.  As a result, 
the mandate, therefore, was to connect children and parents during LIH but as she noted, 
evacuation routes or procedures to do so did not exist.  She explained: 
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Safety but the truth is we need to look at different levels which includes connecting children to 
parents.  We may not be able to and evacuate routes are not available.  There is no process for 
evacuation.  Topography is not friendly and classroom teaching is not priority as school days and 
terms can be adjusted (RE). 
 
Most communities and schools had single access routes, which were not motorable 
during low-intensity hurricanes.  All roads, for example, on the West Coast were flooded and 
impassable during Hurricane Ophelia, cutting-off thousands of children from their homes.  As 
emergency shelters, students would have been safer at schools, but most schools were not 
organized to accommodate them. 
Rhetorically, and as expected, elite education officials recognized safety of children as a 
priority.  Under normal circumstances, the Ministry of Education was responsible for students, 
safety and security while at school.  It would be, as well, under adverse conditions like LIH.  An 
elite officer in the Ministry of Education said “Safety of the children, safety of the staff and the 
safety of the building” were priority.  Similarly, another of the officers believed “safety of 
children, safety of teachers and safety of school buildings as education centers and emergency 
shelters” were priority.   He explained: 
Safety is a key issue from us; and, am, safety from several perspectives. The mere fact that 
students attend a building, our schools, we want to ensure that they are safe. We want to ensure 
that they are in a learning environment that is conducive to the process of education. So these for 
us are keys. The other area, because the schools are being used as centers, hurricane shelters, and 
so forth, we also take that into consideration. If we were to get another David38 what would be the 
kind of situation, would it be able to withstand that and how well would be able to house in that 
institution.   So we take these things into consideration. I think these are our consideration: safety 
of children, safety of teachers on a day-to-day basis at the school and when there is a storm (SH). 
While these elite education officers recognized safe buildings, student and teacher safety 
as priority, as noted already, in practice, policies, plans and budgets that would have guaranteed 
their safety were not in place.   There was a gap, therefore, between the warranted assertions of 
38 Reference to Hurricane David, a Category 5 hurricane on the Saffir Simpson Scale, that devastated Dominica on 
29 August 1979 killing 43 people and  destroying 80% of the housing stock and  
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these officers and their line of action; between what they believed and what they actually did; 
between rhetoric and practice.  Their failure to act appropriately on these assertions placed 
students, teachers and school property at risk during LIH.  
4.2.4 Summary of Elite interviews 
Elite Officers recognized the adverse impacts of low intensity hurricanes on the economy, 
agriculture, infrastructure and education.  Notwithstanding, they neither planned nor budgeted 
for them.  This behavior demonstrated failure to take personal responsibility for addressing low-
intensity hurricanes transferring them imaginatively to external agencies including God.  LIH 
were perceived as “Acts of God” and responsibility for safety and security was left to “hope and 
His goodness.”  Government depended, therefore, on external loans and grants to address 
emergencies ex-post.  These did not cover education.  Rather, elite officers deprioritized 
education because instruction could be suspended or reschedule.  Physical safety of people that 
did not expressly include children and people’s property were priority. Connecting children to 
their parents appear to have been the priority but the mechanisms to so, like evacuation routes 
and procedures were not in place.  Elite education officials believed student, teacher and school 
safety as priority.  Those beliefs were not followed by corresponding actions – policies, plans 
and budgets that guaranteed their safety.  Interviews with school principals as outlined in Section 
2.3 confirmed this chasm between assertions about safety and actual action on safety.  
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4.3 INTERVIEWS WITH PRINCIPALS 
Inadequate planning goes into education in emergencies (Sinclair, 2002; INEE, 2010).  
Emergencies were unanticipated and national governments were often unprepared.  
Consequently, they overwhelmed government’s capacities to address them (Kagawa, 2005).  
External agencies, non-government organizations (NGO), and international inter-governmental 
agencies were often at the center of response during catastrophic events.  They 1) restored 
schools temporarily; 2) provided psychosocial support and child-friendly spaces for protection; 
3) replaced teaching and learning materials; and 4) instituted programs of recovery for children 
(Aguilar, 2009; UNICEF & University of Pittsburgh, 2004; Penson & Tomilson, 2007; Sinclair, 
2002; Sommers, 2004). These agencies, however, were rarely present during low-intensity 
hurricanes in Dominica.  
Overall, results of interviews with eleven school principals who experienced Hurricanes 
Dean and Ophelia in Dominica showed low intensity hurricanes had damaging effects on 
schools, responses were selective and in some cases, delayed.  Response activities, like student 
evacuation, were left to principals and their school communities.  These principals, however, 
lacked the training, guidance, skills and support required for effective response.  As a result, they 
and their students were left vulnerable particularly to Hurricane Ophelia.  Word similarity 
analysis showed there was thematic consistency across principals’ interview responses 
confirming most had similar experiences with LIH or used similar vernacular to describe them.  
Figure 21 shows the clustering of these word similarities by sources of interviews   
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 Figure 21. Principals Interviews Clustered by Word Similarity, Dominica 
Principals were asked to 1) assess the impacts of low-intensity on education; 2) 
timeliness and effectiveness of responses; and 3) the role Ministry of Education played in 
reducing impacts.  Figure 14 showed three outliers and possibly thematic inconsistency – PJ, PM 
and VR.  This may be so because only Hurricane Dean affected all three.  Both Hurricanes Dean 
and Ophelia affected the others.  Unlike the other principals, all three were satisfied with the 
timeliness and effectiveness of responses.  Further, non-public sector agencies handled responses 
in two of these cases and the third suffered minimal damage.  The next three themes deal with 
responses from these eleven principals beginning with the damaging impacts of LIH on schools. 
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4.3.1 Theme 7: LIH had damaging impacts on schools 
Disasters destroy school buildings, learning materials, and disrupt educational access and 
participation for large number of students (Sinclair, 2002; Sommers, 2002, 2003, 2004). They 
lead to fatalities; are traumatic for children and their teachers, and affect student academic 
performance (Holmes, 2002, Joseph, 2006; Machel, 1996; Pane, McCaffery, Karla & Zhou, 
2008, Sommers, 2009).  Interviews with principals confirmed some of these impacts for two 
low-intensity hurricanes: Hurricanes Dean and Ophelia. 
As a precursor to assessing response times and efficiencies during Hurricanes Dean and 
Ophelia, principals were asked to identify the impacts of these two hurricanes on their schools.  









 Figure 22. Impacts of LIH, Dean and Ophelia on Schools, Dominica39 
 
Impacts were categorized as: 1) fatalities, 2) destruction to school infrastructure and related 
facilities, 3) the destruction of school materials, 4) disruption in instruction and 5) psychosocial 
effects. These are shown in Table 12 for ease reference.  
Table 12. Impacts of LIH on Education Categorized by NVIVO Nodes or Themes 
39 The arrows are labeled using unique identifiers (PJ/VR/AA) to depict the sources. 
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  Frequency of principals’ responses to questions on impacts is recorded in Table 13. 
 








As shown in Table 13, most schools experienced building damages, downed 
communication lines and disruptions to instructions. There were two fatalities, as well as 
possibly psychosocial effects as a result.   Theme 8 explored how these impacts were addressed. 
4.3.2  Theme 8:  Multiple actors 
Key priorities areas in education during emergencies have been to establish a sense of normalcy 
for children by returning them to routine schooling as quickly as possible and reduce the 
psychological impacts of disasters on them (Kagawa, 2005; Pigozzi, 1999; Sinclair, 2002).  















   
Impacts Schools Affected 
Building damages 5 
Downed communication lines 4 
Disruption in Instruction 4 
Teaching material destroyed 3 
Furniture and equipment destroyed 3 





response (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Gates & Reich, 2010; Smith & Vaux, 2003).  This section 
attempted to determine the urgency of responses.  Principals were to identify actors who 
addressed the impacts of these hurricanes on their schools, the response-time and their 
satisfaction.  
They identified multiple actors including the Ministry of Education involved in addressing   
Table 14 lists these agents and the frequency with which respondents credited them.  
Table 14. Agents who Addressed Hurricane Impacts on Education, Dominica 
Agents who addressed impacts Frequency of response 
Ministry of Education (MOE) 4 
Part MOE 1 





Four principals credited the Ministry of Education with addressing impacts fully; one 
principal credited the Ministry of Education in part; three credited others and two principals did 
not respond (see AA; AJJ; PJ; BV).  Two external agencies (NGOs) with local operations in 
Dominica were involved in building repairs according to contract document but principals were 
unaware and could not have included those as agents who addressed LIH. They worked through 
the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education. 
The Ministry of Education addressed damages to buildings and related facilities (AA; AJJ; 
PJ; BV).  These were repairs to window, doors and roofs.  Schools, parent, communities and 
local government addressed the non-infrastructural impacts (AA; AJJ; VR; VP, MH; JM; JB).  
These were: 1) the funeral arrangements for the two victims, 2) evacuation of students, 3). 
replacement of learning and materials, like books and computers, and 4) providing psychosocial 
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support for students and teachers.  No one addressed the instruction days lost as a result of these 
emergencies, neither were there edicts, policies or mandates in place to address them.  
Principals’ assessment of timelines did not always correspondent with documentary 
evidence.  Most principals believed repairs were completed in one month. One said one week, 
another said within a month and still another said within 5-6 months.   Review of a progress 
report on the school repairs following Hurricane Dean, however, showed that by 12 September 
2007, roughly one month after Hurricane Dean, only two of the contracted works were 
completed.  A copy of this report forms Appendix F.  Five of the contracts for repairs had not 
been signed by then (EPDU, 2007).  This study was conducted five years after Dean and could 
have reduced their ability to recall accurately, in this case.   
External agencies (NGOs) financed repairs on both schools where contracts were completed:  
Digicel, a Telecommunications company and the Caribbean Development Bank Basic Needs 
Trust Fund (BNTF).  Principals’ of these two schools expressed satisfaction with the timeliness 
and level of response.  These external agencies had the available resources to effect timely 
repairs but their involvement confirmed dependence on external funding sources during low-
intensity hurricanes (LIH). 
As anticipated, principals were less forthright in revealing their satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with the manner in which impacts were addressed.  Respondent tend to self-efface where they 
perceive responses may have adverse consequences or appeared to be potentially embarrassing 
(Tourangeau, Lips & Rasinski, 2001).  Two principals expressed satisfaction, one of which was 
the school where two fatalities occurred.  The police and local government, agents external to the 
Ministry of Education (Godfathers), conducted search and rescue and made funeral arrangements 
for the two victims.   
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Nine principals did not respond to the question on satisfaction, two however, expressed their 
dissatisfaction.   One of these opined: 
I was dissatisfied with the response we got for Ophelia, probably they should give us more 
initiative to send the children home a little earlier or just give the principal more initiative. When 
we see the bad weather then we can take the decision on our own and just start to disperse the 
children. Call their parents and disburse the children. The argument sometimes is you take a 
decision and nothing really happens, nothing serious as Ophelia happens. When, um, because I 
kept calling the church at the foot of the hill and they were reporting to tell me what was 
happening and they said that the water was on the road and I know children were living around 
that area.  So I knew it was kind of getting very, very serious. So, I think, they should give us 
more initiative, as though trust us a little more to make decision (VR). 
A central aspect of this dissatisfaction was the expectation that as principals, they should 
have had greater autonomy to make decisions that would have resulted in more timely responses.  
The centralized nature of educational governance and management did not appear to make that 
possible.  Two other principals shared this concern: 
But also I think though, even from the perspective of the Ministry of Education,  I don’t think, I 
don’t, I am not satisfied that they trusted our judgment enough on the situation although we were 
on the ground and we saw what was happening.  I mean, it has rained in the past and, um, there 
were times when there was no real concern for us but I remember articulating, “Hi, this is 
unusual, this is something that we have to attend to; we need to get the children off.”  I don’t 
believe our personnel took that seriously, maybe because they could not understand what we were 
seeing on the ground at the time (JB).  
The ministry person should be informed of impending dangers and give principal leeway to be 
able to take decisions when certain things happen; that they do have to call their boss and their 
boss don’t know, and have to, and even allow things to happen at the school because you are 
waiting for permission from somebody (VP) 
Notwithstanding their dissatisfaction, the Chief Education Officer confirmed that principals 
were responsible, under the Education Act, 1997, for school closures during emergencies when 
he or the Minister could not be reached.  He did not outline the procedures or conditions that 
would merit making that decision on their own.  Normally, under the Act, that responsibility fell 
to the Minister and Chief Education Officer on advice from the National Emergency 
Management Organization (NEPO).  Principals seemed unaware of that prerogative.  
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Summarily, Ministry of Education faced challenges while addressing education during LIH.  
Responses were limited and recovery protracted, in one case for up to 6 months and in another 
one-year.  It was focused on building repairs.  External agencies, like Basic Need Trust Fund 
(BNTF) assisted.  Much of the non-repair works, like student evacuation, restoring learning 
materials, were left to principals who had no official training, guidance and support.  Fortunately, 
most were in communities willing to share their local knowledge on hurricanes and disasters. 
They advised principals and assisted in evacuation.  As Theme 9 will show actions designed to 
mitigate future impacts did not receive serious consideration.     
4.3.3 Theme 9: Mitigation  
Comfort, et al (2004) argued for the need to treat disasters as policy problems and to put policies 
in place before disasters occur.  These pre- disaster policies would include mitigation40 and 
preparedness41.  Principals were asked to discuss what could be done to reduce the impact of 
education emergencies in the future.  Overall, they recommended: 1) mitigation, 2) risk reduction 
and response strategies, 3) more and appropriate information to improve the manner in which 
low-intensity emergencies at school are handled.  They also recommended: 4) improved location 
and siting of school buildings to reduce risk and vulnerabilities; 5) development of policies that 
targets areas prone to disasters, 6) improved communication as disaster events unfolded.  Central 
40 Mitigation are strategies and activities, like adopting and applying building codes and standards designed to 
reduce the vulnerabilities and risks associated with disasters (Mileti, 1999).  
41 Preparedness involves strategies and activities undertaken before a disaster to reduce loss of lives and property. 
These include adequate relief supplies, evacuation and drills and exercises (Mileti, 1999). 
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was the need for greater autonomy at the level of schools to facilitate effective and timely 
response.  Elite officers shared similar sentiments.  
   Accordingly, to one principal; 
From the perspective of the Ministry of Education, I do not believe we have clear cut information 
that we can follow. You do not know the line of contact in such a situation. So I don’t think as a 
principal, I was really prepared to deal with the situation when it came. I believe this is something 
principals should be briefed upon. We are dealing with large groups of students, emergency 
situations may come up. We need to know how we go about dealing with situations when they 
come. Maybe it should not be left just to the principal, just to decide, this is what I do, you know 
(JB) 
This principal highlighted the absent procedures, information, and poor communication 
with the Ministry and his lack of preparedness for dealing with Hurricane Ophelia.  He did not 
know how to deal with situations like these and held the Ministry of Education responsible.  Two 
other principals suggested making schools safer for children by locating them away from cliffs 
and rivers, and erecting retaining structures to manage rock slides, and control flooding and their 
impacts.  One of them expounded: 
Building schools in safer zones for children to not have to think about slides.  (Have you 
considered the terrain of Dominica?).  But we should have put retaining walls in place before the 
children begin to utilize the building or so to minimize slides or rock falls coming to the school 
(VR). 
One principal spoke about putting a “little policy” in place particularly for those 
communities and schools prone to disasters like those triggered by Hurricanes Dean and Ophelia.  
She thought such policies should be targeted and focused on areas prone to disasters.  These 
areas would have to be known.   She explained; 
So probably there could be one “little policy” for places like C…, not everywhere, when you see, 
anytime you see,  there is the overnight heavy showers especially during those periods when it is 
hurricane season and so on that once they see overnight it has been raining steadily probably like 
up to 6:30 - 7:00am just keep their children at home for the day you know but that should not be a 
general thing because all places like W… without disasters to go and tell people if they see a little 
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rain do not come to school no but for the disaster prone areas probably like M… too and those 
areas and so. That is something ministry could do (JM)  
Responsibility for establishing this policy would lay with the Ministry of Education as 
described in the National Disaster Plan (NDP, 2001).  Three principals, however, were of the 
opinion; there was nothing or little the Ministry of Education could have done to mitigate the 
effects of low intensity hurricanes.  They stated;  
To be fair, there was nothing! What they could have done? There was nothing! (AJJ) 
Nothing! (Nothing? I retorted) No! The role of a hurricane, we talking about the actual effect of 
the storm, the ministry could not do anything, the ministry could not tie the roof. This was the last 
thing you expected to happen. This building has been there since 1973 you know, saw David and 
all these hurricanes. This was the last thing (BV). 
No, I don’t think so. That’s an Act of God (MH). 
 These principals downplayed the Ministry’s roles and responsibilities for 
addressing education during low-intensity hurricanes.  Like the elite officers, they perceived 
disasters as “Acts of God” and therefore beyond its control.  Both held similar assertions about 
disasters.  Consequently principals’ failed to hold this Ministry or themselves accountable for 
ensuring staff and student safety during these hurricanes.  The absence of relevant policies, plans 
and budget at the Ministry cascaded to schools, isolated principals and their schools and left 
them vulnerable to LIH.  As they recognized, they were unable to effectively handle the events 
which unfolded since they lacked appropriate training, awareness and support from the Ministry 
of Education.   Moreover, schools were located in areas that left them vulnerable to floods, 




4.3.4 Summary of interviews with principals  
Overall, principals’ interviews revealed the adverse impacts of chronic low-intensity hurricanes 
on schools.  These included damages to buildings and learning materials, flooding and, possibly 
psychosocial impacts on students.  Principals, however, found responses shoddy and focused 
mostly on building repairs, with all else left to them and their communities.  Few principal 
expressed dissatisfaction with the extent and timeliness of responses but few expressed 
satisfaction.  The dissatisfied expressed concerns with their lack of training, awareness and 
guidance for addressing low-intensity hurricanes particularly when communications failed.  They 
were unaware of their legal obligations during these hurricanes and called for greater autonomy 
which they already possessed legally.  Finally, they suggested the use of mitigation strategies 
that included greater autonomy for decision-making on the ground as disaster events unfolded 
and putting a “little policy” in place.  Notwithstanding, inspection of affected school buildings 
showed despite repairs and rehabilitations, they remained at-risk and vulnerable to low-intensity 
hurricanes. 
4.4 INSPECTION OF SCHOOLS  
Assessing and managing vulnerabilities and risks are critical aspects of social and cultural 
protections (Dombrowsky, 1981).  Schools represent safe places for children.  Ensuring school 
buildings are hurricane safe constitutes an essential component of that safety.  Comprehensive 
retrofitting of school buildings to ensure safe structures was conducted in Dominica in 1998 with 
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assistance from the Organization of American States (OAS), ECHO and the Government of 
Dominica (GOCD, OAS & ECHO, 1998).  There had no follow-up since.  An evaluation of the 
status of school building maintenance in Dominica found ad hoc maintenance, poor design and 
construction practices that made most schools vulnerable to the direct and indirect impacts of 
earthquakes and hurricanes (Consulting Partnership Engineers, 2011).  As mentioned, I inspected 
affected schools buildings to determine whether they were still vulnerable to low-intensity 
hurricanes after repairs or rehabilitation.   
Ten of fifteen42targeted school buildings were inspected for adherence to building 
standards and codes.  Overall, inspection showed widespread failure to adhere to key standards 
and codes in their location, construction, repairs and rehabilitation and facilities.  As Theme 10 
will show, this resulted in their continued vulnerability and risk to low-intensity hurricanes.   
4.4.1 Theme10: Risks and vulnerabilities 
Overall, inspections results showed that during construction and repairs, key building standards, 
codes and features designed to reduce the vulnerability of school buildings were ignored.  There 
were serious siting problems as well.  Schools buildings and facilities were located in areas prone 
to flooding, landslides, sea surges and damage both from the direct and indirect impacts of low-
intensity hurricanes.  Roofs, in particular, were found to be susceptible to these gale force winds.  
42 Five principals either did not consent to participate in this study or were not available for reasons already 
mentioned – migration, retirement and death. 
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 School roofs inspected lacked key hurricane ties43 designed to strengthen roof 
members and secure their integrity as single whole structures.  Hurricane ties are specially 
designed metal plates fastened between roof member cleavages to hold them in place during 
storms or hurricanes.  There are four kinds of hurricane ties – roof to purlin; purlins to rafters; 
rafter to ring beams and ring beams to walls.  As shown in Figure 23, purlin to rafter ties were 
absent in all but concrete structures.   Six of the ten schools inspected had no purlin to roof ties, 
making those roofs vulnerable to uplift and being blown away by hurricane force winds.  This 
placed equipment, learning materials and furniture at risk for damage or loss as well, as 




43 Hurricanes ties are metal plates affix to roof members to reduce vulnerabilities to winds and to help the roof 
function as a “single” structure.  Roofs are susceptible to uplift and being blown away by hurricane force winds as a 
result of the conventions they generate. Making sure they are fastened securely reduces the likelihood. 
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 Figure 23. Purlin to Roof Hurricane Ties by Roof types in Selected School Buildings, 
Dominica 
 
The absence of these purlins in at least one roof member whether ring beams to rafter; rafters 
to purlins or purlins to roofs left the entire roof vulnerable.  Figure 24, for example, shows a roof 
with ring beam to rafter hurricane tie but there were no rafter to purlin ties leaving the roof above 





 Figure 24. Ring-beam to Rafter Hurricane Tie in a School Building 
  
 Where hurricanes ties existed, in some cases the corrugated sheeting used to cover non-
concrete structures revealed several vulnerabilities.   Purlins did not extend to the full length of 
the corrugation leaving portions dangling.  There were no facie boards against which to fasten 
the side edges of these corrugated sheeting to reduce uplift.   One third of the school roofs 
inspected had these shortcomings.   Figure 25 shows rotting corrugation, rotting metal rafter; 
incomplete purlins that did not extend the full length of the corrugation sheeting which was left 
dangling in that school.  Corrugation sheets in three of the wooden roofs I inspected were 
fastened with simple nails.  Screws rather than nails tend to hold better during hurricanes.  
Originally, these were members of steel-framed buildings constructed in the 1970’s.  Age and 
successive renovations, according to one principal, compromised the integrity and strength of 
these steel members.  
 
 





 Figure 25. Key Roof Vulnerabilities in a School Building, Dominica 
 
Entire classrooms were also found to be vulnerable to toppling during hurricane force 
winds because in some cases they were left unattached to their foundations.   Figure 26 shows 
the shoddy foundation works on one wooden temporary classroom at one of the inspected 
schools.  The structure was left suspended above its foundation pillar.  Loose stones or rocks 










Figure 26. School Flooring Unattached and Unsecured to Foundation Pillar, Dominica 
 
Two other types of vulnerabilities were observed: schools were located close to rivers and 
stream, and essential facilities were located on ground floors making them susceptible to 
flooding during hurricanes.  Figures 27 and 28 depict a school which experienced severe 
flooding, and where students and teachers were trapped for several hours before being evacuated 
by the fire and ambulance services during Hurricane Ophelia.  The exposed tree roots in the 
center of Figure 27 marks the river entry point unto the only access road to the school. It also 
shows the school entrance through the flood waters entered its compound.  That school was 
flooded with four feet of water.  It destroyed the library and books.  The library was re-painted 
and its floor re-tiled in August 2012, nearly one year after Hurricane Ophelia.  
Wooden frames 
Loose boulder 
Concrete foundation pillar 
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 Figure 27. Close Proximity of School to River, Dominica 
In this case, the school grounds, classrooms and library were located on the ground floor as 
shown in Figure 28.   
 
Figure 28. School and Library Flooded during Hurricane Ophelia, 2011, Dominica 
 
River 






School records were also vulnerable mainly because of their location and storage method.  Of 
the ten schools inspected, six had their records located downstairs or the ground floor, two on 
elevated ground (elevated) floor levels and one on the upper floor (upstairs) as shown in Figure 
29.   No school inspected had more than two floors.   
 
Figure 29. Location of Records in Inspected Schools, Dominica 
 
School records were mostly stored in paper files or jackets, placed on open wooden shelves 
or metal cabinets where roof members were vulnerable to uplift during low intensity hurricanes.  
These records were at risk therefore, for damage or destruction during low-intensity hurricanes.  
Figure 30 shows the storage of records at one school.  As can be seen, they were stored in paper 
file jackets, placed on wooden shelves and covered with curtain-like cloth fabrics.   Interestingly, 
this school like all schools in this study had an equipped and functional computer room which 
could have been used to store data and information.  Paper-based files would still be required but 




Figure 30. Storage of School Records and their Vulnerability to Hurricanes, Dominica 
4.4.2 Summary of school inspections 
In summary, school inspections revealed the prevalence of repairs and construction works that 
did not adhere to building codes and standards.  Roof members were vulnerable to damage from 
low-intensity hurricanes because most did not possess hurricane ties.  In some cases, temporary 
classrooms were not attached to their foundations.  Inspected schools facilities were vulnerable 
to flooding because they were located close to rivers and cliffs.  School records were not 
securely stored.   They were located on the ground floors and were at risk for damage from 
flooding.  School records were also at risk for damage where school roofs were at risk for 
damage.   Table 14 summarized the study findings as captured under each of the themes which 
emerged from this study. 
School records 


















using key words 
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Theme 1:  
Risk and 
vulnerabilities 
• GSPS 2006 
• GSPS, 2012-
2014  
• Government understood the need to 
move toward risk and vulnerability as 
mitigation but framed policy in non-
committed language of response and 
recovery 
 




• GSPS 2006, 
• GSPS, 2012- 
2014 
• Proposed the establishment of 
contingency and vulnerability funds but 
weak policy commitment language  






• GSPS, 2006 
• GSPS, 2012-
2014 




• Ministry of Education (MOE) was not a 
primary agency 
• MOE held membership in several 
NEEC Task Forces that were unrelated 
to education  
• No institutional presence for education 
during LIH within Ministry of 
Education 
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Adverse impacts 
on education and 
limited policy 
responses 
• Elite Interviews: 
RE, KJ, EL, FP, 
EC, & RR,  
 
• Low intensity hurricanes damages 
school buildings, and disrupting 
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• Education is priority in annual 
budgetary allocations but is not during 
LIH expect for repairs to damaged 
buildings 
• Contingency funds for addressing low-
intensity hurricanes did not exist. 
• Loans, grants and transfers were main 
funding strategies resulting in increased 
indebtedness. 
• MOE transferred funds from planned to 
emergency activities but for social 
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• Safety of people and safety of property 
were priority. 
• Education was not prioritized.  



































• Window, doors and roofs, learning 
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principals  experiences with 
and perspectives 
of principal on 







materials and equipment were 
destroyed 










• MOE responses were mainly repairs to 
buildings. 
• Principals and their communities took 
care of all else including psychosocial 
support and evacuation 
• Principals lacked information, guidance 
and support during and after those 
hurricanes 
• Principals had to depend on the 
experience of communities and were 
indecisive and may have increased 









• Principals argued for increased 
mitigation including locating schools 
away from rivers;  Increased 
information, communication, guidance 
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building codes 
and standard in 




Persistent risk and 
vulnerabilities  
• 6 schools had no 
purlin to rafter 
ties 
• 10 schools 
<300ft from 
ocean 
• 5 schools < 100ft 
from ocean 
• 5 schools within 
5ft of cliffs 












• Building codes and standards were not 
adhered to during repairs and 
rehabilitations 
• Risk and vulnerabilities of buildings 
and facilities persisted. 
• School records were vulnerable to low 






5.0  DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Low intensity hurricanes (LIH) affected and disrupted education in Dominica.  They are a 
serious and chronic problem for which appropriate policy solutions have to be devised.  
Documents reviews, interviews and building inspections conducted in this study confirmed the 
chronic and recurring nature of these hurricanes and their effects on education and schools.  They 
were fatal, damaged school buildings and destroyed learning materials and equipment.   In turn, 
they disrupted schooling both before and after they made landfall, since most schools are 
emergency shelters.  They were possibly traumatic, therefore, for teachers and children.   
Based on a complex set of policy, financial and institutional failures, Dominica and in 
particular the Ministry of Education did not have in place frameworks and proactive approaches 
to sustainably and effectively address these LIH.   Dominica relied instead on “Band-Aid” or 
“quick-fix” responses and recovery that only addressed repairs to damaged school buildings.  
What is required is a type of “life-style shift” or adapted developmental approach in which low-
intensity hurricanes are incorporated into educational policies, plans and budgets for 
vulnerability and risk reduction.  Government emphasized vulnerability and risk reduction 
approaches to LIH in the documents I reviewed.   Its assertions surrounding these approaches 
appear to be compatible with current thinking on addressing LIH, that is, preparedness and 
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mitigation.  Actions on the ground, however, as elite public officers and school principals 
described them, did not reflect vulnerability and risk reduction but response and recovery.  
In the four chapters which follow, I returned to the topic question: how does the 
government of Dominica address education during low intensity hurricanes (LIH)?  This will 
guide the general discussion as I outline government’s ways and means for addressing LIH as an 
education policy issue.  Here, I organized this discussion around the ten themes identified earlier 
and the information they provided for answering this question.  I will also return to the 
epistemological foundations of this study: the pragmatic paradigm.   
Using pragmatism, I identified and discussed government’s assertions, their actions, and 
the consequences and alternatives to these actions.  The objective was to paint a portrait and 
critique government’s approach to addressing education during LIH in Dominica.  I began with 
the documented policies, and then followed on with themes on the roles, responsibility and 
perceptions of elite officers on the issue.  I then discussed the perceptions and experience of 
school principals and closed with my own building inspections to ascertain whether 
vulnerabilities existed after repairs and rehabilitations.   These are organized into the next four 
chapters which follow: 1) documented policies, 2) elite officers’ perceptions and assertions, 3) 
principals’ experiences and 4) researchers observations.  
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6.0  DOCUMENTED POLICIES 
Official policies specific to addressing education during low-intensity hurricanes (LIH) in 
Dominica did not exist.  What I found were policies and pronouncements about disasters in 
general.  There was no single policy document devoted to addressing disasters either.  These 
were scattered throughout official documents and speeches I reviewed.  These reviews 
uncovered three major themes: 1) vulnerability and risk reduction; 2) vulnerability and 
contingency funding; and 3) limited and weak institutional capacity. 
None of these themes made specific references to education during LIH.  It was 
reasonable to expect, however, that they would include education, because national governments 
are responsible for national security, safety and protection.  Consequently, they are the principal 
agencies responsible for overall disaster management in developing countries (Ahrens & 
Rudolph, 2006; Freeman & Kunreuther, 2002; Khan & Rhaman, 2007; Luchi & Esnard, 2008; 
Osei, 2007; Sinclair, 2002).  National governments were responsible as well, for establishing the 
legal, policy and plan frameworks to address disaster preparedness, mitigation, response and 
recovery (Aldunce & Leon, 2007 and Chhetri, 2001).  In the case of Dominica, government is 
responsible for disaster management and the National Development Plan 2001 outlined its roles 
and responsibilities which have been devolved to several agencies, including the Ministry of 
Education.  Section 6.1 discusses the documented vulnerability and risk reduction policies. 
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6.1 THEME 1: VULNERABILITY & RISK REDUCTION POLICY 
The official documents I reviewed, specifically, the Medium Term Growth and Social Protection 
Strategies 2006; 2012-2014 and the annual Budget Addresses, 2005/06; 2007/08; 2009/10; 
2011/12 & 2012/13 demonstrated Government’s desire to adopt vulnerability and risk reduction 
approaches to manage disasters.  The Medium Term Growth and Social Protection Strategy 
(GSPS) 2012-2014 for Dominica stated “Government will reduce environmental vulnerability 
and improve disaster prevention and management through a combination of risk reduction, 
impact mitigation and other measures.”   
The terms “reduce environmental vulnerability,” “improve disaster prevention” were 
outcomes while “risk reduction” and “impact mitigation” and as used in this statement were 
strategies.  This policy statement seemed, therefore, to be in line with approaches recommended 
internationally.  Policy statements that addressed contingency funding, however, focused on 
response and recovery and not vulnerability and risk reduction.   Contingency funding had, “to 
cover the cost of repairs and environmental enhancements necessary, after such environmental 
mishaps.”  “Repairs” and “after” are ex-post terms as opposed to vulnerability and risk 
reduction which an ex-ante terms.     
Vulnerability and risk reduction, like retrofitting buildings, conducting emergency drills 
and exercises has become the new and emerging focus of long-term disaster prevention and 
management.  They has been incorporated into the lending terms and conditions of development 
banks as an adaptive mechanism to sustainably address emergencies and disasters in developing 
countries (ADB, 2008; CDB, 2009; Freeman, n. d.; World Bank, 2006).  In addition, focus on 
vulnerability and risk reduction has been better investment than response and recovery. One 
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dollar spent on risk reduction resulted in seven dollars savings on response and recovery (ADB, 
2008).   
The chasm between this espoused vulnerability and risk reduction approach and the 
response and recovery approach-in-use revealed government’s challenge in adopting the expert- 
recommended approaches versus its perception of disasters as “Acts of God.”  The earliest and 
continuing usage of disasters as “Acts of God” framed them as divine retribution for human 
misdeeds and failings, and being divine, difficult to prevent and mitigate (White et al, 2001).   
One elite officer espoused that perception:  According to her “we just go and hope this year 
would be a good year and God would be good to us” (FP).  This fatalistic perception of disasters 
as “Acts of God” underscored the failure to accept responsibility at the policy level for their 
impacts; instead transferring blame and accountability to an untouchable deity.  This 
demonstrated an accepted inability or a learned helplessness in mitigating the effects of LIH 
mishaps.    
Principals’ perception of LIH reflected this helplessness.  When interviewed, they 
indicated there was “nothing” the Ministry of Education could have done to alleviate the impacts 
of LIH on education and schools.  The failure to put in place even low cost vulnerability and risk 
reduction policies, like evacuation routes is affirmed by the reluctance of school principals to 
hold the Ministry of Education responsible for education during LIH.  Martinet (2002, p. 9) 
explained this reluctance to accept responsibility for disasters: 
According to Steinberg those in positions of authority from politicians and business 
leaders to state officials and federal elected and appointed officials (not to mention any 
government agencies) use the terms ‘acts of God,’ ‘forces of nature,’ and ‘freak events’ 
to distance themselves and their organizations from any complicity and responsibility for 
building (or permitting) homes in high hazard areas. Using these terms, places blame for 




 Analysis of interviews suggested that LIH were often the result of political and 
managerial failures (see Boin, Rosenthal & Comfort, 2001).  These failures have been due less to 
the direct impact of disaster events themselves and more to the failure to put in place social and 
cultural disaster protections: understanding, interpretations, attitudes, perceptions and behaviors 
(Dombrowsky, 1981).  
Summarily, in theory, government’s policy positions appeared to mirror expert- 
recommended approaches to disaster management in general.  In practice, however, what 
happened was mostly response and recovery.  In reality, not much was being done policy-wise or 
at the practice level to actually prevent or mitigate the impacts of LIH on education.   This 
reflected failure to accept responsibility for disaster outcomes because they were being perceived 
as “Acts of God” at both levels: policy and practice.  Simple drills and exercises, SOPs and 
safety steps to reduce accidents and casualties at schools were not in place, and evacuation routes 
to move children safely out of harm’s way did not exist.  Further, as Section 6.2 will show, there 
has been tentative commitment to put contingencies in place to begin to seriously address LIH. 
6.2 THEME 2: VULNERABILITY AND CONTINGENCY FUNDS  
Disasters were also the function of people’s responses (Boin, Rosenthal & Comfort, 2001).   I 
found a general failure to commit to making available adequate and sustainable funds for 
addressing low-intensity hurricanes (LIH).  Two factors underscored that finding. 1) The non-
binding vernacular used to rationalize the establishment of disaster vulnerability and contingency 
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funds; and 2), the expressed policy of dependence on external funding to either establish or 
supplement proposed local funding, in particular, vulnerability funding.   
6.2.1 Vulnerability funding 
With respect to the vulnerability fund, for example, the Medium Term Growth and Social 
Protection Strategy Document (2006) stated, “The Government of the Commonwealth of 
Dominica will explore.”  The objective was to “explore” the establishment of this fund.  The use 
of the word “explore” implied “search” and “investigate,” and does not connote commitment.   
There were no guarantees and assurances for its establishment, and as a result there seemed to 
have been no accountability mechanisms. The same is true for the proposed contingency funding 
6.2.2 Contingency funding 
The policy vernacular for the contingency fund was also non-binding.  In this regard, the 
Medium Term Growth and Social Protection Strategy document (2012-2014) stated, “As soon as 
it is deemed feasible, the Ministry of Finance will set aside 5% of the Public Sector Investment 
Project for purpose of starting a fund” and further,” efforts will be made to supplement the 
resources” for this fund.    
The terms “as soon as it is deemed feasible” and “efforts will be made” are non-binding 
and exploratory terms. They demonstrated a lack of commitment at the local level to sustainably 
address LIH.  One elite office believed indecisiveness, lack of cooperation and collaboration at 
line ministries’ level were undermining the establishment of these funds (FP).   
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Notwithstanding, where they existed, contingency funds had been inadequate for 
addressing disasters in developing countries.  They have had to be supplemented with external 
funds or other local funds diverted from planned activities (Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 2007; 
Price and Mihir, 2009).  Increasingly, this “dependence on external funding,” approach would 
have to be replaced with local funding initiatives in response to frequent low-intensity hurricanes 
(LIH).  Dominica would have to accept greater responsibility therefore, if not for some of the 
impacts, but certainly for reducing their likely impacts in the first place.   
Government demonstrated commitment to funding catastrophic hurricanes but did not 
show similar commitment to funding LIH.  In 2011, it contributed $1.9 million to the Caribbean 
Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) (FP) but reneged on the establishment of proposed 
vulnerability and contingency funds contained in key policy documents.  The CCRIF is a 
“parametric insurance facility”44 that involved risk-pooling for catastrophic events (CCRIF, 
2012).   In the case of hurricanes, that is Category 3 or higher on the Saffir Simpson Scale.  It 
does not cover LIH despite Dominica’s vulnerability. 
Binding policy language that holds key disaster agents and agencies accountable is 
required.  The institutional weaknesses and proposed improvements described in the official 
documents I reviewed meant the institutional advocacy required to ensure government’s 
commitment was not available.  Theme 3 in section 6.3 discusses these weaknesses.  
44 The CCRIF is the first multi-country risk pool in the world, and is also the first insurance instrument to 
successfully develop a parametric policy backed by both traditional and capital markets. It is a regional insurance 
fund for Caribbean governments, designed to limit the financial impact of catastrophic hurricanes and earthquakes 




                                                 
6.3 THEME 3: LIMITED AND WEAK INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY  
The institutional capacity available to address disasters in Dominica was inadequate and 
ineffective.  First, the National Emergency Planning Organization (NEPO) and the Office of 
Disaster Management were described as falling short of their mission and objectives of 
preventing, mitigating and preparing for potential disasters in Dominica (GSPS, 2006).  Second, 
there was no education task force at the national level designed to address education during LIH.  
Third, despite being assigned responsibility for education during disasters, the Ministry of 
education had nothing in place to meet its obligations; and fourth, schools in turn had not 
developed the capacity for addressing LIH at their plant level.   This theme discusses capacity at 
the national, ministerial and school levels. 
6.3.1 Capacity and disaster management at the national level 
The National Emergency Planning Organization (NEPO) and the Office of Disaster Management 
(ODM) were government agencies responsible for managing LIH in Dominica.  They, however, 
were failing to meet their mission and objectives.  At the time, they fell under the portfolio of the 
Ministry of National Security (MNS) and the chairmanship of the Minister responsible for 
National Security.  It was recommended that: 1) NEPO became a Prime Ministerial 
responsibility, 2) the ODM relocate to the Prime Minister’s Office and upgrade its staff, and 3) 
develop disaster policies and plans and undertake timely and orderly evacuations (GSPS, 2006).   
Dominica however has been slow to enact these proposed actions and decisions.  Six year 
after the initial dissatisfaction expressed in 2006, the Government of Dominica’s Medium Term 
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GSPS (20012-2014) still conveyed the need to improve Dominica’s capacity for managing LIH.  
Specifically, this included; 1) developing disaster management policies and plans; 2) conducting 
timely and orderly evacuation; 3) undertaking extensive public information and education 
programs; and 4) execute extensive mitigation (GSPS, 2012-2014).  Based on personal 
observations of meetings I attended in May, 2012, NEPO was still being chaired by the Minister 
responsible for National Security. In addition, the Prime Minister of Dominica expressed 
dissatisfaction with the attitudes of NEPO officers in preparing for the 2013 hurricane season 
(GIS, 2012).   
While NEPO and the ODM continued to fall short of their mission and objective, an even 
more serious failure had been the inability to fully reform them after six years.  At the national 
level, therefore, the organizational capacity required to address disasters including LIH were 
inadequate and ineffective.  The policy proposal to bring the management of disasters and low-
intensity hurricanes under the Prime Minister’s direct portfolio was to correct these problems.  
This decision, however, was not without precedence and adverse consequences.  Jamaica, for 
example, decided to bring disaster management under the portfolio of the Prime Minister but that 
arrangement undermined the credibility and performance of the Office of Disaster Preparedness 
and Emergency Management (ODPEM) (Osei, 2007).    These capacity impasses at the national 
level have cascaded to the ministerial level. 
6.3.2 Capacity at the MOE level 
Institutional failures at the national level resulted in corresponding failures at the Ministerial 
level.  The Ministry of Education (MOE) had been assigned specific and important roles and 
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responsibilities for education during disasters.  They included enforcing drills, selection and 
maintenance of schools as emergency shelters and disseminate information on Standard 
Operation Systems (SOP) to educational institutions.  These are essential since education is 
considered the fourth pillar of humanitarian response (Aguilar and Retamal, 2009, Pigozzi, 
1996). 
Despite these assigned roles, the Ministry of Education was not a designated primary 
disaster management agency in Dominica (see NDP, 2001).   Rather, it was a secondary agency 
with membership assigned in five separate National Emergency Executive Committee (NEEC) 
Sector Task Forces namely economic instability, refugee handling, shelter inspection, shelter 
management and public information and education.   None of these agencies and their 
responsibilities was education-related, sidelining the Ministry of Education’s roles and 
responsibilities.   As a result, it did not have in place the institutional structures and procedures to 
fulfill these assigned roles and responsibilities.  These were not assigned to any of its technical 
units.  How serious then has the Ministry of Education been in addressing LIH, meeting its 
obligations under the NDP, 2001 or the safety and security of students in its care? 
The Education Act, 1997, the legal instrument and key policy document governing 
education made only a single reference to hurricanes.  Section 34(1) of the Act made the 
Minister and Chief Education Officer responsible for school closures in the event of hurricanes.  
Schools are closed for impending hurricanes because about 80% are designated emergency 
shelters.  The Act did not outline any other key roles, responsibilities, institutional or operational 
frames and procedures to address education during LIH in Dominica (See Education Act 1997).  
Moreover, there were no written policies, plans or SOPs within the Ministry to manage 
transitions from schooling to shelter and back to schooling.   Additionally, there were no detailed 
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guidelines in the Act or the accompanying Regulations for how principals should proceed when 
requesting school closures or responding to hurricanes, generally.   
6.3.3 Capacity at school level 
Principals themselves had no arrangements in place at their schools to deal with LIH.  They were 
unable to reach the Ministry of Education for approval to close schools in time.  They were 
unaware also of their own prerogative to close schools and submit reports ex-post, when they 
could not reach the Ministry.  By their own admission, they lacked the training; awareness and 
guidance for handling LIH (see JM; VP; VR; JB).     
Principals had to depend on the advice and guidance of parents and other community 
members to evacuate students.  In at least three cases, it was community interventions that 
prompted principals and teachers to take action to move students to safety during Hurricane 
Ophelia (see interviews with JB; VP; JM).  Even then, by the time principals opted to act, 
conditions had deteriorated significantly.  With roads flooded and impassable, for example, 
students were still dismissed from school.  They became stranded.  Many walked home and did 
not get there until several hours later.  In one case, a group of students overnighted in a 
community on the edge of the disaster zone.  It took one of the elite officers I interviewed two 
days to finally get home, four miles from work, during Hurricane Ophelia (RE).  On the one 
hand, principals’ responses reflected the uncertainty and administrative paralysis they 
experienced during LIH.  On the other hand, it showed how community awareness and alertness 
may have averting disaster and kept children safe  
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Comprehensive, multi-sector, multi-hazard, multi-actor approaches are replacing 
command and control approaches to emergency management because of their complex nature 
(Comfort, et al., 1999, UNESCO, 2010).  Dominica’s approach to disaster management was 
multi-sectoral, multi-organizational and similar in organization to the United Nations’ Cluster 
Approach (see UNESCO, 2010).  Sector Task Forces replaced clusters but did not include an 
education Task Force (See Figure 16). 
Globally, Ministries of Education were not directly involved in addressing education 
during catastrophic events even though they were primarily responsible for education (Sinclair, 
2002; Sommers, 2004).  This was so, because many lacked the capacities or were too badly 
damaged or affected to respond effectively (Sinclair, 2007; Sommers, 2008, Kagawa, 2005).  As 
a result, international humanitarian and inter-governmental organizations, like UNICEF and 
UNESCO; and NGOs like Save the Children and Child Fund International became lead agencies 
in response and recovery.   
The institutional paralysis associated with unpredictable conflict-based emergencies or 
sudden catastrophic disasters are expected because of the widespread destruction of education 
sectors they caused (Retamal & Aguilar, 1998; Sinclair, 2002; INEE, 2004).  In the case of LIH, 
whole education systems were not destroyed.  If the appropriate institutional arrangements, 
polices, plans and guidelines were in place before hurricanes, they would most likely to be in 
place after.  Planning for education, therefore, should be part of every emergency program from 
the beginning (Pigozzi, 1996); but one may not be able to plan for that which one has not 
assumed responsibility.  In one school, for example, the principal reported teachers “fleeing” the 
premises and leaving students behind as Hurricane Ophelia unfolded (JB).   
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In the final analysis, though, the nature of the emergency is not that important in terms of 
the immediate needs of those affected (Pigozzi, 1996).  They all need shelter, protection and 
nourishment, health care and education, for example, the overall goal of those addressing 
emergencies (Pigozzi, 1996).  This distinction may be helpful, however, for thinking through 
how to go about ensuring that good and appropriate education is part of emergency response 
(Pigozzi, 1996).   
In summary, NEPO and ODM lacked the capacity to fulfill their mission and objectives 
of preventing, mitigating and preparing for potential disasters in Dominica.  Despite 
recommendations for improvement, many of the initiatives, like establishing evacuation routes 
and bringing these agencies under the ambit of the Prime Minister had not been implemented.  
The Ministry of Education had been assigned specific responsibilities for education during low-
intensity hurricanes.  However, the Ministry itself was assigned to five our task forces, like 
shelter management and refugee-handling that were unrelated to education.    It did not have in 
place, policies, plans or guidelines for addressing education during emergencies and did not 
incorporate any of its assigned responsibilities into its operations.  Consequently, principals did 
not make any arrangements for handling hurricanes at their schools. They lacked training, 
awareness and guidance and had to rely on communities for assistance.  As a result, they 
appeared paralyzed and dismissed students into the disaster areas.    Education was deprioritized 
during LIH. Interviews with elite officers, Section 3.5 confirm this deprioritization.   
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7.0    ELITE OFFICERS PERCEPTIONS AND ASSERTIONS 
In addition to the deprioritization of education during low-intensity hurricanes, two other major 
themes emerged in interviews with elite public officers.  These were inadequate local financial 
resources to address chronic low-intensity hurricanes and their impacts on education; and the 
adverse impacts of low-intensity hurricanes on education and the limited policy responses.   
Sections 7.1 – 7.3 discusses these themes.  
7.1 THEME 4: ADVERSE IMPACTS ON EDUCATION AND LIMITED POLICY 
RESPONSES  
Disruption to normal schooling was a major impact of low-intensity hurricanes on the education 
sector in Dominica (KJ; MP; EC).   The others were 1) fatalities and psychosocial impacts, and 
2) diversion of resources away from education.  This section discusses these impacts. 
7.1.1 Disruptions 
According to the elite public officers interviewed, school closures in preparation for hurricanes 
and direct damages to buildings caused school disruptions (.  Even when storms were eminent 
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and did not make landfall, schools had to be closed and most buildings evacuated because they 
were also emergency shelters (MP).  “If every week you’re preparing for a hurricane it means 
every week you are losing time in the classroom with the children and you know you have set 
dates for exams and everything” (MP).  Anwar, (2008) confirmed countries were often preparing 
for new disasters while they were recovering from earlier storms.  This is likely to remain a 
problem well into the future.  Goldenberg, Landsea, Mestas-Nunez & Gray (2001) found there 
was both increased hurricane frequency and intensity in the Caribbean since 1980:  
The years 1995 to 2000 experienced the highest level of North Atlantic hurricane activity in the 
reliable record. Compared with the generally low activity of the previous 24 years (1971 to 1994), 
the past 6 years have seen a doubling of overall activity for the whole basin, a 2.5-fold increase in 
major hurricanes ($50 meters per second), and a fivefold increase in hurricanes affecting the 
Caribbean. The greater activity results from simultaneous increases in North Atlantic sea-surface 
temperatures and decreases in vertical wind shear. Because these changes exhibit a multidecadal 
time scale, the present high level of hurricane activity is likely to persist for an additional 10 to 40 
years. The shift in climate calls for a reevaluation of preparedness and mitigation strategies 
(Goldenberg, et al, 2001, p. 474). 
 
Consequently, Dominica had a 10% chance of being hit by a hurricane, each year 
(Williams, 2010).  On average this would be at least a category 2 storm every two and a half 
years.   This would be four major hurricanes by the time a cohort of student graduated from high 
school.  This constituted chronic exposures to LIH.  The failure, therefore, to recognize and 
address this reality may be at the center of failures in addressing education during LIH.  In 2012, 
Dominica adopted a “Low Carbon Climate Resilient Development Strategy, 2012 – 2020” that 
would adapt and focus Dominica’s development to include hurricane frequency and impacts.  
This did not mention the education sector, or its frequent disruptions from LIH (CIF & GOCD, 
2012)  
Disruptions in water supply, and flooded roads as a result of these frequent hurricanes 
also disrupted schooling (RE).  In 2011, for example, more than 80 millimeters of rain fell in six 
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hours during Hurricane Ophelia (IRFC, 2011).  It caused extensive flooding and damages to 
homes, related infrastructure and affected schools along the West Coast.  Five schools were in 
the immediate disaster zone and had to be closed but by that time, students’ routes home had 
flooded.  It was two-three days before school resumed.  Low-intensity hurricanes were also fatal. 
7.1.2 Fatalities and trauma 
 Interviews with principals confirmed LIH were fatal for schools and possibly traumatic for 
teachers and students.  In 2007, for example, Hurricane Dean caused two fatalities.  The PTA 
Secretary at one school and her son who was a student at that same school were buried beneath a 
huge landslide.   My interview with this school principal captured the apparent traumatic 
experience.   
Well, huh, at the time, I felt my heart sank because I knew she was gone (long pause) and 
I could not believe she was gone because, huh, she was so close; we were so close.  I 
remembered one morning I came here. I only went to her office becomes she comes at 
eight. I was going to say good morning to her (YS).   
 
 She had forgotten this PTA secretary had died and was no longer there. Notwithstanding 
these impacts, policies and strategies to better address LIH had not been developed or adopted.    
7.1.3 Poor response policies 
 Key LIH lessons on preparation and mitigation had not been learnt despite the recurrent and 
chronic nature of LIH, and their cumulative impacts on education.  Ministries of Education were 
expected to play pivotal roles in formulating policies that would effectively address education 
during LIH (INEE, 2010; Sinclair, 2002, 2007).   Those polices as shown already did not exist.  
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Five of the nine elite officers interviewed believed negative attitudes and the failure to 
collaborate; plan and budget for LIH had not changed.  One elite officer lamented the absence of 
templates for action, the lack of communication mechanisms, the absence of strategies to deal 
with associated floods, and a road map for evacuations during low-intensity emergencies (RE).  
These negative attitudes, behaviors and neglect resulted in the cultural of institutional failure to 
accept responsibility for LIH.   
These attitudes included, for example, a failure to establish a contingency fund for 
Dominica (FP).  The failure to collaborate and “just come together and make a decision” to 
establish this funding was viewed as a recurring problem (FP).  Consequently, governments 
turned to international funding sources as supplements (Linnerooth & Mechler, 2007; Price & 
Mihir, 2009).  Elite officers interviewed, however, supported the establishment of contingency 
fund to address low-intensity hurricanes because existing funds were deemed inadequate (SH, 
FP).   
7.2 THEME 5: INADEQUATE FINANCES FOR ADDRESSING EDUCATION IN 
EMERGENCIES 
Overwhelmingly, financial resources to address disasters worldwide were inadequate due to 
global increase the incidence and costs (Hofman & Brukoff, 2006; Smillie & Minear, 2003).  
Additionally, aid pledges for disasters greatly outstrip actual commitments (Wathne & Hedger, 
2010).  The United Nations OCHA Financial Tracking Service showed only 38% of the $8.6 
billion humanitarian funds canvassed for 2013 had been committed or collected (OCHA, 2013).  
Most of that funding, however, went to UNICEF and was spent mostly in African and Asian 
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countries (OCHA, 2007b; OCHA, 2013).  Notwithstanding, affected countries still anticipated 
aid and humanitarian assistance during disasters while donors faced moral difficulties with 
withholding such aid, perpetuating the perception that aid was available and  accessible (Wathne 
& Hedger, 2010).  With little actual access to global aid funding, therefore, countries like 
Dominica with chronic low-intensity hurricanes have turned to loans and grants.  Thy have also 
diverted funds from planned activities for hurricane response but had begun to consider local 
contingency funding for disasters.  These next three sections discuss these options. 
7.2.1 Local and diverted funding 
Local funds were already considered inadequate for meeting planned obligations and therefore 
would not meet the “unanticipated” costs of low-intensity hurricanes (BA, 2011; BA, 2012-2013; 
FP; SH).  A review of the Ministry of Education’s annual budget data for 2003 – 2010 showed, 
however, that at least on the books, more often than not, there were annual surpluses.  These 
surpluses, however, could not be carried-over into the following year, nor were they readily 
available at the end of the year to be re-assigned.   Between 2007 and 2011, however, budget 
funds in excess of $322,000 earmarked for school maintenance were diverted for other 
undisclosed purposes (EPDU, 2012). 
In 2011/12, however, budget estimates of school repairs totaled $1.9 million but actual 
allocation was $900,000 on account of limited available funds (EPDU, 2012).  This is 
significant, since a recent report on school plant maintenance in Dominica found schools that did 
not meet building codes and standards, and were vulnerable to hurricanes (CEP, 2011).  Despite 
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these safety violations and available funds, the Ministry did not appear to make school safety a 
priority.   
An elite officer within the Ministry of Education said that they prioritized but did not 
indicate what these priorities were (SH).  In practice, funds were diverted from planned activities 
to address damages to school buildings and to provide support, that is, books and uniforms, for 
children (JC).  Education during low-intensity hurricanes was not planned for (JC).  
Planning priorities were the responsibility of line item ministries (RE).  The Ministry of 
Finance however, was responsible overseeing the planning process in Dominica.  Line ministries 
had failed to plan and prioritize budget for LIH, and the Ministry of Finance appeared not to 
have had the authority to enforce compliance.  Consequently, Dominica turned to external 
funding like loans to supplement local funds for addressing LIH.   
7.2.2 Loan funding 
The Caribbean Development Bank provided low interest emergency response loans to Dominica 
following low-intensity hurricanes (CDB, 2009; RE; EC; KJ; EL).   Dominica received a $30 
million loan following Hurricane Ophelia (RE). One of the principles underlying the Bank’s 
strategy is;    
Ensuring that Disaster Risk Management (DRM) is integrated into all economic, social 
and environmental sectors in member countries such that it becomes an integral part of 
everyday life and is not viewed as an activity limited to a national office of disaster 
management during an emergency situation (CDB, 2009, p. 3).    
 
In addition, it made provision for the post-disaster response to reduce risk, through: 1) 
emergency relief grants, 2) immediate response loans and 3) rehabilitation and reconstruction 
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loans.  One a disaster is declared and determined, the bank offers member states loan funding in 
writing (CDB, 2009).  Other entities offered loans as well. 
Following Hurricane Ophelia, the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
provided similar response loans (EC; KJ; RE).   Dominica received a $35 million Chinese loan 
after Hurricane Ophelia (RE).  Neither these Chinese nor CDB loans were earmarked for 
education.  Rather they were designated but for road repairs and reconstruction.  Indirectly, these 
may have included road access to schools but this was never explicitly stated in official 
documents reviewed or in interviews. 
Loans increased Dominica’s national debt at times when it experienced losses to a 
significant portion of its GDP as a result of LIH (FP; RE).  Annually, low-intensity hurricanes 
resulted in a 4% decline in GDP or between $50 and $100 million in damages (RE; KJ).  This 
happened because agriculture and in particular bananas, the sector which makes the largest 
contribution to the economy suffers severely from hurricanes.  As a result, government actively 
sought grant funding that would cushion its debt burden.   
7.2.3 Grant funding 
Dominica received grants from friendly governments like Venezuela to address emergencies.   
These, however, were earmarked for the construction of coastal retaining walls to reduce the 
vulnerability of coastal road and communities to sea surges and high seas generated by LIH (RE 
& EC).  Indirectly, these too may have included schools or route ways to schools located in these 
coastal communities. The grant amount, however, was not made public.  Dominica Red Cross 
received grant funds of $27,500 Swiss Francs from the International Federation of Red Cross and 
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Red Crescent (IFRC) Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)45 in 2012.  This was to be used to 
deliver immediate assistance to 79 families (approximately 395 persons).  Children may have 
benefited but not direct grant funds went to education.  
In summary, despite budget surpluses, elite officers still felt there were insufficient funds 
to establish contingency funds (FP).   As a result, Dominica used loans, grants and transferred 
funds from planned activities in response to low-intensity hurricanes because of poor planning 
and prioritization.  None of these loans or grants, however, were earmarked for or allocated to 
education.  The expectation is that “National authorities, humanitarian agencies, donors, NGOs, 
communities and other stakeholders should work together to ensure adequate funding for 
emergency education provision (INEE, 2010, p. 113).  Beyond those already mentioned few 
funding sources for education and low-intensity hurricanes existed.  This may have been so 
because education is deprioritized during emergencies as the next section will show.  
7.3 THEME 6: EDUCATION IS DEPRIORITIZED DURING LOW- INTENSITY 
EMERGENCIES. 
Education is considered the fourth pillar of humanitarian assistance behind food and nutrition, 
health and water and sanitation, however in Dominica it is deprioritized during low-intensity 
hurricanes (See Retamal & Aguilar, 2009).  As expected, rather, protection of life and property 
was considered top priority, followed by health and safety, and then transportation and 
communication (RE, KJ).  However, elite education officers I interviewed identified “safety of 
45 The IFRC’s Disaster Relief Emergency Fund is a source of un-earmarked money created by the Federation in 
1985 to ensure that immediate financial support is available for Red Cross and Red Crescent emergency response. 
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children, safety of teachers and safety of school buildings” as priority (MP; SH).  This section 
explores further this deprioritization and the rationale given.  It is built on the premise that during 
normal budgetary allocations, education is given priority.  
7.3.1 Education as priority 
During normal budget allocations, education was considered top priority in Dominica.  It often 
received the largest share of government’s annual budget.  Between 2005 and 2010, education 
received between 13% and 25% of the national budget.  During that six year period, its share of 
the national budget share was ranked either first or second (EPDU, 2012b).  Education was also 
the largest public sector ministry and employed the largest number of public officers, including 
over 1000 teachers in 2012 (EPDU, 2012).  During LIH, education tends to lose its priority status 
(Esnor, 2010; Madifs, Maetyris & Triplehorn, 2010).   
7.3.2 Deprioritizing education 
Schools became emergency shelters during LIH, had to be closed and students dismissed in 
preparation for these hurricanes.   Protection and safety of the public became priority then (KJ).  
Children, therefore, had to vacate their school premises to accommodate the public.  Elite 
officers in both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public works confirmed this.  One 
officer stated, “Classroom teaching is not priority as school days and terms can be adjusted” 
(RE).  Another officer identified, “health and safety, transportation and communications” as 
priority and “maybe somewhere under there, we have education” (KJ).  This was based on the 
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rationale that the school day or term (semester) could be extended to accommodate the 
instruction days lost as a result (RE).  Experience showed, however, that neither stated nor 
enforceable policies designed to ensure recovery of instruction days lost existed.   
Even a major concern such as evacuating children or reuniting them with their parents 
though a stated priority, could not be executed because as one elite officer confirmed evacuation 
routes, maps or strategies for action did not exist (RE).   This chronic gap between stated and 
enacted policies signaled political and managerial failures to recognize children as among the 
most vulnerable during LIH.    
The INEE Minimum Standards required education authorities to prioritize the continuity 
and recovery of quality education during emergencies (INEE, 2010).  Moreover, Dominica was a 
signatory to international conventions, like the 1989 International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child that secured the right of children to an education, protection, safety and the protection 
of their learning spaces during emergencies (See Table 2).  Had children been duly considered, 
particularly within the Ministry of Education, better preparation would have been made to secure 
their safety and education during LIH. In theory, though, the Ministry of Education considered 
education priority. 
7.3.3 Ministry of Education and prioritizing education 
There appeared to be a gap between what the Ministry of Education said and what it actually did.   
Elite education officials, for example, identified “safety of children, safety of teachers and safety 
of buildings” as priority during low-intensity hurricanes (MP & SH).  Evidence showed; 1) they 
had not budgeted for education during LIH; and 2) education’s responses were mostly reactive 
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using funds diverted from planned programs to address impacts.  These actions were consistent 
with  “quick-fixes’ or responses that did not address the fundamental issues of low-intensity 
hurricanes, like repairs and rehabilitation, instead of incorporating LIH into education policies, 
plans, budgets and operations (Pigozzi, 1996; Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998).  Apart from the 
disaster agent itself, in most, but not all cases, the major source of problems is to be found in 
organizations responding to them (Dynes, 1974 cited in Quarantelli, 1989).   
Overall, prioritizing education during LIH was largely rhetoric.  Due consideration was 
not given to safety, child and school protection and safety as a critical part of the protection of 
life and property.  With respect to the Ministry of Education, the agency legally responsible for 
education, there was a gap between its assertions and actions about prioritizing education.  
Officials said education was priority but actions on the ground did not show that it was.  
Principals lacked guidelines and were unable to communicate with the MOE particularly during 
Hurricane Ophelia, school repairs were delayed well beyond the reopening of school.  
Discussion of principals’ interviews in Chapter 8 confirmed these lapses and others.   
188 
 
8.0  PRINCIPALS’ EXPERIENCES 
Three major themes emerged during interviews with principals. These were: 1) The damaging 
impacts of low intensity hurricanes on their schools; 2) multiple actors; and 3) mitigation 
strategies.  These are discussed below in the three sections which follow.   
8.1 THEME 7: DAMAGING IMPACTS ON SCHOOLS 
In addition to the two fatalities mentioned earlier, low-intensity hurricanes in Dominica, 
destroyed teaching and learning materials, and damaged school buildings.   This section explores 
the impacts of low-intensity hurricanes on schools in Dominica through the perceptions and 
experiences of school principals I interviewed.  
8.1.1 Damaged school buildings 
Gale force winds, floods and landslides associated with LIH damaged school buildings in 
Dominica.  Hurricane Dean damaged twelve schools in 2007.   Specifically, it damaged window, 
doors and roofs totaling over $600,000 (EPDU, 2007).  
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Damages were prevalent where structures were wooden, aged and did not adhere to 
building codes and standards.  In one case, inadequate precautions were taken at the end of the 
school year46 to ensure windows and doors were secure.  As a result, Hurricane Dean damaged 
them.  The actions and practices of contractors, contraction supervisors, principals and other 
relevant school personnel, therefore, increased the vulnerability of structures as the section on 
building inspections showed. 
Landslide also damaged schools or caused fatalities.  One landslide associated with 
Hurricane Dean damaged the back wall of a classroom.  The estimated cost of repairs was 
$20,000.   
Well huh, at that time, I felt that my heart sank, because I knew she was (pause) and I could not 
believe that she was gone because um she was so close, we were so close. I remembered, one 
morning I came here. I only went to her office (pause) because she comes at eight. I was going to 
say good morning to her.  
So she worked right next to you? I asked). Just next door here (Oh! oh! Alright! So you saw each 
other every day? I questioned). Every day, yes! Until after she was gone! A new secretary came 
and I was still calling her Ms. E. Good morning Ms. E because Ms. E was there and we were 
close and then she would say, “But miss, I am tired of telling you that I am not Ms. E.” We were 
very close and she did a lot of stuff for me. When I did not have time, I would say, “Ms. Esprit, I 
want that, photocopy that for me, please or type that for me, please because I have a class.  I am 
going to the class, you know, do some photocopies for me, please.” And I would get my work 
done. She would give me a lot of assistance whenever possible, you know (YS).  
This was five years after Hurricane Dean yet the loss, and the struggle to cope with it 
were evident in this exchange.  The emotions captured in this account, as well, may have been 
evidence of trauma.  This principal had forgotten the former clerk was gone.  
46 The hurricane season lasts from June to November each year.  Schools in Dominica are closed for their annual 
vacation from July to August.  Schools would be in session for four months of the season – July and September – 
November each year. 
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Notwithstanding, neither she, nor her teachers and students had access to professional 
grief counseling or psychosocial support.  Since 2000, the Ministry of Education has had 
professional counselors located in its central office.   Students can be referred to these officers 
but similar counseling services are not available for teachers.   Ensuring that teachers receive 
psychosocial support first so they in turn can help students cope is essential in dealing with 
trauma associated with emergencies like low-intensity hurricanes (Sommers, 2006; UNICEF & 
University of Pittsburgh, 2004).  Children too required psychosocial support. 
In one case, two students were housed in temporary emergency shelter for at least two 
weeks after their homes flooded during Hurricane Ophelia (VR).  While the impacts of that 
experience may not be known, psychosocial support and the “return to happiness” program are 
important for addressing childhood trauma caused by disasters (see Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; 
Save the Children, 2004; UNICEF & University of Pittsburgh, 2005).  UNICEF’s Child-friendly 
Spaces created opportunities for support and protection during disasters as well (UNICEF, 2004).  
In Dominica, Child Friendly Spaces have been adapted into Child Friendly Schools (CFS).  This 
adaptation should begin to create a transformative, proactive approach to child protection and 
safety.   It impact was yet to be evaluated but one principal outlined the role CFS played in 
providing psychosocial support for children after hurricane Ophelia: 
We have child friendly school (CFS) initiatives going on and so the teachers went home-visiting 
to talk to the parents, talk to the children to find out what happened, and when they (children) 
came back to the school, we also gave them a chance to talk to the class about the experiences 
(VR). 
In the absence of professional support, principals used home visits, simple whole class 
techniques to engage students as they talked about their experiences, and the loss of their friend 
and classmate in the case of the fatalities.  The effectiveness of these simple interventions had 
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not been assessed.  Studies indicated, however, that PTSD from catastrophic hurricanes can 
persist over long periods (Caldas de Almeida, 2002; Feitelberg, 2007).   
A study conducted five years after Hurricane Mitch impacted Hondurans found, 22% of 
the population were psychiatric cases; 18% had major depression and 11% suffered from PTSD 
(Caldas de Almeida, 2002).  Similar trauma was recorded in children.  Studies conducted in the 
Cayman Islands three years after Hurricane Ivan found 34% of the 129 students surveyed 
suffered from full PTSD; 22% from partial PTSD and 54% were depressed (Fietelberg, 2007).  
These traumas, however, were associated with catastrophic events but one would expect 
recurrent and untreated trauma, especially in children, to persist, as a result of frequent and 
chronic exposures to LIH in Dominica.  In addition, to damages to buildings, fatalities and their 
associated traumas schools also lost essential teaching and learning materials.  
8.1.2 Lost teaching and learning materials 
As result of damages to buildings and flooding, schools lost valuable teaching and learning 
materials (BV; PJ; VR; VP).  These materials were damaged as a result of landslides and 
flooding from nearby rivers.  They were also damaged by the direct ingression of rain when 
roofs, doors or windows were damaged or by blinding rain gaining access to classrooms through 
construction blocks designed to aid ventilation (CEP, 2011).   
Two schools had their computer rooms flooded; another had its library flooded, resulting 
in the loss of books and other instruction materials (See Figure 19) and in still another, its poultry 
shed for agricultural science was destroyed.  In one school, rainwater from Hurricane Dean 
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flooded and destroyed the computer room, its computers, home-economic equipment and 
furniture after the roof was removed completely.  The use of porous dry wall materials for the 
ceiling exacerbated the impacts (BV).  Six months had elapsed before repairs were undertaken 
which compounded the impacts and compromised student instruction particularly in Home 
Economics.  Unfortunately, the lost computers, home economic equipment and books were never 
replaced (BV & VP).   The end result was always disruption, lost in instruction time and possibly 
adverse impacts on student performance. 
No study or record exists on the effects of LIH on student academic performance and 
achievement in Dominica.  Studies conducted in other hurricane prone areas do show 
connections between hurricanes and student academic performance.  Research studies conducted 
in Florida and North Carolina showed hurricanes can have adverse effects on student academic 
performance on critical tests (See Holmes, 2002; Baggerly & Ferretti, 2008; Pane, McCaffery, 
Karla & Zhou, 2008).   
In summary, LIH in Dominica were fatal for two people. They also damaged and 
disrupted nineteen schools, their learning materials and equipment either through direct wind 
forces, landslides and/or flooding in 2007 and 2011.   In turn, they were traumatic for principals, 
teachers and students.  They also disrupted instructions and may have affected students’ 
academic performance, although this could not to be confirmed.  Despite these consequences, 




8.2 THEME 8: MULTIPLE ACTORS 
Several actors were involved in response flowing low-intensity hurricanes in Dominica. These 
included the Ministry of Education, school staff, Non-government Organizations (NGOs), 
principals and their school communities.  This section discusses the roles these actors played and 
principals’ assessment of their responses beginning with the Ministry of Education. 
8.2.1 The Ministry of Education 
Principals credited the Ministry of Education either fully or in part for school repairs and 
rehabilitations following Hurricanes Dean and Ophelia.  The Ministry repaired ten school 
buildings.  They repaired walls, doors, windows and roofs.  In total it spent about $500,000 on 
repairs.  Overall, it had primary responsibility for both pre-disaster and post-disaster response 
including disseminating SOPs to educational institutions and evacuating students (NDP, 2001).  
In addition, they had overall responsibility for education including the provision of materials and 
supplies in accordance with the Education Act 1997 and Regulations, 2011.   It is uncertain why 
it chose to focus solely on building repairs but insufficient finance at the national and ministerial 
levels were reasons given.  As a result, NGOs financed repairs in two schools. 
8.2.2 Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) 
NGOs repaired two schools.  In addition to the repairs to the damages sustained, extensive 
renovations were made to these schools including complete re-roofing in one and the re-
194 
 
construction of lunch shelters in each.  The cost of repairs and renovations far exceeded the 
initial estimates of $22,000 for repairs.   Notwithstanding the extensive works on these schools, I 
found both lunch sheds lacked rafter-to-purlin ties in their roofs.  This was a violation of the 
building code which left these buildings vulnerable to future damage.  Principals were unaware.  
When asked about the absence of these ties, one stated simply, “The shed is new” (PJ & MH).  
Apparently, new was taken as “safe or secure” despite being in violation of Dominica building 
codes and standards.    Based on principals’ interviews, communities were also involved in some 
of the repairs undertaken and other responses at these schools (MH). 
8.2.3 Parental and community involvement  
NGOs tend to partner with communities in service delivery and in this case, the school repairs.  
Communities provided free labor during school repairs and renovations after low-intensity 
hurricanes in Dominica.   They were involved, for example, in the construction of the lunch shed 
at one school which an NGO financed (MH).     
Communities were also involved in the critical evacuation of students as Hurricane 
Ophelia unfolded.  Their knowledge of local conditions and their astuteness during that storm 
may have averted the loss of lives, for example, in one community where there were two 
hurricane-related fatalities, five years before.  One principal described that experience working 
with a key community member during Hurricane Ophelia: 
The teachers came to me and they are saying miss the wind is getting stronger and then pelting 
rain, rain, rain, rain and then one parent came to school and he said, he came for his children 
because usually at C… when it rains like that it washes away the bridges and there is one 
important bridge that joins the school to the village. So he asked me whether he could have his 
children.  So I say no problem you can have them.  Now there is this young lady who works as 
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the village council clerk whose office is attached to the principal’s, and she being from C…, she 
advised me. She said, “Ms. M, I think after break we should send them (the children) home.” 
Then um, when we looked at the rain, the way it was getting stronger and stronger, you know, she 
said, “Best I call one of the bus drivers to take them.” So she did call and I told the teachers we 
are going to let them go after they had their break. They had break and after break, our break was 
10:30 so; about 11am we dismissed them. (JM) 
As a result, students were able to get home safely before conditions deteriorated.  In 
addition, teachers who resided outside of this community were also able to get home without 
incidents. The quick thinking of this young lady and her knowledge of disasters in this 
community may have secured the safety of students and teachers.    
There appeared to have been no strategies or plans at the school to respond appropriately. 
Principals would later confirm there were no policies or guidance at the school level to deal with 
chronic LIH (JB, JM).   They seemed unaware of the implications of LIH for their schools.  
Awareness, however, should be part of every agency’s strategy.  It should be prepared to address 
education in the event of an emergency (Pigozzi, 1996).   Evidence, however, from the literature 
suggested that during emergencies the best preparedness plans can go awry:   
There often is a big gap between what was planned and what actually happens in a major disaster 
crisis.  There is, in fact, only a partial correlation between the undertaking of preparedness 
planning and the successful or good management of community disasters (Quarentelli, 1989, p. 
45, 46). 
 
This is so because preparedness planning is strategic while crisis management is tactical. 
Adjustments or contingencies to preparedness planning have to be made as low-intensity 
hurricanes unfold: related knowledge, assertiveness and leadership are essential. Bringing 
together all essential actors including communities for drills and exercises, can reduce the gaps.   
Community involvement, therefore, is a critical aspect of this adjustment (Pigozzi, 1996; 
INEE, 2010).  Practice, practice, and practice through drills and exercises is the key to LIH 
preparedness.  Their participation is recommended for the analysis, planning, design, 
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implementation, monitoring and evaluation of education responses (INEE, 2010).   In a number 
of schools, however, principals and teachers used their own initiatives in responding to low 
intensity hurricanes 
8.2.4 Principals and staff 
As weather conditions deteriorated during Hurricane Ophelia and attempts to reach the Ministry 
of Education failed, principals, unaware of their authority to close schools became indecisive.  
As noted already, teachers at one school abandoned students and the principal.  Another school 
became inundated with four feet of floodwater from a nearby river.  Students evacuated to the 
upper floors but panicked as flood waters rose.  Eventually with assistance from parents and the 
nearby fire and ambulance services, they were hoist one-by-one across the school’s perimeter 
fence to safety (VP).  This school was also a designated emergency shelter.  No one talked about 
keeping the children in place and have parents come to school as a shelter. The access road, 
however, to the school was impassable.  One principal, however, described his effort to keep 
students at school.   
Teachers were already leaving, you know, I had to call them back, Say hey guys we have the 
students there. They are our responsibility. We need to see to it first that these young people get 
to their home safely. So they agreed and really put a plan in place. This is where we had a few 
teachers go down to the river side. There were a few who arranged with the vendor to have the 
students fed… Someone from the village called and said Mr. JB, it is very unsafe to dismiss the 
children to those who were heading north and advised we also keep them so we had a number of 
students who were already wet come back to the school, so we also had to find clothing for them 
in the meantime, you know.  So we really had them organized into groups based on the direction 
they had to go.  It was right after 7 O’clock, I was the last man on deck (JB) 
 
An elite education officer had advised this principal in a telephone conversation as 
Hurricane Ophelia unfolded.  Using his initiatives, he was able to put in place a plan of action to 
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deal with these situations and at the same time keep children safe and comfortable using 
available resources and involving communities. 
Parents, principal and staff spent the two days following Hurricane Ophelia cleaning and 
clearing while students remained home.  They lost, therefore, three instruction days.  Principals 
expressed satisfaction with the contribution parents made but some seemed dissatisfied with the 
Ministry of Education’s response.  These are discussed in the next section. 
8.2.5  Response assessment  
Most principals declined to share an assessment of their satisfaction with the Ministry of 
Educations response to the low-intensity hurricanes they experienced. Six did not offer a 
response. Three were satisfied and two expressed dissatisfaction.   
NGOs repaired the two schools where principals expressed satisfaction.  A third school 
where the principal expressed satisfaction suffered only minor damages totaling $5,000.  A 
review of a periodic progress report on the repairs dated 12 September 2007 showed only one 
school was repaired fully.  This was one week after the commencement of the new school year 
and one month after Hurricane Dean damaged them.  
Notwithstanding, only two principals expressed their dissatisfaction with the Ministry of 
Education’s responses.  They were dissatisfied with their inability to reach the ministry and its 
failure to conduct hurricane impact assessments or to check on them afterwards (JB, VP & VR).  
Both described officials as “insensitive” for requesting their attendance at a professional 
development workshop, the day following.  One of these principals opined: 
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Let me ask was any… did anyone come from the ministry to do an assessment?  Up to today, I do 
not know it...part of that but you can detect. I just find the government persons, the persons whom 
you working with pretty insensitive (laughing). (You can go ahead) even after we had, maybe 
they did not understand the extent of the damage, if not damage per say but the amount of water.  
It’s because we had some good drainage system that’s why the water…It could have gone higher; 
and the amount of silt that was deposited on the courtyard and in the classrooms.   
We were supposed to be having a workshop and I could not believe that my EO (District 
Education Officer) was asking me to come to attend a workshop, the next day in a school with all 
the silt on the ground. My books were, most of my books, well not most but a good bit of them 
got wet, and we had to throw them away.  We could not operate in a system like that I do not 
know how and nobody and somebody wanted us to attend (VP). 
The disappointment this principal felt and the lack of post-hurricane support seemed 
difficult to comprehend.  For another principal, the disappointment seemed personal as well.  She 
described her experience: 
I was really disappointed because we were flooded out, and as if they thought nothing had 
happened; when I reached home I met the river in front of my door, river at the back.  I was in the 
middle of a river and next day while we are trying to sweep out water, you are texting to say that 
the meeting is still being conducted.  Imagine, I got support from principals in my district, like 
they passed to visit but nobody from the Ministry of Education.  I am not saying they should take 
the job of police officers and so, but my husband is a police officer and the police were right there 
(VR).  
She and two others felt that with greater autonomy, they would have been able to make 
emergency decisions without the Ministry’s approval.   As already noted, they were unaware, 
however, of their legal authority to dismiss students and close schools during LIH.  Their failure 
to know and act accordingly brought into sharp focus their level of awareness, training and 
preparedness for handling LIH.  Principal and teacher preparation programs in Dominica did not 
include training for managing LIH.   Principals felt, therefore, that they were left on their own to 
respond, and expressed disappointment about that (JB, VP & VR).  Principals believed the 
Ministry of Education should have followed-up out of concern for teachers and students 
especially those whose homes were flooded during Hurricane Ophelia.   
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Disasters are local and local officials like principals have to be prepared to act when they 
occur.  It means being aware, planning, drills and exercises and practice, practice, practice for 
eventualities and uncertainties.  It means adapting to events as they unfold and that requires 
dynamic systems, institutions and personnel that can make these adjustments to save life and 
property.  This is contingent, however on their ability to recognize risks to which a community is 
exposed and to act upon them (Comfort, 2004, 2007). 
Overall, the Ministry’s response was confined to school building repairs and renovations. 
NGOS were also involved in repairs.  These repairs did not always adhere to building codes and 
standards.  School officials, teachers, parents and key community members assisted with 
evacuation.  Teaching and learning materials and equipment damaged by LIH were never 
replaced.  Overall, principals were mum in their assessment of the Ministry of Education 
response.   Two principals were dissatisfied with the support they received and described 
education official as “insensitive’ to their experiences with Hurricane Ophelia.  They asked for 
greater autonomy because they were unaware of their legal authority to dismiss students and 
close schools in the event of hurricanes or any emergency.  They recommended, therefore, more 
proactive, mitigation strategies to address LIH in the future. 
8.3 THEME 9: MITIGATION 
Overall, principals believed mitigation and preparation would have been better approaches for 
handling effectively the threats of LIH to education.  Mitigation, vulnerability and risk reduction 
were considered better approaches for addressing LIH because of their cost saving potential 
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(ABD, 2008).  They believed more could have been done to prepare for these hurricanes 
considering they occurred so often.  Principals recommended three strategies that could have 
been employed to mitigate and prepare for LIH in Dominica.  These were:  1) Access to 
appropriate information and guidelines; 2) operational communications networks; 3) and the 
formulation and dissemination of policies and plans.  Notwithstanding, these recommendations, 
four principals believed “nothing” could have been done especially by the Ministry of Education 
to mitigate impacts.  This section discusses these strategies and explains principals’ positions 
beginning with access to appropriate information and guidelines.  
8.3.1 Appropriate information and guidelines  
Principals believed access to relevant information and guidelines was critical for dealing with 
LIH (JB: JM: VP).  That information however should have been available long before and in 
preparation of these hurricanes.  The absence of related training and professional development in 
LIH for school administrators in Dominica contributed to their lack of awareness and uncertainty 
(JB).   
There were no official guidelines or standards operation procedures (SOP) for addressing 
low intensity hurricanes although the Ministry of Education was responsible for disseminating 
these to educational institutions (See NDP, 2001).  Most principals expressed dissatisfaction, 
therefore with the absence of feedback and follow-ups.  Without the necessary information, 
guidelines, and feedback, principals were left in limbo.  They did not have the necessary training 
or professional development that would provide the skills to address LIH at the school level.  
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Organizational missteps with respect to communication and information sharing, the exercise of 
authority and decision making were common issues during emergencies (Quarantelli, 1988).   
Even if principals were able to reach the Ministry of Education by phone, besides the 
approval to close schools, not much information or guidance would have been available.  
Besides, there were telephone network congestions and failures that made it difficult to reach the 
Ministry in the first place.   
8.3.2  Operational communication networks  
Principals believed stable and operational communication systems and networks were essential 
for effectively addressing LIH.  Five principals in this study placed phone calls seeking guidance 
and approval for school closures but were unsuccessful (JM; JB; PJ; VP).  Many principals were 
unable to reach the Ministry of Education for during low-intensity hurricanes, for example, as 
Hurricane Ophelia approached.  This happened because communication networks particularly 
telecommunications collapsed or become unreliable.  Experience showed that in the case of 
Hurricane Dean and Hurricane Ophelia, for example, telecommunications links collapsed either 
as a result of damaged lines and equipment or congestions.  They followed-up in writing to the 
Ministry of Education reporting damages to their schools as a result of these low-intensity 
hurricanes (VP; JB; PJ; JM). 
Open and accessible communication lines and networks remain critical for information-
sharing, guidance and decision-making making as emergency events evolve (Comfort, 2004). 
Real time information is also important for parents inquiring about their children and their safety.  
Stable communications networks are essential, therefore, during LIH. Where this may not be 
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possible, ample preparation through hurricane drills and exercises are required, until it becomes 
second nature.  Principals, however, did not recommend drills and exercise as part of the routine 
administrative responsibilities that could mitigate the impacts of LIH.  The Ministry of Education 
was responsible for initiating drills and exercises (NDP, 2001).  Putting related structures in 
place to execute these would have been required. 
8.3.3 Formulation and dissemination of policies and plans 
Principals, as indicated already, lamented the absence of information and guidelines on low-
intensity hurricane (JB, VP & VR).  There were no hurricane-related policies or plans in place to 
drive information and guidance.  There was no appropriate authority in education to which they 
could turn for advice and information.  In recognizing these gaps, one principal believed there 
should be a “rainy day,” a “little policy in place” as a risk reduction strategy (JM).  Accordingly, 
children would be kept at home once rains reached a given threshold or were forecast to do so.   
This of course would have to be done in advance of the start of the school day to give parents 
sufficient time to make alternative arrangements.  Forecast data and information would have to 
be accurate or at least reliable, and communicated to the public to allow for the necessary 
adjustments.   One elite officer observed, however, that when decisions were taken to close 
schools and business outlet as a risk reduction measure, debates over payment and compensation 
for working days lost often surfaced (RE).  Parents tended to clamor when sufficient notice to 
close schools was not given (RE).   Three principals, however, believed “nothing” could have 
been done to reduce the impacts of low-intensity hurricanes. 
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8.3.4 Do nothing 
Three principals believe that there was “nothing” the Ministry of Education could have done to 
reduce the impacts of low-intensity hurricanes because they were “Acts of God.”   Elite officers 
interviewed also believed low-intensity hurricanes were “Acts of God.”  The implications were 
discussed earlier.  This perception persists because of the limited knowledge or cognition on 
hurricanes and their impacts.  In assessing responses during Hurricane Katrina in the US in 2005, 
the issue of cognition surfaced:  
Cognition is central to performance in emergency management. Cognition is defined as 
the capacity to recognize the degree of emerging risk to which a community is exposed 
and to act on that information. It is the triggering insight of emerging risk that initiates 
the emergency response process. Without cognition, the other components of emergency 
management remain static or disconnected. (Comfort, 2007, p.189) 
 Recognition of risk is the foundation of action and response.  Both action and response 
hinges on the acceptance of responsibility. They involve putting the necessary protections in 
place to minimize the effect of low-intensity hurricanes.  This includes accepting the distinction 
between these hurricanes events and disasters that often follow when protections collapsed 
(Quarantelli, 1981).  The failure, therefore, to: 1) plan  and budget adequately; 2) establish the 
necessary contingency funds; 3) establish evacuation routes 4) strengthen institutional capacities; 
and 5) respond appropriately appeared to be consistent with the “do nothing” perception of 
hurricanes as “Acts of God.”    These failures are the disasters.  Low-intensity hurricanes are the 
triggers.  
This “do-nothing” expectation exonerated the Ministry from responsibility and glossed 
over its poor response performance because principals failed to hold it accountable for these 
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failures.  By exonerating the Ministry of Education, principals in turn exonerated themselves 
from failures that occurred at their schools.  This included dismissing students unto hurricane 
affected areas, rather than keeping them at schools, designated as hurricane shelters, where they 
would have been safer.  Their difficulty in reaching the Ministry for advice during Hurricane 
Ophelia is inexcusable since they were authorized under the Education Act, 1997 to take the 
necessary actions during hurricanes to protect children and submit reports ex-post.  Repairs did 
not improve mitigation because inspections showed vulnerabilities and risks persisted in school 
buildings that were repaired after hurricanes.     
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9.0  RESEARCHERS OBSERVATIONS  
Several studies have inspected building structures to assess their behavior under stress that 
included hurricanes.  Building structures failed at relatively low wind speeds or during low- 
intensity hurricanes particularly where there were poor attachments at critical connections 
(FEMA, 1992; Marshall, 2009).   These are connections where hurricane ties were not installed. 
Further, damages were attributed to the failures of attachments and/or materials, inadequate 
designs, inadequate workmanship and missile (debris) impacts (FEMA, 1992).  Few studies 
particularly in developing countries have inspected post-hurricane repairs to determine the extent 
to which buildings were affixed with features that resulted in mitigation.  Where they have been 
studied, as in the Eastern Caribbean, lessons from damages and failures of residential buildings 
after Hurricane Ivan were not incorporated into repairs and rehabilitation.   These buildings 
remained vulnerable to future hurricanes despite repairs (Huggins, 2007).   Similar failures were 
observed with respect to school buildings affected by low-intensity hurricanes in Dominica.  This 
is significant because incorporating codes and standards into building constructions constituted 
protection and reduces the likelihood of disaster because:  
 Not every windstorm, earth-tremor, or rush of water is a catastrophe.  A catastrophe is known by its 
works; that is to say, by the occurrence of disaster.  So long as the ship rides out the storm, so long as 
the city resists the earth-shocks, so long as the levees hold, there is no disaster.  It is the collapse of 
the cultural protections that constitutes the disaster proper” (Carr, 1932, cited in Dombrowsky, 1981) 
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It is the failure to install protections like adherence to building standards and codes that 
constituted the vulnerabilities and risks.  School buildings I inspected after Hurricanes Dean and 
Ophelia showed despite repairs they remained vulnerable to and at risk for damage and 
destruction by future LIH.  
9.1 THEME 10: VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS PERSISTED EX-POST 
School buildings I inspected were vulnerable to hurricanes even after they had been repaired.   
These buildings: 1) did not all adhere to building codes and standards designed to reduce their 
vulnerabilities to LIH; 2) They were located in areas at risk for flooding and landslides; and 3) 
school records located in these buildings were also vulnerable.   These are discussed in the sub 
sections which follow.  
9.1.1 Violation of building codes and standards 
Roofs and roof members were especially vulnerable to low-intensity hurricanes.  Six of the ten 
schools I inspected had no purlin-to-roof ties.  These ties or metal plates are designed to securely 
connect roof members to each other and so protect them from wind uplift or damage.  These 
codes may not have been present in the first place because of the age of some buildings: one 
school was constructed in 1969; five were constructed between 1970 and 1976; two between 
1980 and 1983 and one in 2006.   The older schools were mostly wooden and did not have these 
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hurricane ties.  The Planning Act which governs building codes and standards was enacted in 
2002.   Regulations to accompany this Act and to ensure its enforcement were still pending.  
Photographs taken of these buildings also showed purlins-to-rafters ties were absent, 
corrugations sheets were rotting and their edges were not fastened to prevent uplift during 
hurricanes.  In three schools where steel trusses were used, rafters showed rotting and 
vulnerability to uplift.  Additionally, in some cases, wooden classroom structures were not 
secured to their foundations.  Based on my firsthand knowledge, these breaches in construction 
and repairs were due to inadequate supervision during the construction and repairs of most 
buildings because of inadequate manpower and the failure of the Ministry of appoint building 
supervisors beyond the one that existed at the time.  The financial inadequacy and budgetary 
pressures made it difficult to hire more supervisors.  In one case, however, due diligence should 
have been followed in ensuring doors and windows were secured before schools closed for the 
summer vacation.  Subsequently, it sustained damages by Hurricane Dean estimated at over 
$5,000.  
In 1998, a USAID project retrofitted several schools to improve their protective features 
as hurricane shelters and to strengthen them against hurricanes (See GOCD, 1998), since then, 
no further initiatives have been undertaken to improve protective school structures.  A recent 
review of the status and practices of school maintenance in Dominica showed school buildings 
were at risk for and vulnerable to hurricane force winds and earthquakes (CEP, 2011).  Shoddy 
designs and constructions, general disrepair of school buildings due to inadequate funding; 
limited building supervision and the absence of protective features were identified as 
contributors to these risks and vulnerabilities (CEP, 2011).  Wave Hazard (sea-surge) 
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Assessment for Selected Sites on the West Coast of Dominica showed, local construction 
practices reflect the uneven distribution of risk.  They are good enough for ordinary weather, but they 
are not designed to withstand hurricanes (OAS, 1998).   
9.1.2  Vulnerable location of schools and facilities 
School buildings and facilities I inspected were vulnerable and at risk for floods and landslides 
triggered by low-intensity hurricanes.  Dominica’s small size at 289 sq. miles and its rugged 
terrain limits the availability of appropriate flat land for locating schools.  School, therefore, have 
multiple floors.  All, except one, have two floors – ground and upper floors. Many were located 
along the narrow coastal or river flood plains which left them at risk for flooding and made 
evacuation nearly impossible.  Seven of the schools inspected were within close proximity to the 
ocean.  All were within 300 feet, and five were 100 feet or less from the ocean high water mark.  
The safe location of schools remained a significant challenge in Dominica.   Its topography and 
location makes it one of the Caribbean countries most vulnerable to disasters (Collymore, 2004).  
Five of the schools I inspected were located within five feet of a cliff which left them vulnerable 
to landslides.  One principal believed the use of retaining walls would alleviate vulnerabilities to 
landslides.  These, however, would not protect school facilities from floods.  
Computer rooms and libraries and other school facilities were also susceptible to 
flooding.  Libraries in all ten schools I inspected were located on the ground or elevated ground 
floors.  Nine computer rooms, for example, were also located on the ground or elevated ground 
floors.    While their locations made them accessible to all students, it also made them vulnerable 
to flooding.    These floods, according to the principal, commonly occurred even during just 
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heavy rains.  They threatened the safety of school records since most were located on ground 
floors of schools of I inspected. 
9.1.3 Vulnerable storage of school records 
School records I observed were stored in ways that left them vulnerable to flooding and other 
water egressions.  Eight of the ten schools I observed had their records stored on the ground or 
elevated ground floors.  They were stored in paper file jackets stacked in open shelves or file 
cabinets that left susceptible to water damage during low-intensity hurricanes. Special policies 
should be developed and enforced for the secure storage of school records.  Remote storage 
centers either internationally or regionally may need to be considered.  Computer storage of 
school records is not prevalent even though all schools I inspected had computer labs.  In 
addition to the threat of losing valuable school records, the loss of instruction days was a 
perennial problem.  
9.1.4  Loss instruction days 
The use of schools as emergency shelters in Dominica remains a fundamental yet unresolved 
issue because they have to be closed in preparation for hurricanes, disrupted schooling.  
According to Section 4 (1) b of the Education Regulations, SRO 7 (2011), the school year shall 
be no less than 180 days.   The Regulations stated further,  
Where a school in any school year does not meet the required 180 school days within the regular 
time scheduled in the school time table for the conduct of instructional sessions referred in these 
Regulations, the principal shall make arrangements for the school to satisfy that requirement 
unless exempted in writing by the Chief Education Officer. 
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The principal shall ensure that instructional classes for the school in any school year commence 
not later than the date of the second Monday in the month of September in a calendar year; and 
unless otherwise specified by the Minister, shall end not later than the date of the first Monday in 
July in the following calendar year (Education Regulation, SRO 7, 2011: Sections 4 (2) (3)). 
There has been no enforcement of this policy in schools included in this study.  There 
was a 14 year gap between the assent of the Education Act (1997) and the assent of the 
Regulations.  Nothing was in place to track or determine whether this section of the Law was 
complied with.  Principals submitted monthly reports on attendance and the number of in-session 
school days.  This was difficult to verify and data was never disaggregated to reveal instruction 
days.  This raises questions about the extent to which all was being done to ensure children’s 
right to education as enshrined in the International Convention on the rights of the Child.  
Dominica is a signatory of this convention.  Senior Public Officers including Education Officer 
interviewed were well aware of the prevalence of these disruptions.   
In summary, the vulnerable location of schools and their facilities, shoddy repairs that do 
not always adhere to building codes and standards, inadequate building and maintenance 
supervisions may continue to place school buildings at risk for damage by low intensity 
hurricanes.   In addition, schools were closed when these hurricanes approach.  In turn, these 
disrupted instruction for many children.  The lost instructional days were never rescheduled 
despite the legal requirement to do so.   These losses may be undermining children’s rights to an 
education and their academic performances during low-intensity hurricanes but the MOE has no 
way of knowing for sure.  The Ministry of Education is fully responsible for education during 
LIH in Dominica and needs to do more to address it, given their frequent, recurrent and chronic 
impacts and disruptions for children and their education.  Chapter 10 provides recommendations 
for its consideration. 
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10.0  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Two assertions drove responses to education and LIH in Dominica – the belief that they are 
“Acts of God”, and that local funds for addressing them had been insufficient.  It was 
characterized as a “God” problem and there was nothing or little that could be done humanly to 
address them.  The result was to look to externalities for assistance. Where external agencies 
demand greater responsibility, policies have been proposed that were shrouded in fuzzy or non-
binding language, and the plans and budget to guide actions have not been implemented.  
Principals have also bought into the “Act of God” perception and “insufficient funding” 
assertions.   
This study also found that that existing theories on disasters were inadequate to address 
education during LIH.  Existing theories were reactionary and response-recovery focused.  
Education and LIH requires an anticipatory approach because of chronic, recurrent and impact 
cumulative nature of LIH.  The adaptive development approach proposes the inclusion of LIH in 
education policies, planning, budgeting and operations.  Such an approach treats LIH as chronic 
and therefore requires a ‘lifestyle’ approach that creates a culture of safety for children and their 
education. In a sense it is transformative but not on hindsight. It is premised on understanding the 
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geo-physical and economic contexts within which Dominica exist and incorporating them into 
plans and budgets.  As already stated, this approach makes economic sense for Dominica 
because for every one dollar spent on risk reduction resulted in seven dollars savings on response 
and recovery (ADB, 2008).  Education in LIH remains a complex proposition that may require 
trade-offs given the limited resources.  Appendix G summaries this complexity and offers a 
model for understanding and addressing education during LIH in Dominica. 
     The Government of Dominica seemed to understand fully the impacts and 
implications of LIH on Dominica’s economy, infrastructure and education system.  They 
understood as well the associated issues and challenges.  There seemed to be the desire to be 
more proactive focusing on vulnerability and risk reduction.  Consequently, government has 
attempted to put policies in place, though piecemeal and strengthen institutional capacities to 
address these hurricanes.  These policies and recommendations for institutional improvements, 
however, have been articulated in non-binding language which seemed incongruent with 
practices and actions on the ground.  Recommendations for institutional improved were only 
partially implemented. 
While policies, though limited, reflect a desire to focus on preparedness and mitigation, 
actions on the ground have focused on response and recovery but mostly for repairs to 
infrastructure, like roads bridges and school buildings.  Public Safety, transport and 
communications have been identified as priority.  This does not appear to include children, who 
usually vacate school buildings even when evacuate routes to do so expeditiously did not exist.   
Despite the frequent, recurrent and chronic nature of LIH, the change policy process has been 
slow and often non-binding.  This could have been so for several reasons which hinge on the 
failure to accept for full responsibility for addressing LIH: 
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1. Hurricanes are still perceived as “Acts of God,” and therefore beyond the 
capacities and responsibility of government to address them adequately. 
2. Financial resources dedicated to low-intensity hurricanes have been described 
as inadequate.  As a result, Dominica had depended on dwindling external 
sources including loans.  These loans increased indebtedness. 
3.  Failure to put in place the necessary financial and institutional polices and 
frameworks within the Ministry of Education to adequately manage education 
during LIH. 
4. The failure to plan adequately and incorporate low- intensity hurricanes and 
children’s safety into development and education policies, plans and programs. 
5. Failure to prioritize programs and activities in line with available resources in 
the contexts of LIH particularly within the Ministry of Education.  
   Consequently, without the necessary training, guidance and relevant support, principals 
have had to address those aspects of LIH that have had the greatest impact on children – 
fatalities, evacuation, psychosocial support and loss of teaching and learning materials and 
instructions.  Principals seemed unprepared for the challenges particularly during Hurricane 
Ophelia which occurred while classes were in session.  This approach left children and teachers 
vulnerable and at risk as Ophelia unfolded.  Many were unable to get home and schools were ill-
equipped and unprepared to house them despite being designated emergency shelters.  This was 
exacerbated by limited response and recovery.  Lost equipment and materials were not replaced.  
Lost instructional time was not rescheduled.  Psychosocial support was virtually unavailable 
except where principals used their initiatives.  Repairs and rehabilitation neglected standards and 
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codes designed to strengthen school buildings against hurricanes.  Relevant emergency 
information and guidelines for principals were not available and communication protocols were 
weak and ineffective, and collapsed during LIH.  
To begin to change this approach, government institutions including the MOE and 
principals needed to change their perceptions of LIH as “Acts of God.”  Their impacts should be 
seen as the result of failure to put in place social and cultural protections: cognitive awareness, 
appropriate attitudes, codes and standards, SOPS, drills and exercises, and make timely 
administrative and political decisions to mitigate their impacts.  It must accept greater 
responsibility for their management and hold itself accountable for addressing them.  This new 
perception would drive actions to address LIH.  This would mean putting in place policies, 
programs and facilities that strengthen institutional capacities and that better prepare the Ministry 
of Education and school principals for addressing these low-intensity hurricanes.  Simply, it 
means incorporating child safety and low-intensity hurricanes (LIH) into education policies, 
planning and budgeting and making the institutional changes that make them an integral aspect 
of the operations of the Ministry of Education.   This would constitute an adapted developmental 
approach that incorporates LIH vulnerabilities and risk into education development and planning 
to improve child safety and security.  Section 10.2 offers several other recommendations that 
would begin the shift to this new approach.  Those recommendations are those that can be 
implemented immediately on a low or limited budget and existing manpower. 
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10.2  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Further research needs to be conducted in Dominica, the Caribbean, other regions of chronic 
low-intensity hurricanes to deepen understanding of chronic low-intensity hurricanes, and their 
impacts on children and learning.  
Government needs to re-think and re-design its disaster policies to reflect local contexts 
and experiences and give due consideration to LIH, and education during LIH. 
The Ministry of Finance can establish proposed financial facilities starting small given 
the limited resources and strengthen institutions and organizations to enforce their inclusion 
within the MOE annual budget as a roll-over contingency fund.  
Given the limited resources, the Ministry of Education can implement its key 
responsibilities under the National Disaster Plan, 2001 that does not require large financial 
outlay:  enforce drills and exercises; distribute SOPs to educational institutions; and disseminate 
information on preparedness.  
The Ministry of Education can put in place and disseminate a “rainy day policy” and 
guidelines as principals recommended to allow for school closures when rain exceeds a given 
threshold or hurricanes are forecast. 
The Ministry of Education can enforce existing laws and regulations associated with low-
intensity hurricanes including rescheduling instruction days lost; principals’ responsibilities to 
close schools and ensure children’s safety.   
Treat schools as hurricane shelters for students and children as well and have them 
equipped to do so when the need arises, as in the case of Hurricane Ophelia in 2011.  
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The Ministry of Education can be made a NEEC Sector Task Force and a lead agency 
during low-intensity hurricanes given the vulnerability of children and to ensure it focuses on 
education during hurricanes. 
 An officer with direct responsibility for education in emergencies can be stationed within 
the Education Planning and Development Unit, to ensure the Ministry fulfills its roles and 
responsibilities for low-intensity hurricanes under the Education Act or NDP, 2001.  
Model disaster plans, procedures and protocols consistent with current thinking and 
approaches in education and LIH can be developed as guides for formulating school disaster 
plans and empowering principals. 
Professional development and in-service training of teachers in education and LIH need 
to commence with urgency.   In the medium to long term, such training should become part of 
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SUMMARY OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYTIC STRATEGIES FOR EDUCATION AND LIH 
Research Propositions Data 
collection 
method 
Documents or Respondents Data types Information Analysis Cross-references/ 
corroboration/ 
tensions 
1. Because low-intensity 
hurricanes are 
recurrent, Dominica 
has in place explicit 
policies that 
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STATUS OF REPAIRS ON SCHOOL DAMAGED BY HURRICANE DEAN 1997, 
DOMINICA 
 
ESTIMATES FOR DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF SCHOOLS   
School  & Designated Contractor Damage Estimate ($) Status: 12 Sept. 2007 
Salisbury Primary School Office (lower building) - 1 sheet 
galvanize removed, guttering 
broken 
$88,622.23 Contractor has difficulty 
obtaining tax clearance 
RJ Upper building - entire roof and 
ceiling removed 
    
Mahaut Primary School 
 
PJ 
One landslide at the back of the 
southern end and rocks inside one 
classroom. Galvanize shed at the 
front part partly broken off, 
guttering also broken 
$20,000.00 Ongoing 
       
Goodwill Secondary School Roof of computer lab affected. 
One classroom affected, 3  
computers waterlogged and 
damaged 
$25,000.00 Completed except 
computers 
SJ (Digicel)       
Wesley Primary School All the guttering around the 
school removed and damaged 
$6,801.88 Need to sign contract 
MD       
Pierre Charles Secondary School Ceiling of the auditorium 
damaged 
$60,000.00 Completed 
MH       
North East Comprehensive School Counseling room ceiling cave in $51,250.00 Contractor signed 
contract last week 
  Library door broken     
  Clothing and textile room/door     
Calvin Thomas Windows in staff room are broken     
Marigot Junior School Small section of roof affected $45,324.15 Contract not signed 
EG       
Vieille Case Primary School Roof and lunch shed removed $17,257.40 will be completed next 
week 
PC (Digicel)       
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Wills Strathmore Stevens School One window broken off and 
window damaged 
$3,000.00 not signed 
DG 
 
      
APPENDIX F (Continued) 
 
   
Soufriere Primary School Roof affected about three 
galvanize sheet removed. Debris 
in yard and tree fell in the block 
section, two classrooms may be 
affected 
$5,000.00 To be repaired by Basic 
Needs Trust Fund  
BNTF       
Isaiah Thomas Secondary School Eastern core house galvanize 
lifted 
$5,153.65 Completed 
  Vehicular access road to the 
school almost impassable 
    
  Few fallen trees     
  Seriously damaged fowl house 
used for agriculture classes 
    
EC About three (3) damaged doors     
Woodford Hill Primary School Broken windows at the school 
library and in two classrooms 
$10,500.00 Contractor signed 
contract last week 
CT A number of ceiling piles got 
water logged and are currently 
suspended, taking some of the 
lighting fixtures with them 
    
Sub Total   $337,909.31   
add 40% Labor Cost   $135,163.72   
Add 15%Contigency   $50,686.40   
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